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Many countries in Africa are embroiled in heated debates over who belongs 
where. Sometimes insider/outsider debates lead to localized skirmishes, but other times 
they turn into minor conflict or even war. How do we explain this variation in violence 
intensity? Deviating from traditional explanations regarding democratization, political or 
economic inequality, or natural resources, I examine how nationality laws shape patterns 
in violence.  
Citizenship rules determine who is or is not a member of the national political 
community. Nationality laws formalize these rules, thus representing the legal bond 
between individuals and the state. Restrictive nationality laws increase marginalization, 
which fuels competition between citizenship regime winners and losers. This competition 
stokes contentious insider/outsider narratives that guide ethnic mobilization along the 
dual logics of threat and opportunity. Threats reduce resource levels and obstruct the 
exercise of rights. Opportunities provide the chance to reclaim lost resources or clarify 
nationality status.  
Other work explains conditions necessary for insider/outsider violence to break 
out or escalate from the local to the national level. I show that this violence intensifies as 
laws become more exclusive and escalates to war once an outsider group with contested 
foreign origins faces denationalization. Groups have contested foreign origins where the 
“outsider” label conflates internal and foreign migrants. Where outsiders are primarily in-
migrants, it is harder to deny the group’s right to citizenship, so nationality laws do not 
come under threat and insider/outsider violence remains constrained to minor conflict. 
Using an original dataset of Africa’s nationality laws since 1989, I find that event 
frequency and fatality rates increase as laws become more restrictive. Through case 
studies, I explain when citizenship struggles should remain localized, or escalate to minor 
or major conflict. Next, I apply a nationality law lens to individual level conflict 
processes. With Afrobarometer survey data, I show that difficulty obtaining identity 
papers is positively correlated with the fear and use political violence. I also find that 
susceptibility to contentious narratives is positively associated with using violence to 
achieve political goals. Finally, I describe the lingering effects of a violent politics of 
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Chapter 1. Citizenship Rules and the Structure of Belonging 
 
Debates over who belongs where are a persistent feature of African politics. Mass 
expulsions of foreign workers in Ghana (1969), Uganda (1972), Nigeria (1983), and Gabon 
(1995) predate South Africa’s xenophobic riots (2004, 2008). The cycles of inter-ethnic 
violence since Nigeria’s independence, or in Kenya’s Rift Valley (1991-1997, 2007-2008), 
are hauntingly reminiscent of ethnic cleansing in Cameroon (1966) and Rwanda (1994). 
Some episodes even surpassed the threshold for civil war, as happened in Senegal (1989), 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1996), Côte d’Ivoire (2002), and Sudan (2003). 
The minor conflict in northern Ghana (1981, 1994-1995) shows that even stable countries 
can experience a violent politics of belonging. Why are clashes between self-proclaimed 
“insiders” and alleged “outsiders” worse in some places than others? Under what 
conditions does insider/outsider violence escalate to civil war? 
Insider/outsider disputes revolve around the question of who can claim rights and 
resources in the state. 1  I describe it as violence of belonging (VOB). VOB surfaced 
immediately after independence, but leaders managed to suppress widespread unrest for 
                                                             
 
1 There is a vast terminology to describe “insiders” and “outsiders”. I use “insider” to refer to 
individuals who believe they are indigenous to a territory. In the literature, “insiders” are alternately 
called “natives”, “hosts”, “indigènes”, “autochtons”, “sons of the soil”, “first-arrivers”, etc. I use 
“outsider” to refer to individuals who are believed by insiders to have migrated to an area from 
elsewhere. In the literature, “outsiders” are alternate called “settlers”, “strangers”, “migrants”, 
“foreigners”, “allogènes”, “guests”, etc. I assume outsiders are internal-migrants or immigrants 
from another country. Some research defines outsiders strictly as internal migrants (cf. Fearon and 
Laitin 2011; Côté and Mitchell 2015). 
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many years. Democratization in the early 1990s raised the stakes of national citizenship 
and forced governments to define who officially belonged to the national political 
community—and who did not. Debates over membership criteria erupted into violence 
(Young 2007; Geschiere 2009; Mamdani 1996; Adejumobi 2001). Today, a “new 
nationalism” (Ake 1996; Kersting 2009) that equates citizenship with indigeneity is gaining 
ground around the world. Surging populism in Europe and the United States has striking 
parallels with “sons of the soil” movements in Africa and Asia. Citizenship struggles may 
very well define the next era of politics.  
Political or economic inequality, natural resources, weak institutions, or low state 
capacity are well-studied factors in conflict. Contested citizenship rules, on the other hand, 
receive far less attention. The existing literature has explained why citizenship is such a 
contentious issue in African politics, and why it often leads to violence. However, it has 
not fully addressed the question of why some citizenship debates are more violent than 
others. Importantly, it does not account for the conditions under which these debates turn 
into civil war. I argue that the answer lies with nationality laws, which formalize citizenship 
criteria in a state. I find that these laws impact patterns in violence in two distinct ways. 
First, the codification of exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality laws increases the 
severity of VOB in general. Secondly, exclusionary nationality laws explain the conditions 
under which VOB escalates to civil war.  
The effect of exclusionary nationality laws on political violence is understudied in 
the existing literature. Further, broadly cross-national work on the topic is lacking, even 
among studies about insider/outsider violence specifically. Most research examines 
complex processes at work in one or a handful of cases, leaving generalizable factors and 
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outcomes underexplored. Moreover, the emphasis tends to fall on election violence, which 
leads to a selection bias towards high-intensity events driven by a narrow set of processes. 
In contrast, I take an explicitly cross-national perspective and examine provisions in 
nationality laws across the African continent. I show that variation in these laws accounts 
for different intensity levels across insider/outsider conflicts. Additionally, I broaden the 
scope to examine a wider range of events, occurring from the local to the national level as 
well as within and outside of election periods. This approach reveals trends that were not 
observable before. For example, I find that event frequency and fatality rates generally rise 
as laws become more exclusionary. I also find that national level VOB turns into war when 
nationality laws are revised to strip an outsider group of their citizenship status. 
The nationality law lens deviates from existing answers for why insider/outsider 
violence escalates in a country. Following this line of argument, I put forward a new theory 
about the intersection of citizenship politics and violence. I conceptualize citizenship 
struggles as a form of redistributive conflict. The stakes are high because, as Andreas 
Wimmer (1997) observed, formal citizenship implies "ownership" of the state. Without 
formal citizenship rights individuals are prevented from participating fully in the political, 
economic, and social area. I theorize that competition between “winners” and “losers” of 
the status quo citizenship rules produces contentious narratives about where outsiders 
belong. When the necessary conditions are met, insider/outsider violence reaches the 
national level. I argue that when the outsider group has contested foreign origins, the 
national citizenship rules may be thrown into question. If nationality laws are then revised 
to denationalize outsiders, then the group has a strong incentive to rebel and the risk of war 
peaks. Conversely, where outsider groups do not have contested foreign origins, nationality 
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laws do not come into question. Therefore, VOB remains constrained at the minor conflict 
level. 
Politics of Belonging in the Literature 
I situate this project in the literatures on citizenship politics and political violence. 
This approach is the road less travelled. Exclusion from power and competition over scarce 
resources lead to violent confrontations between groups. However, citizenship, an 
underlying instrument of exclusion and competition, is an understudied a causal factor in 
ethnic conflict. The impact of exclusive nationality laws specifically is largely ignored in 
ethnic conflict research. Standard explanations of ethnic conflict point to systematic 
economic and political inequality between groups (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and 
Min 2010; Stewart 2002; 2008; Østby 2013), to the actors’ economic motivations (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004), or to the feasibility of launching a rebellion at all (Fearon and Laitin 
2003). Other scholars focus on economic (Olzak 1992, 2011; Weiner 1978) or political 
(Wilkinson 2004; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Mansfield and Snyder 2005) competition 
between groups. Still others describe the ways in which weak or discriminatory institutions 
incentivize collective action (Onoma 2010; Lieberman and Singh 2012; Boone 2014).  
It is widely acknowledged that contestation over exclusive citizenship rules 
exacerbates communal tensions, thereby leading to violence. The body of work on 
contentious citizenship politics in Africa draws upon major strands in the literature 
regarding inequality, competition, and institutions. Additionally, it points to the historical 
evolution of citizenship on the Continent, as well as the contemporary political setting. For 
instance, land, ethnicity, and citizenship were intertwined and politicized during the 
colonial era (Mamdani 1996, 2001), and scholars have long noted the mobilization power 
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of ethnicity and its proclivity for violence (Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985). Recent efforts to 
nuance ethnicity-based accounts describe various land and election mechanisms at work 
(Boone 2014; Gescheire 2009; Côté and Mitchell 2015, 2016; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).  
Existing research explores the ways in which individuals and groups are denied 
their legitimate citizenship rights, and the implications of widespread marginalization. 
Unlike these studies, I focus on how exclusionary provisions in nationality law affect 
patterns in violence. Treating nationality law as an explanatory factor is a new direction 
for the conflict literature. Yet nationality laws are a useful lens for studying the politics of 
belonging because they are the link between membership and authority in a polity. 
Furthermore, I apply the nationality law lens in an explicitly cross-national way. I am 
therefore able to correct for a pervasive selection bias in the literature. Current research 
relies on qualitative analysis of a single or a handful of cases, typically of electoral 
violence. Consequently, a great deal is known about the confluence of within-country 
processes, but cross-national effects are underexplored. In fact, general patterns in VOB 
outside of election periods are not well understood. It thus remains unclear why citizenship 
struggles are worse in some places than others, and what specific role nationality laws play 
in this difference.  
Studies of Africa’s nationality laws are hard to find. Notable exceptions include 
work by Bronwen Manby (2009, 2010), who catalogues discriminatory policies and 
practices throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, and Geoffrey Herbst (1999), who classifies 
countries according to jus soli or jus sanguinis citizenship principles. The existing 
scholarship is valuable because it identifies processes by which contested citizenship turns 
violent. However, data limitations have hampered the development of systematic, 
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generalizable measures relevant to citizenship politics. For that reason, I created the first 
metric for comparing countries over time: the African Citizenship Policy Index (ACPI).2 
The ACPI is a country-year measure of formal exclusion from citizenship rights that covers 
42 countries from 1989 to 2014.  
The ACPI facilitates the comparative study of citizenship laws in Africa, and I use 
it to test new hypotheses about VOB. To my knowledge, these tests constitute the first 
broadly cross-national investigation into how exclusionary nationality laws impact patterns 
in political violence. 3  I find that as laws become more exclusionary, insider/outsider 
violence in general worsens. The number of violent events increases, as does their fatality 
rates. My generalist approach complements existing case study research. Not only does it 
reveal patterns not previously observable in small-N qualitative studies, but it also sheds 
new light on existing propositions. For example, the current literature is unclear on how to 
weight the relative influence of VOB determinants, such as ethnic discrimination, 
competing land claims, electoral competition, and restrictive nationality laws. The ACPI 
offers a way to determine the respective influence of a host of causal factors through 
statistical modeling. Further, it allows analysts to compare the relative size of effects, which 
was not previously possible with the available qualitative analysis. I find that exclusionary 
                                                             
 
2 See also Frugé (n.d.) and Frugé (n.d.) 
3  The closest study is Manby (2009), a thoughtful and detailed examination of how policies 
surrounding citizenship rights (including nationality laws) lead to pervasive discrimination, 
economic crisis, and political strife. Manby looks at cases where nationality laws were an issue in 
conflict, but does not build a generalizable theory about political violence. Further, she draws on 
qualitative evidence from many cases in Sub-Saharan Africa, but does not conduct a largescale, 
variable-driven analysis of law and violence severity. 
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laws matter above and beyond standard predictors of conflict from the literature. The ACPI 
has a larger effect on VOB severity than ethnic discrimination, population characteristics, 
development level, and land scarcity.  This is a valuable contribution to the field. 
The Intersection of Nationality Law and Violence 
Given that citizenship politics is a high-stake game, where winners “own” the state 
(Wimmer 1997), we have reason to believe that these contests would be violence-prone. 
Citizenship rules determine who is a full member of the national political community and 
who is not. Nationality laws are the formal expression of these rules and thus represent the 
legal bond between an individual and the state. Furthermore, citizenship distinguishes 
between insiders and outsiders because it is an instrument of inclusion and exclusion 
(Herbst 2000; Brubaker 1992).  
Restrictive laws limit the number of groups that can claim membership in the polity. 
As laws become more exclusive, they marginalize a larger swathe of the population. 
Citizenship laws can impose restrictions based on ascriptive criteria, such as race, religion, 
ethnicity, gender. They may also support discriminatory policies, weak institutions, 
corruption, or leadership preferences. For example, Uganda only grants citizenship by birth 
to members of indigenous ethnic group. The DRC and Côte d’Ivoire have, at different 
times, embraced similar policies. Additionally, identity cards in South Sudan are only 
issued in the capital Juba, which is a difficult journey for many individuals. Finally, 
Kenya’s government stopped issuing identity cards in counties bordering Somalia in 
November 2014. The move was a response to attacks by al-Shabab, but it meant that those 
without identity cards could not travel. 
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I conceptualize citizenship politics as a redistributive conflict producing winners 
and losers. Winners receive a larger share of state resources than losers. Winner/loser status 
follows ethnic lines but is not fixed. In other words, winners and losers can be insiders or 
outsiders, depending on state policies and regime preferences. For example, the indigenous 
groups in Kenya’s Rift Valley Province (i.e. the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu—the 
KAMATUSA) were citizenship regime losers under first-President Jomo Kenyatta, 
winners under Daniel arap Moi, and losers under Moi Kibaki. Groups that migrated to the 
Rift Valley from other parts of Kenya (such as the Kikuyu), on the other hand, were 
citizenship regime winners under Kenyatta, losers under Moi, and winners under Kibaki. 
I theorize that competition between citizenship regime winners and losers drives an 
“ethnicity security dilemma” that leads to insider/outsider violence. Previous work does 
not frame insider/outsider disputes in the context of winning/losing under the status quo 
citizenship regime, or as an ethnic security dilemma. Winner/loser competition also 
produces contentious citizenship narratives questioning where outsiders belong. These 
narratives justify winner/loser claims to state resources through ethnic appeals, often 
equating national identity with ethnic identity. They also present the status quo citizenship 
rules as a threat to group resources, and propose an overhaul to prevent further loss. Others 
tend to use narratives to explain mobilization processes (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Klaus and 
Mitchell 2015) or deteriorating security conditions (Autesserre 2012). I go one step further 
to argue that narratives are also a conflict escalation process that turns minor conflicts into 
wars. Understanding the magnitude of violence taking place is an important new direction 
for the VOB field—and one that matters more broadly considering that greater magnitude 
implies higher costs and because variation in violence magnitude leads to distinct 
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conceptual categories in conflict studies (e.g. social conflict vs. minor conflict vs. major 
conflict). 
I do not address violence onset. Rather, I argue that exclusionary nationality laws 
increase the severity of insider/outsider violence that has already broken out. Further, I look 
to variation in national level conflict. Earlier studies examine electoral violence as the 
ultimate level of violence. I propose that a nationality law lens helps disentangle VOB 
episodes more completely, explaining the divergence between minor and major conflict. I 
argue that after citizenship struggles reach the national level, an outsider group is likely to 
rebel if threatened with denationalization. Further, I suggest that the government is more 
likely to denationalize a group with contested foreign origins. When the group composition 
of outsiders includes internal and external migrants, popular imagination conflates them 
with foreigners. It is thus easier for insider entrepreneurs to deny their right to citizenship. 
Where politicians cannot make this case because the outsider group is composed of in-
migrants, VOB remains constrained at minor conflict. This is a new argument that deviates 
from traditional explanations of civil conflict. Previous work does not examine how the 
interaction between nationality laws and group composition shapes civil conflict.  
Three prominent alternative explanations for VOB escalation point to ethnic 
competition, electoral competition, and competing land claims. Ethnic competition theses 
cannot explain variation in violence severity because ethnic competition exists everywhere. 
A more appropriate question is under what circumstances does ethnic competition lead to 
violence? How does ethnic competition exacerbate conflict processes set in motion? The 
nationality law lens helps distinguish between ethnic conflicts and shows why their conflict 
arcs diverge. Secondly, electoral competition theses can explain some VOB outcomes, but 
10 
 
not all. They do not capture the full variation in VOB severity and therefore fall short of 
explaining the most local or the most incendiary conflicts. Characteristics of nationality 
law, on the other hand, help explain why VOB is worse in some places than others both 
during and outside of elections. They also reveal a new causal pathway leading to civil 
war: denationalization. Finally, land mechanisms are powerful explanatory factors in VOB 
because they unify ethnic and electoral mechanisms. However, competing land claims are 
present in national level conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and 
Rwanda, as well as in localized episodes in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, 
Senegal, and Zimbabwe. 4  Therefore, competing land claims cannot fully explain the 
variation in VOB intensity. 
A unified theory of citizenship struggle would blend these three lines of argument, 
Nationality laws would be an important component because they structure competition 
over ethnicity, elections, and land by formally “fixing” group status relative to one another. 
However, before the field can develop a grand theory of citizenship struggle, it is 
imperative to understand the foundations of citizenship. Therefore, we must construct a 
comprehensive theory of how nationality laws affect contentious politics. This dissertation 
contributes to ongoing conversations in that vein. 
                                                             
 
4 Minor conflict implicating the land regime occurred in Kenya (1992, 1997, 2007/8), Nigeria 
(1966, 1990s-2000s), and Ghana (1994-1995). Major conflict implicating the land regime occurred 
in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007), the DRC (1996-2003), and Rwanda (1959-1961, 1990-1994). Boone 
(2014, 84) documents localized land skirmishes in Burkina Faso (1990s), Cameroon (1960s-
2000s), Ghana (1990-2000s), Mali (2000s), and Senegal (1990s). I put farm seizures in Zimbabwe 
(since 2000) in this category as well. 
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There remains the question about whether insider/outsider violence itself 
encourages more restrictive laws. Nationality laws, like most political institutions, may 
have exogenous initial conditions, but they evolve through some endogenous processes. 
At independence, African countries by and large adopted the laws of exiting colonial 
powers (Herbst 1999).5 Over time, international pressures to liberalize have grown, 
forcing changes that gradually reduced discrimination based on ethnicity or gender 
(Manby 2009) and increased tolerance of dual nationality (Manby 2009, Whitaker 2011). 
As nationality laws become more exclusive, the risk of VOB increases, which in turn 
affects the development of later nationality laws. Following a VOB episode, these laws 
may become either more or less restrictive, depending on local context. For example, 
increased international scrutiny, heavy foreign involvement, or a strong civil society can 
lead to inclusionary policies after VOB (as happened in Ghana and Kenya). In the 
absence of these liberalizing forces, regimes may impose stricter nationality laws, thereby 
escalating VOB and possibly sending a country down the path to war (as seen in Côte 
d’Ivoire and the DRC).  
Organization of the Dissertation 
I develop and test my argument over the course of nine chapters. My research 
design combines quantitative and qualitative empirics to study how exclusionary 
nationality increase VOB severity from multiple angles. The testing all supports the same 
causal pathway: exclusive laws contribute to the intensification of insider/outsider 
                                                             
 
5 Only Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan, Seychelles, and Zambia diverged from 
the laws of their colonizers (Herbst 1999, 273). 
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violence. I first make the case for studying the role of nationality laws in driving political 
violence (Chapters Chapter 2 and   
13 
 
Chapter 3) and then demonstrate that exclusionary laws increase VOB severity 
generally (Chapter 4). Next, I describe several mechanisms linking exclusionary 
nationality laws and the trajectory of VOB (Chapters 5 and 6). I then turn to the effect of 
citizenship policy on conflict processes at the individual level (Chapter Chapter 7). Finally, 
I consider the implications of this project, both in terms of what a violent politics of 
belonging means for individual countries (Chapter Chapter 8) and what the nationality law 
lens can contribute to broader academic and policy goals (Chapter Chapter 9). 
Chapter Chapter 2 presents the conceptual foundations of this study by defining 
citizenship as a   political construct and situating this project within the literatures on 
citizenship and political violence. I also explain why testing hypotheses about nationality 
laws using data from Africa produces generalizable knowledge relevant to many regions. 
Chapter   
14 
 
Chapter 3 details my theory, a new framework for understanding how nationality 
laws shape patterns in violence. I also lay out the hypotheses guiding my analysis. 
In Chapter 4, I introduce my original dataset on Africa’s nationality laws. From this 
dataset, I created the African Citizenship Policy Index (ACPI) to facilitate systematic, 
comparative analysis of Africa’s nationality laws on a largescale. To my knowledge, this 
chapter is the first effort to explicitly model the relationship between restrictive nationality 
laws and conflict. I uncover relationships not observable in prior analysis. I find that 
exclusionary laws increase the frequency of inter-ethnic violence, and increase the fatality 
rates of violence over land, ethnicity, and elections. They even affect the fatality rates of 
violence unrelated these issue-areas.  
Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 compare the arc of VOB in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, 
Kenya, and Ghana. This set of cases illustrates the conditions under which citizenship rules 
are politicized, and the effects of restricting nationality laws. The cases of Côte d’Ivoire 
and the DRC explain why denationalization of an outsider group pushes minor conflict 
towards major conflict. Evidence from Kenya and Ghana show why some VOB remains 
constrained at the level of minor conflict or localized skirmishes, Kenya and Ghana, 
respectively.  
Using survey data from 29 national surveys, Chapter Chapter 7 applies the 
nationality law lens to conflict processes at the individual level. I find that individuals who 
face difficulty obtaining national identity documents (which prove their citizenship status) 
are more likely to fear becoming a victim of violence, as compared to other individuals. 
They are also more likely to have used political violence recently. Furthermore, individuals 
susceptible to contentious citizenship narratives are more likely to have used political 
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violence, as compared to other individuals. This effect holds whether the narratives target 
insiders or outsiders. 
Chapter Chapter 8 uses original surveys I collected in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana to 
explore the lingering effects of violent citizenship struggles. My surveys demonstrate that 
the recruitment environment for Ivoirian ethnic entrepreneurs is rife with opportunity and 
that mobilization there has a greater risk of turning violent, as compared to Ghana. These 
results speak to the divisions that persist in Côte d’Ivoire, and foreshadow cleavages of 
unrest in the future. Moreover, they have sobering implications for the future of Côte 
d’Ivoire and other post-citizenship-conflict societies. Namely, the potential for conflict 
relapse remains elevated even after the war has subsided.  
Finally, Chapter Chapter 9 draws together results from the entire study and 
discusses broader implications of the research. I then make policy recommendations for 






Chapter 2. Legislating Nationality 
 
This chapter grounds my research in the wider literatures on citizenship and 
political violence. I begin by looking at citizenship as an institution and the significance of 
codifying exclusionary criteria into law. I then explain the evolution of citizenship in 
Africa, with particular attention to the reasons why citizenship is a contentious issue on the 
Continent. Next, I cover standard explanations in for ethnic conflict, before moving into a 
discussion of insider/outsider contention specifically. I wrap up by underscoring my 
original contributions to both the politics of belonging and the conflict studies fields.  
The Contentious Foundations of Citizenship 
In the most general sense, the term “citizenship” indicates belonging to a particular 
national or sub-national political community (Habermas 1994). I focus on citizenship in 
the national political community, which represents the bond between individuals and the 
state. Nationality laws are the formal-legal expression of citizenship status, and therefore 
a vehicle individuals to obtain rights and resources from the center. Others have shown that 
restrictive nationality laws deny the rights and resources to which many individuals are 
entitled, thereby increasing marginalization. I contend that exclusionary nationality laws 
therefore impact the severity of civil unrest. 
Engin Isin and Peter Nyers define citizenship as “an ‘institution’ mediating rights 
between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong” (2014, 1). 
Citizenship rules determine who is a full member of the polity and who is not. They are 
embedded in a regime of policies and practices (Isin and Nyers 2014; Keller 2014). 
Everyday activities, such as registering a birth, enrolling in school, accessing healthcare, 
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finding employment or travelling freely are affected by an individual’s citizenship status 
(Manby 2009). Importantly, Isin and Nyers refer to “political subjects” rather than 
“citizens” because the institution does not guarantee access those rights and resources. 
Although citizenship implies legitimate claim to rights within a community, it by no means 
guarantees those rights will be protected. As Mahmood Mamdani eloquently put it, 
“citizenship does not entitle you to resources, it entitles you to enter the struggle for 
resources” (2002, 505). For example, the Federal Character Principle in Nigeria puts the 
rights of indigenous groups over the rights of migrants, even if those migrants are Nigerian 
citizens. This leads to a hierarchical citizenship in Nigeria, where indigenes receive 
preferential treatment.  
For decades, T.H. Marshall’s (1998) model of citizenship was the standard-bearer. 
However, Marshall’s three pillars of citizenship, comprising civic, political, and social 
rights, has received much criticism over the years for being an oversimplification. Critics 
rightly point out that inequalities in society means that citizens cannot access or exercise 
their rights equally. Moving away from Marshall’s idealized citizenship as something 
“granted and fixed”, and towards a flexible model of citizenship as something “embodied, 
enacted, or negotiated”, is a conceptual improvement (Harrington 2014, 16). The shift 
signals refinement in theory and recognition that citizenship is constituted through struggle 
for “civic and political recognition” (Harrington 2014, 16; c.f. Isin and Nyers 2014; Dean 
2014). 
The field has moved towards conceptualizing citizenship as rights and 
performance. Rights span the civil, political, and social sphere. They include the right to 
vote, travel freely, and speak freely, as well as the right to equal treatment before the law, 
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dignity, and a certain standard of living. Duties are obligations citizens have to the state, 
such as taxes or civic participation. Performance refers to the fact that rights and duties are 
not passively held. Rather, it is through performance of rights and duties that “citizenship 
is brought into being” (Isin and Nyers 2014, 3). The terms of citizenship are renegotiated 
when individuals or the state seek to redefine the rights and duties of citizenship, or when 
non-citizens perform as citizens and thus make a claim to citizenship.  
Citizenship is multi-dimensional because it refers to a host of relationships that 
cross-cut levels of analysis. Membership within some kind of community exists at almost 
every level of social organization. From kinship systems to juridical states, networks at the 
national and sub-national level can be described as communities that confer a type of 
citizenship. For my purposes, citizenship refers to the legal bond between an individual 
and the state. A citizen is thus a person who is officially entitled to rights and resources 
within the polity. Hereafter, I use the term “citizenship” to mean national citizenship, and 
I stipulate when rules of sub-national belonging are relevant to the discussion.  
At times, citizenship status overlaps with social identity characteristics, such as 
ethnicity or gender. Citizenship should not, however, be conflated with social identity 
because it is a legal status rather than emotional or cultural belonging to a group. For the 
same reason, citizenship status should not be equated with national identity either. National 
identity is a construct of belonging meant to replace localized identities, and it can 
contradict an individual’s citizenship status. For instance, children brought into the United 
States by their undocumented parents who have grown up in the country may identify as 
American (national identity), but they would be deported if discovered (citizenship status). 
National identity is different from nationality, which implies belonging to a cultural group 
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(Assal 2014, 2011; Bauböck 2006). Despite the minor conflation of terms, the literature 
uses “citizenship law” and “nationality law” interchangeably. 
The institution of citizenship is integral to state-formation. The state’s 
completeness and legitimacy is expressed through allocation of citizenship rights and 
obligations (Harrington 2014, 15). States face the challenge of building legal and emotional 
ties with the population because the modern nation-state rarely lives up to the ideal-type: 
an “internally homogeneous, externally bounded political, legal, social, cultural, and 
(sometimes) economic space (Brubaker 2010, 63).” Citizenship helps states build 
emotional ties with the population because it is an instrument of collective unity. Rogers 
Brubaker (1992) observed that a political understanding of citizenship means that political 
unity constitutes nationhood, and citizenship helps build cultural unity (i.e. France). In 
contrast, an ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship means that the population’s ethno-
cultural unity constitutes nationhood, and the state uses citizenship to build political unity 
(i.e. Germany 1913-1999/2000). 
As for legal ties, nationality laws codify the criteria for membership in the polity. 
In other words, they formalize citizenship rules. Nationality laws can be distinguished by 
the extent to which they reflect jus soli or jus sanguinis principles. Jus soli laws, as found 
in the United States and India, recognize individuals born in the state’s territory as citizens, 
regardless of their parents’ nationality. In Africa, only Chad, Lesotho, and Tanzania have 
an absolute jus soli rule in which any child born in the territory is automatically granted 
citizenship. Jus sanguinis laws, on the other hand, only recognize citizenship through 
descent. They are appealing for nationalist projects seeking to preserve an ethno-cultural 
composition in the polity. Indonesia and Malaysia use jus sanguinis laws to limit the 
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influence of the wealthy Chinese minority, while Israel, Hungary, and Poland, use them to 
unite co-ethnics scattered through diaspora (Herbst 2000). Most countries in Africa confer 
citizenship based on jus sanguinis principles—more than 30 states grant citizenship if a 
child has one or more citizen parents.  
States with jus sanguinis citizenship principles face a dilemma with individuals 
born to foreign parents. These individuals are not automatically granted citizenship, but 
they often spend their entire lives in the state’s territory. For example, Germany’s 1913 
nationality upheld jus sanguinis principles. After 1990, there was a large population of 
new-Germans across Europe who had never visited the country. However, the law denied 
citizenship to thousands of Turks who knew no country other than Germany as home. Some 
countries, including Germany, have adopted soli-sanguinis hybrid solutions to address this 
complexity. In Uganda, individuals with non-citizen parents can become citizens “by 
registration” at the age of majority. This path is also available in Namibia, South Africa, 
and São Tomé and Príncipe. Certain states make no official provision for children who do 
not meet criteria for citizenship, condemning many of them to statelessness. This is the 
case in Botswana, Gambia, Libya, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. 
By defining membership in the political community, citizenship is often understood 
as a boundary mechanism, an instrument of inclusion and exclusion (Herbst 2000; 
Brubaker 1992). Furthermore, in distinguishing insiders from outsiders, citizenship 
determines “owners” of the state (Wimmer 1997). Citizens have a legitimate claim to rights 
in the polity, whereas outsiders do not. It is worth reiterating that just because a person is 
entitled to rights, it does not mean that she is able to fully exercise them. Formal nationality 
laws do not always reflect informal practices or popular notions of membership. After the 
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United States Civil War, for instance, African-Americans were de jure citizens that were 
denied their rights under de facto Jim Crow citizenship rules.  
In her book Struggles for Citizenship in Africa (2009), Bronwen Manby describes 
how capricious or despotic regimes, discriminatory institutions and practices, weak civil 
administration systems, and corrupt or convoluted bureaucracies directly impede an 
individual’s free and full exercise of their rights. An individual may be denied citizenship 
rights based on their ethnic background, race, religion, or gender. They may also face 
discrimination based on non-ascriptive characteristics, such as the failure to pay a bribe or 
to navigate complex and costly institutional procedures. Perhaps the most common method 
of exclusion arises when individuals cannot obtain national identity documents that prove 
their citizenship status or this documentation is not recognized (even destroyed) when 
presented to officials. For example, South Sudanese identity cards are only issued in the 
capital Juba, which restricts citizenship rights for those without the time and resources to 
travel. 
Exclusionary citizenship regimes are not unique to Africa. Historically, wealth-
based or literacy-based restrictions to voting circumscribed franchise in Europe and the 
New World. In the 19th century, Britain, Chile, and Canada had an income and/or property 
restriction on voting rights. Argentina and the United States had literacy requirements into 
the 20th century. States may also restrict citizenship rights by gender. Women received the 
right to vote in federal elections in 1893 in New Zealand, 1907 in Finland, 1920 in the 
United States, and 1971 in Switzerland. In present-day Nepal, a woman’s citizenship 
application must be supported by her father or husband—a restriction not imposed on men. 
More than 24 African countries still have laws on the books that exhibit gender 
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discrimination. Zambian men can pass citizenship on to their non-national wives, but 
Zambian women cannot pass citizenship on to their non-national husbands. According to 
Burundi’s nationality code, citizenship is passed through men only, meaning children with 
foreign fathers are not granted citizenship at birth. Change is on the horizon, though. The 
1992 Unity Dow ruling set a precedent for other countries to follow. The court case forced 
change in Botswana’s citizenship law such that women could pass citizenship on to their 
spouses or children.  
Citizenship regimes reproduce racial or ethnic discrimination both directly and 
indirectly.  Malaysia’s constitution guarantees special privileges for ethnic Malays, who 
are defined by law as Muslim. Bhutan’s leadership pursued “one nation, one people” 
policies in the 1980s that made it harder for individuals who were not “pure” Bhutanese to 
acquire citizenship and resulted in the loss of citizenship among ethnic groups formerly 
considered citizens, such as the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampas. Autochthonous or 
racialized inclinations are present in African nationality laws too. For example, the DRC, 
Côte d’Ivoire, and Uganda have, at different times, embraced policies stipulating that an 
individual must be from an indigenous ethnic group in order to claim citizenship. Sierra 
Leone and Liberia go so far as to grant citizenship at birth only to individuals “of negro 
descent” in an effort to minimize the influence of the Lebanese community (Manby 2009). 
In addition, indigeneity is not formally defined in Nigeria, but the informal understanding 
is that indigeneity is passed through the paternal line and usually only for one generation 
(Manby 2009).  
Even where formal institutions may guarantee citizenship, informal restrictions 
may still serve as a barrier to citizenship rights. So-called “Amerasians”, born of Asian 
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mothers and American fathers during war, were ostracized in Vietnam (DeBonis 1995) and 
in Japan (Williams-León and Nakashima 2001). Additionally, the Indo-Pakistani heritage 
of the Karana community of Madagascar complicates their eligibility for citizenship and 
makes passports hard to acquire (Manby 2009, 2010). In Kenya, Somalis and Muslims face 
increasing challenges as the government struggles to fight al-Shabab. In November 2014 
the government suspended the issuance of identity cards in three counties bordering 
Somalia as part of the fight against al-Shabab, meaning individuals living there who did 
not possess an identity card could not travel. In Swaziland, individuals who are not 
ethnically Swazi face discrimination. A 1974 law required citizens to swear allegiance to 
a Swazi chief (ukukhonta), and the 2005 constitution favors those of Swazi descent.  
Previous research explores the ways in which individuals and groups are denied 
their legitimate citizenship rights, and what the implications of widespread marginalization 
are. Unlike these studies, I focus on how exclusionary provisions in nationality law affect 
patterns in violence. Treating nationality law as an explanatory factor in political violence 
is a new direction for the conflict literature, as I show later in this chapter. 
The Evolution of Citizenship in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa is a unique testing ground for arguments about how nationality 
laws shape patterns in violence. It is a region comprised of young states undergoing the 
tumultuous process of democratization. As such, citizenship rules, and by extension 
nationality laws, are still in the process of being defined and redefined. Settling “the 
citizenship question” is integral to long-term growth and stability in these states. For 
historic reasons, citizenship questions are linked to issues surrounding land, elections, and 
ethnic identity, which makes them contentious and oftentimes deadly. The problem of 
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contested citizenship threatens the future of many countries and yet cross-national data on 
nationality laws is scarce. I address this gap in the field. 
It is helpful to begin a discussion of present-day debates in Africa by looking at 
citizenship during the colonial period. Modern citizenship, in which individuals are bound 
to specific and discrete polities, did not exist before colonial conquest (Herbst 1999). 
Colonial governance was organized according to the logic of ‘decentralized despotism’, to 
borrow a phrase from Mamdani (1996). Europeans established a system of hierarchical 
citizenship characterized by racial discrimination. It divided each state’s population into 
Citizens and Subjects. Citizens occupied a domain of rights and privileges associated with 
civil law and liberal citizenship. Subjects occupied a domain of distorted tradition and 
fabricated customary law, devoid of citizenship rights. Colonized populations were only 
accorded citizenship status in rare circumstances. 6  Africans were further divided into 
tribes, which roughly mapped on to ethnic groups, but were sometimes artificially 
constructed by colonial ethnographers. Each ethnic group was presumed to have a 
“homeland” such that an individual was always a native of his or her homeland and a settler 
in any other territory. Massive migration schemes transplanted thousands of people outside 
their assigned homelands, turning them and their descendants into settlers (Mamdani 
1996).  
                                                             
 
6 In 1848, France granted full citizenship rights to Africans living in four towns in present-day 
Senegal, but they could only exercise their rights within these privileged communities. 
Additionally, evolués in French colonies who adopted European culture through education or 
assimilation could earn full citizenship rights (Keller 2014; Manby 2009). 
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Through these practices, colonial-era institutions turned flexible cultural identities 
into rigid political identities (Idris 2012; Boone 2014; Mamdani 1996, 2001a). Moreover, 
the colonial state created new identities that had not previously been salient—or, in some 
cases, even existed. One of colonialism’s most devastating legacies in Africa is the 
grounding conceptions of citizenship in land and ethnicity (Mamdani 1996; 2001b). In the 
settler-native paradox identified by Mamdani, settlers were treated preferentially, to the 
detriment of natives. In the early years of independence, African governments reversed the 
settler-native paradox such that migrants and their descendants lost rights and resources 
they previously enjoyed—even if they had known no other home than where they currently 
resided. The 1960s and 1970s saw expulsion of immigrants and refugees in Uganda, 
Nigeria, Ghana, and elsewhere. 
The legal implications of Citizen-Subject dualism were so-far reaching that they 
resonate today. Archetypes of governance from the colonial period flowed into post-
colonial politics, bringing their contradictions and tensions with them. System-level 
changes of globalization, liberalization, and economic collapse have only deepened 
citizenship contention. Peter Geschiere (2009) argues that globalization has increased 
mobility, decentralization, and democratization, which feeds an “obsession with 
belonging”.  
Elections are arenas where elites and individuals compete for power and resources, 
which can intensify the salience of political identities (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; D. 
N. Posner 2005). Multi-party politics and the ensuing competition for elected office only 
redoubled the importance of citizenship (Young 2007; Geschiere 2009; Dorman, Hammett, 
and Nugent 2007; Whitaker 2005). Another wave of expulsions occurred in the 1990s in 
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Nigeria, Gabon, Zambia, Angola, and elsewhere. Elite competition for state resources 
shapes dynamics at the grassroots-level by defining the requirements to fully ‘belong’ at 
the national level. According to Dorman, Hammett, and Nugent (2007): 
Political and economic liberalization constitute the current 
configuration against which identity politics are played out, the 
interaction of local and global influences threaten the survival of a 
state-level national identity and gives urgency to elite attempts to 
retain power through the molding of citizenship (8). 
 
Nationality laws are inherently political constructs and therefore subject to the elite 
machinations and changes in the international sphere. Increasingly, nationality law is used 
as a political tool. Revising the laws is a strategy groups use to secure access to resources, 
and to sideline opponents (Manby 2009; Geschiere 2009; Whitaker 2005). For example, 
the DRC has changed their nationality law four times since independence in response to 
political and economic competition between autochthons and the Banyarwanda ethnic 
group (Jackson 2007).7 In addition, the governments of Zambia, Botswana, Swaziland, and 
Tanzania have at one time or another used denationalization to silence opponents or critics 
(Manby 2009). And yet existing research does not examine how variation in nationality 
laws affects patterns in violence. In contrast, examine how variation in laws predicts 
variation in VOB intensity. Further, I show how the interaction of laws and group 
composition helps explain VOB escalation. Specifically, I find that when an outsider group 
                                                             
 
7 In 1964 the nationality law granted citizenship to individuals who could trace their family origins 
to an ethnic group resident in the territory as of 1908. In 1971 the date changed to 1960 (the year 
of independence), but in 1972 the date was pushed back to 1950. In 1981 the “date of origin” 
became 1885, and in the current law (from 2004) the date is 1960. 
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with contested foreign origins (because the “outsider” label conflates internal and external 
migrants) is denationalized, national level VOB escalates to civil war. 
Citizenship debates essentially reflect groups’ efforts to secure a foothold in a 
mercurial club promising privileged access to state resources. Seeking to convince 
“authorizing officials that their claims to land are as good or better than anyone else’s, 
many people have turned to the past, basing claims to land on narratives of origin or 
ancestry that are difficult, if not impossible, to refute (Berry 2009, 25).” Although it makes 
sense that groups would try to ground citizenship in a physical commodity like land, such 
efforts are problematic. Although homeland may be indivisible (Toft 2003), it is not 
permanent. Geschiere and Jackson (2006) notes that even proponents of autochthony, who 
seek to rank ethnic groups according to who arrived in a territory first, do not miss the 
intrinsic “nervousness” of their discourse. They are cognizant that their situation could 
always change if the “wrong” people get into power. Since political competition opens the 
space for regime turnover, the anxiety of autochthons never goes away entirely. Every time 
political competition intensifies, such as during election season, the anxiety returns and 
tensions rise.  
With the realization that a great many conflicts in Africa can be traced back to 
citizenship debates came a flood of studies about citizenship-related violence in Africa 
(Geschiere 2009; Mamdani 2001b; Adejumobi 2001; Keller 2014; Kersting 2009; Bøås 
and Dunn 2013; Boone 2014; Nyamnjoh 2006; Crush 2001; Hayem 2013; Marshall-Fratani 
2007; Jackson 2007). The prevalence of indigeneity discourse in African politics reminds 
us that the African experience of citizenship is inextricably linked to the production of 
social identities through violence. Colonialism established the native/settler divide and 
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liberation struggles reified this distinction. Tragically, African nationalism morphed into 
“ultranationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to [violent] racism (Fanon 1965, 127).” 
Considering that a group’s claim to state resources is legitimated by virtue of 
political membership (Wimmer 1997), exclusionary citizenship regimes are a ripe 
environment for violence. Furthermore, the current brand of identity politics can be 
construed as the politics of fear. It exacerbates communal tensions by turning on ethnic 
cleansing discourses. Moreover, a narrative of victimization takes prominence in 
citizenship debates such that “native” and “foreigner” become synonyms for “victim” and 
“aggressor”, leading to retaliatory or pre-emptive attacks (Dunn 2009). For example, 
victimization frames were used by political entrepreneurs in Rwanda, the DRC, and Côte 
d’Ivoire to mobilize for collective violence (Dunn 2009; Mamdani 2001b; Turner 2013; 
Marshall-Fratani 2007).  
Even though exclusionary nationality laws are often implicated in the cases of 
violence, there are no cross-national investigations into their impact on violence severity. 
In part, this stems from the limited availability of data on African citizenship laws. Money 
(2002) evaluates the restrictiveness of nationality laws around the world between 1929 and 
1954 by breaking laws up into four components: naturalization procedures, gender 
discrimination, and how citizenship is passed to children of citizens and of foreigners. 
Working with more recent data, Herbst (2000) catalogues contemporary nationality laws 
along several dimensions, including jus sanguinis principles, gender discrimination, and 
naturalization procedures. Most of Herbst’s measures are binary and thus serve as blunt 
instruments for analysis. Moving towards multi-category indicators, Seely et al. (2013) 
propose a measure for gender discrimination in current African nationality laws. However, 
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the gender-specific focus narrows the metric’s applicability. Both Herbst and Seely provide 
a snapshot of nationality laws, frozen in time. In contrast, Manby (2009, 2015) draws on a 
wealth of historical data to catalogue African nationality laws since independence. 
Emphasizing risk factors in statelessness, she describes policy trends in relation to general 
citizenship principles, gender equality, dual nationality, ethnic and racial discrimination, 
naturalization procedures, and de-nationalization provisions. She does not, however, create 
any indicator for quantitative analysis.  
The existing literature is composed of a constellation of case studies about extreme 
cases of insider/outsider violence (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire) or unlikely 
successes in stability (e.g. Tanzania, Botswana, Ghana). Although considerable advances 
have been made towards understanding the relationship between exclusionary citizenship 
rules and violence, the dominant qualitative research methods are not designed to search 
for generalizable patterns. Instead, they are meant to build knowledge of processes and 
mechanisms, generate rich theories, and confirm peculiarities about outlier cases. Since so 
few studies have addressed the full variation in violence severity, important questions 
remain unanswered. Furthermore, the generalizability of researchers’ claims goes untested 
and existing findings are difficult to replicate. My research complements this work by 
developing a flexible framework that permits quantitative analysis of relationships 
identified in earlier studies. Importantly, the framework also opens the door for new 
research questions as well. This dissertation, for example, probes the distinct ways that 
exclusionary nationality laws impact political violence. 
Although the literature would lead us to believe that exclusive nationality laws 
shape patterns in violence, this hypothesis has never been directly tested. I frame my study 
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of nationality laws around three questions: How do nationality laws shape general patterns 
in violence? Why do citizenship debates sometimes lead to war? How do nationality laws 
shape conflict processes at the individual level? Answering these questions requires an 
explicitly cross-national approach. In conducting a largescale examination of nationality 
laws over time and across geographic space, I provide a new perspective on citizenship 
politics in Africa. Previous work has typically examined outlier cases of extreme violence 
during election periods or over land rights. By relaxing the standard scope conditions, I 
find that restrictive nationality laws exacerbate insider/outsider violence in general, both at 
the group and the individual level. Furthermore, I identify a new factor in civil war: 
denationalization of an outsider group. In short, I demonstrate that exclusionary nationality 
laws have explanatory power in their own right. 
Theories on Political Violence 
The ethnic conflict literature offers many reasons for unrest, and yet the role of 
nationality laws is largely overlooked. In this section, I review prominent explanations for 
why identity politics so often turns violent. Leading explanations point to grievances, 
“greed”, institutions, elections, and natural resources.  
Identity Politics 
Ethnic identity is a critical factor in conflict. The debate about whether ethnic 
diversity itself drives violence is ongoing (Sambanis 2001; Easterly and Levine 1997). The 
research into why is prolific. Group identity supports coalition building (Bates 1983; Posner 
2004) by resolving organizational barriers to mobilization (Horowitz 1985; Collier 2009). 
For example, ethnic mobilization encourages the rise of political entrepreneurs (Eck 2009). 
Individuals are more responsive to ethnic appeals given ethnically salient political 
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cleavages (Posner 2005; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010), and leaders can make credible 
commitments of future rewards (Weinstein 2007). Ethnicity also assists in targeting 
recruits (Horowitz 1985) and free-riders (Hardin 1995; Olson 1971). Constructivists note 
that the meaning behind ethnic identity makes it a powerful mobilizing force (Lynch 2008, 
2011; Geschiere 2009; Bøås and Dunn 2013).  
Early identity-based accounts argued that “ancient hatreds” led ethnic groups to 
fight one another. Relative deprivation theorists pushed back, arguing that groups actually 
fought over the distribution power and resources (Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985). The 
recognition that conflict stemmed from inequality between groups, rather than ethnic 
attachments alone, represented a significant advancement in the field. Theories making this 
line of argument are referred to as grievance accounts. According to grievance theorists, 
groups are socially, politically, or economically marginalized in absolute terms or relative 
to other groups, they are more likely to violently mobilize. For example, ethnic groups are 
more likely to rebel if they are denied access to the executive (Birnir 2007; Cederman, 
Wimmer, and Min 2010) or if they experience systematic economic and political 
discrimination (Stewart 2002; 2008; Østby 2013).  
Critics point out that groups the world over have grievances, yet violence is a rare 
event (Tilly 1978; Fearon and Laitin 2003). This observation led to a rise in so-called greed 
accounts. Greed theorists argue that actors are economically-motivated, meaning they 
weigh the opportunity costs of fighting and decide it is in their material interest to 
participate (Grossman 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Others argue that specific 
conditions make launching a rebellion actually feasible, and therefore more likely. For 
instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003) show that certain material conditions favor insurgents—
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weak states, mountainous or rough terrain, large populations, and local knowledge. Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) find that economic conditions and a large proportion of young 
men in the population matter, whereas grievance indicators are indeterminate. A variation 
on the greed hypothesis points to economic competition between actors. Anti-immigrant 
sentiment is strong in the presence of weak economic indicators or when groups directly 
compete with immigrants (Weiner 1978; Olzak 1992; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006). Social 
crisis can also lead to scapegoating of foreigners and rising xenophobia (Whitaker 2015). 
Critics of the entire greed-versus-grievance debate point out that greed and 
grievance are not conceptually distinct; it is therefore more productive to study their 
interactive effect (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Moreover, it is increasingly clear that 
grievances are fundamental to the dynamics of contentious politics, yet violence happens 
when institutions and practices form boundaries that political entrepreneurs can exploit 
(Leckie and Huggins 2011). I argue that nationality laws are the ultimate boundary 
mechanism because they link the individual to the state and its resources. Therefore, 
exclusionary nationality laws should increase the severity of violence that does break out. 
Institutions 
Many scholars focus on how institutions structure relationships and hierarchies 
within society, thereby creating competition over the state’s scarce resources. Weak 
institutions in particular create incentives to use violence, and provide space for actors to 
behave with impunity. For example, weak property regimes (Boone 2011; Onoma 2010), 
weak rule of law (Mueller 2008), or overly centralized executives (Branch and Cheeseman 
2006) contribute to the normalization and diffusion of political violence.  
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It is clear from current research that institutionalizing identity politics is particularly 
dangerous. Lieberman and Singh (2012) argue that institutionalization of ethnic difference 
“generates emotional, conflict prone dynamics” (Lieberman and Singh 2012, 5) and drives 
armed conflict. To others, ethnically-exclusive regimes “create a ‘zero-sum’ political 
atmosphere where those outside of favored ethnic status are not afforded representation 
based on public support, demography, or ideology” (Raleigh 2014, 101).  
I build on institutionalist accounts of ethnic conflict, which do not address the 
impact of nationality law. Even though institutionalized exclusion implicates the 
citizenship regime, formalized citizenship rules are understudied in the conflict literature. 
In contrast, I argue that exclusionary nationality laws have explanatory power in their own 
right. I theorize that grievances proliferate under these laws, denying a large segment of 
the population rights and resources to which they are entitled. 8 Weakly protected rights 
                                                             
 
8  This is not to say that inclusionary laws do not create grievances among a segment of the 
population as well. I restrict analysis to exclusionary laws because case evidence suggests that 
movement towards inclusionary provisions leads to less severe hostilities. See Chapter List of 
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means that the present is dangerous and the future is uncertain. Moreover, I argue that 
nationality laws offer a way for groups to secure resources into the future by legitimizing 
their claims as “owners” of the state. Restrictive citizenship criteria are appealing because 
they allocate a larger portion of state resources to a smaller number of groups. 
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Institutionalists often point to role of political competition in driving conflict 
processes. Without strong democratic institutions, elections are dangerous events because 
they “encourage mobilization into rival political camps, the airing of grievances, and 
competition for power (Salehyan & Linebarger 2015, 26).” Early democratization theorists 
believed that weak institutions condemned new democracies to violence, but assumed that 
development would assuage many of the problems (Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 
2000; Huntington 1991; Dahl 1971). Recent work challenges this notion. For instance, 
Straus and Taylor (2012) find that election violence has been consistently high from 1990 
to 2008.  
Electoral violence is defined as any event in which electoral competition provides 
the motivation, target identification, and timing of violence (Salehyan and Linebarger 
2015; Straus and Taylor 2012). Uncertain wins (Wilkinson 2004, Hafner-Burton et al. 
2013) or fraud (Bratton 2008; Gutiérrez-Romero 2014; Norris 2014) increase election 
violence. Elites use intimidation or violence as a tool for staying in power (Wilkinson 2004; 
Bratton 2008, Klaus and Mitchell 2015). They may pray on fears in the general population 
to mobilize supporters for violence (Wilkinson 2004; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). They also 
use elections to prop up neo-patrimonial systems that distribute power and resources in 
exchange for political loyalty (Bratton 2008; Boone 2011; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). 
Elections are notorious are tools for advancing group interests. Politicians rally 
support by playing the “ethnic card” (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). Additionally, 
elections are seen as a vehicle for redressing grievances and resolving competing claims to 
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resources, such as land and power (Boone 2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). Sara 
Berry explains the process of ethnic cohesion in the context of elections as follows: 
Rival candidates and citizens alike re-examined the question 
of who was eligible to stand for office and/or 
vote…competing claims to citizenship frequently turned on 
questions of historical precedent, giving rise to debates over 
descent, cultural heritage and territorial origin that both 
reinforced the salience of these categories as sources of 
social and political entitlement, and challenged efforts to 
clarify their significance for contemporary claims to 
property and authority (2009: 26). 
 
This ethnic cohesion increases the risk of electoral violence (Snyder 2000; Côté 
and Mitchell 2016; Collier 2009). However, I observe that citizenship struggle takes place 
in and outside election periods. Furthermore, I argue that an emphasis on electoral violence 
leads to a selection bias towards high-intensity episodes of VOB, meaning an electoral 
competition lens is too narrow an explanation for VO in general. By relaxing the scope 
conditions, I uncover trends in VOB that are not observable using an election violence lens. 
Natural Resources 
Some scholars argue that groups fight over natural resources in a setting of 
environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Homer-Dixon 1999; Klare 2001). 
However, the evidence is stacked against resource scarcity arguments and this thesis rarely 
explains direct causes of conflict (Boserup 1981; Kahl 2006; Derman, Odgaard, and 
Sjaastad 2007). That said, a sizeable literature shows that land is a principal cause of 
conflict in Africa. 
Land conflict is defined as violence over property rights and land access. 
Essentially, it concerns questions about who can claim (or reclaim) land. On the surface, 
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these conflicts may be understood as competition over scarce resources. This perspective 
assumes a certain degree of fungibility among material resources, but land is not like oil or 
diamonds. Tied up in ethnic attachments, land has great significance even in urban areas 
as a source of income, power, identity, and status (Klaus 2015). Land is life in rural Africa 
because “belonging to the land guarantees the rights of present as well as future 
generations” (Bøås 2009, 21). 
 Land is such a powerful force in African politics because it underlies 
understandings of citizenship and attachments to ethnic identity (Geschiere 2009; Boone 
2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015; Bøås and Dunn 2013). Land politics are therefore 
integral to discussions of political order in Africa (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boone 
2014; Klaus 2015). According to Toft (2003), when land is territory it defines physical and 
political space. As a homeland, land defines a locus of belonging. Catherine Boone (2011, 
2014) and Sara Berry (2009) understand land’s inherently political nature as the tangible 
connection between citizens and the state. 
Land mechanisms not only help explain conflict onset, but also the scope and scale 
of violent episodes. Boone (2014) argues that land tenure regimes define the stakes of 
competition, the axis of competition (outsider vs. insider), and the scale of competition 
(national vs. local). Others focus on the role of elite narratives and individuals beliefs 
regarding secure land rights (Klaus 2015; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). Still others focus on 
the impact of nativist movements on political violence. They demonstrate that 
autochthonous ideology is so violence-prone because it combines material and ideational 
explanations of conflict.  (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Geschiere 2009; Marshall-Fratani 2007). 
Berry (2009) connects land politics and electoral competition by suggesting that 
40 
 
“competition over land and authority has given rise…to struggles over the meaning of 
‘citizenship’ in local as well as national arenas of belonging” (40).   
Land mechanisms have great explanatory power because they synthesize insights 
from the ethnic and electoral competition theses, but these mechanisms alone cannot 
adequately account for general patterns in VOB. Competing land claims are present in 
conflicts ranging from the local to the national level. Sometimes land disputes remain 
constrained, but other times they escalate into wars.9 Clearly, land is just one among many 
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factors shaping VOB outcomes. I propose that exclusionary nationality laws are yet another 
force at work, and one that is not well understood by the literature. 
Insiders and Outsiders 
Although nationality laws are often overlooked in the conflict literature, citizenship 
struggles receive far more scholarly attention. Citizenship struggles are essentially debates 
over the content of citizenship, including what it means and who can claim it, making them 
high-stakes and violence-prone. In Africa, citizenship politics typically reflects 
insider/outsider cleavages given the historical evolution of citizenship on the continent. 
The literature on insider/outsider violence focuses on the role of land, ethnicity, elections, 
and political discourse in driving clashes between indigenous groups and internal or 
external migrants.  
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Citizenship on the continent is historically entangled with ethnic identity and land 
claims (Mamdani 1996, 2001). Therefore, violence of belonging often manifests as 
insider/outsider conflict. I use the term “insider” to refer to indigenous groups, and 
“outsider” to refer to groups that migrated to an area from elsewhere in the country or from 
abroad. Most literature separates analysis of the two. The “autochthon/foreigner” dyad pits 
autochthons against foreign-migrants (Whitaker 2005; Nyamnjoh 2006; Landau 2010; 
Crush 2001). The “autochthon/settler” dyad pits autochthons against internal-migrants 
(Côté and Mitchell 2015, 2016; Geschiere 2009; Bøås and Dunn 2013; Boone 2014). 
The existing literature tends to examine insider/outsider violence through the lens 
of land disputes and election violence. The general consensus is that VOB is most likely 
during election periods when elites politicize national citizenship rules (Côté and Mitchell 
2015; Keller 2014). When the state has authority over land tenure, land becomes a source 
of political leverage. Given the deep connections between land and ethnicity, citizenship 
then becomes ethnicized (Berry 2009; Boone 2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).  
Land mechanisms are not so far removed from electoral politics. Assertion of land 
rights is linked to ambitions for political power and sentiments of belonging. As such, land 
claims feature prominently in election time because politicians mobilize constituents 
through land mechanisms. As a patronage resource, land is used to reward supporters and 
punish opponents (Boone 2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). During the 1992, 1997, 
and 2007 elections in Kenya, land rights were alternately promised or threatened (Boone 
2011; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). Further, elections represent “an opportunity to alter the 
distribution of land rights and other resources (Klaus and Mitchell 2015, 2).” Followers 
and observers alike understand that the status quo property regime hangs in the balance, 
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providing an incentive for violence—either to defend existing land rights or seize the 
opportunity to reclaim something that was allegedly lost (Klaus and Mitchell 2015). For 
this reason, land is inextricable from many electoral contests and ethnicity-driven violence 
in Africa.10  
Throughout these studies, contentious narratives about where outsiders belong 
encourage violent mobilization. Narratives are stories that express beliefs about the world. 
They not only shape beliefs about what constitutes a problem, but also about what practices 
can and should be taken to remedy that problem (Autesserre 2012). For example, land 
grievance narratives are a signaling device elites use to send messages to their supporters 
and rivals (Klaus and Mitchell 2015).   
Citizenship narratives help answer Weber’s (2008) question, “who has citizenship 
but should not have it, and who should have it but does not have it” (125). Citizenship 
narratives reinforce identity politics by affirming insider/outsider labels. For instance, 
“sons of the soil” (SOS) movements claim that only “indigenous” ethnic groups, those who 
arrived in the territory “first”, are true citizens. Ethnicity is a powerful unifier because it 
amplifies group cohesion and offers a powerful lens through which grievances are 
experienced and understood (Horowitz 1985).  Furthermore, these narratives employ 
discourses that mix elements of the tangible (land) and the relational (claims to having been 
first-arrivers in a territory), which makes them very dangerous (Côté and Mitchell 2015; 
Bøås and Dunn 2013; Geschiere 2009). Finally, contentious narratives are the mechanism 
linking elite incentives and individual interests in the “joint production” of violence 
                                                             
 
10 See Côté and Mitchell (2015) for a critical review of the literature on SOS conflicts. 
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(Kalyvas 2003; see also Klaus and Mitchell 2015).  Power-seeking elites incite violence by 
manipulating ethnic attachments through contentious narratives. Violence follows a logic 
of threat when rights are insecure and a logic of opportunity when competition balloons 
(Klaus 2015; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).  
Why does insider/outsider violence break out? When does it escalate from the local 
to the national level?  Previous work suggests that citizenship debates break out during 
political liberalization (Geschiere 2009), economic crisis (Geschiere 2009; Côté and 
Mitchell 2016), and where the balance of power favors migrants (Boone 2014; Côté and 
Mitchell 2016). VOB moves from the local to the national level where citizenship is 
politicized by elites, often as a result of severed patronage networks (Côté and Mitchell 
2016; Arriola 2009; Villarreal 2002) and where the state has land tenure authority (Boone 
2014). Most of these arguments highlight that mounting economic and political pressures 
heighten “fears of dispossession and exclusion” (Berry 2009, 25), which incentivizes 
violent collective action. 
The general assumption has been that electoral violence constitutes national level 
conflict. For instance, Boone (2014) collapses episodes in Kenya, Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, 
and Eastern the DRC under the umbrella of “national scale land conflict”. I find this 
assumption problematic given the significant differences in minor and major conflict. I 
show that exclusionary nationality laws affect a wider range of outcomes (regardless of 
election timing) than previous studies and identify a new factor in civil war. Specifically, 
VOB escalates to war where an outsider group with contested foreign origins faces 
denationalization. I propose that an outsider group composed of internal and external 
migrants is more likely to be labeled “foreign” in exclusionary discourse. These narratives 
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make it easier for political entrepreneurs to challenge the outsider group’s right to 
citizenship.  
Lastly, the generalist perspective in my research contrasts with existing work. 
Employing much broader scope conditions, I examine violence across multiple issue-areas 
(land, ethnicity, and elections). Observations in my models often fall below standard 
thresholds for conflict, and take place within and outside of election periods. I 
operationalize “intensity” as event and fatality counts rather than selecting specific VOB 
episodes within specific countries. I also discard the small-n research design in favor of 
largescale statistical analysis. Using the country-year ACPI indicator, I conduct the first 
cross-national analysis of how exclusionary nationality laws impact political violence. 
Together, these deviations from previous work shed light on generalizable trends never 
observable before. They also support a new framework for theorizing about contentious 
citizenship politics that can be applied globally. 
Final Remarks 
Citizenship has been described in the literature as a form of membership, a 
politicized status, a collection of practices, and even as performance. I focus on the legal 
bond between individuals and the state. Citizenship grants membership in the national 
political community, but does not guarantee that rights will always be respected. It only 
means that citizens have legitimate claim to rights and resources within the polity. 
Importantly, citizens are constituted through a struggle for “the right to have rights” 
(Arendt 1966).  
I examine how the codification of exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality 
laws shapes patterns in insider/outsider violence. Previous work implies this relationship 
48 
 
should exist, but does not directly test the hypothesis. I argue that nationality laws deserve 
close inspection because they formalize belonging in the political community. They are the 
fundamental boundary mechanism determining who has access to state resources and who 
does not. As laws become more restrictive, the severity of VOB increases because a larger 
segment of the population is excluded. I detail my theory in the next chapter. It is situated 
in the wider literature on citizenship politics and ethnic conflict.  
Scholarship on insider/outsider violence in Africa describes the connection 
between citizenship struggles and the issue-areas of land, ethnicity, and elections. Ethnicity 
is embedded in power structures and social identities, and assertion of land rights is linked 
to the political arena. Land serves as a patronage resource and “proof” of belonging in the 
political community. Consequently, in the theatre of contested citizenship, land often 
serves as the script and elections are typically the stage. It also clearly explains how these 
struggles escalate from localized skirmishes to the national level. However, current 





Chapter 3. A Theory of Violence and Belonging 
 
This chapter presents an original theory on the intersection of nationality laws and 
violence. I argue that exclusionary nationality laws affect conflict processes in two distinct 
ways. First, they increase the severity of insider/outsider violence in general. Second, they 
illuminate the conditions under which insider/outsider violence escalates to war. I begin 
the discussion by explaining why we would expect nationality laws to impact patterns in 
violence at all. Next, I detail the theory and its assumptions, address key alternative 
explanations, and introduce hypotheses guiding this analysis. I conclude with a recap of 
my theory’s contributions to the citizenship politics and conflict fields. 
The literature identifies specific conditions under which insider/outsider violence 
breaks out, and when it escalates from the local to the national level. However, it cannot 
explain variation in VOB severity in general. I conceptualize citizenship politics is 
essentially a redistributive conflict. Winners and losers of this conflict compete over scarce 
resources in the state. Winner/loser status tends to follow ethnic lines in Africa, which 
increases the likelihood of armed mobilization. Previous work does not attribute 
explanatory power to nationality laws, focusing instead on land and electoral mechanisms. 
However, nationality laws matter because they shape the distribution of resources in the 
polity and thus influence insider/outsider balance of power. Specifically, exclusionary laws 
increase marginalization and contribute to an ethnic security dilemma, which intensifies 
insider/outsider violence.  
My research illuminates a new conflict process: the interaction of exclusionary 
nationality laws and group composition, which increases the probability that minor conflict 
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escalates to civil war. I theorize that national level violence will escalate to war if an 
outsider group is denationalized. Faced with the threat of losing their citizenship status, 
incentives are sufficiently high for that group to rebel. Further, I expect this situation to 
arise where an outsider group has contested foreign origins, which is most likely when an 
outsider group is composed of internal and external migrants. Popular imagination is then 
more likely to conflate outsiders and foreigners, making it easier for insiders to argue that 
outsiders should be excluded from the national political community.  
The Citizenship-Violence Nexus 
Exclusive nationality laws marginalize a large segment of the population and 
produce deep grievances, which can lead to widespread civil unrest (see Manby 2009). To 
examine the impact of exclusionary nationality laws on VOB severity, I focus on 
insider/outsider violence because citizenship struggles in Africa are historically tied to 
struggles over ethnicity and land. Although this argument is implicit in the current 
literature, it has not been directly tested. This oversight is notable because citizenship is 
the underlying mechanism of inclusion and exclusion in a state. Therefore, we have clear 
reason to expect that the codification of exclusive citizenship rules into nationality law 
would affect violence outcomes.  
Why do citizenship politics and violence intersect? I conceptualize citizenship 
politics as a redistributive conflict producing winners and losers. Winners receive a larger 
share of state resources than losers. They are also citizenship secure in that they can 
exercise their rights without inordinate obstacles. Losers, on the other hand, face more 
obstacles in obtaining the rights and resources to which they are entitled, rendering them 
citizenship insecure. Formal barriers to citizenship, such as exclusive nationality laws or 
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property regimes, cause more insecurity than informal barriers, such as weak civil 
administration.  
I theorize that since their claim to citizenship rights is officially recognized and 
generally upheld in practice, citizenship regime winners tend to have authority in the social 
and political spheres. They also exhibit fewer political grievances than losing groups, and 
can more easily access institutionalized channels of dispute resolution. Further, groups can 
lose out under the prevailing citizenship for a variety of factors: demographic ratios, an 
unfavorable balance of power, weakly enforced rights, discriminatory institutions, etc. 
Current literature examines how each of these factors drives violence over land, ethnicity, 
or elections. I synthesize these insights and argue that they are all sources of citizenship 
regime winner/loser competition that drives insider/outsider violence. My argument 
generalizes insights from the literature about how competition between land rights winners 
and losers drives land conflict (Boone 2014). 
Importantly, I maintain that winner/loser status follows ethnic lines, but transcends 
insider/outsider distinctions. In other words, winners can be insiders or outsiders, 
depending on state policies and regime preferences. The same is true for losing groups; 
they can be insiders or outsiders, depending on the political environment in a state. In the 
DRC, for example, the Banyarwanda were winners during colonialism, losers at 
independence, and alternately winners and losers under Mobutu. Although Kabila 
defended their interests at the start of the Second Congo War, the Banyarwanda ultimately 
fell from favor and their citizenship status remains precarious. Under inclusionary 
citizenship regimes, both insiders and outsiders can be winners. For instance, Ghanaian 
politicians court the votes of autochthons and migrants (Whitaker 2015; Kobo 2010). By 
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the same token, insiders and outsiders can lose out under the prevailing regime. In Côte 
d’Ivoire, for example, property rights are poorly defined and not properly documented, 
making land claims in general tenuous and contradictory.  
My argument also builds upon research into the “ethnic security dilemma” (Posen 
1993, Saideman et al 2002). Insiders and outsiders compete for citizenship rights and 
resources within the state, each group fearing oppression and persecution if another group 
controls the state. Their competition drives a security dilemma, which leads to violence. 
Kenya’s turbulent election history illustrates how winner/loser competition drives an ethnic 
security dilemma between insiders and outsiders. Rift Valley Province (RVP) has long 
been contested territory. The Kalenjin ethnic group claims ancestral land rights in RVP, 
but waves of Kikuyu settlers challenge these claims. In the 1990s, President Daniel arap 
Moi used the language of “cleansing” the Rift to mobilize Kalenjin supporters before 
elections. He freely intimated and evicted Kikuyu and other “outsiders” in competitive 
districts to undermine the opposition. In December 2007 Mwai Kibaki of the Party of 
National Unity (PNU) won re-election. Supporters of the main opposition party, the 
Kalenjin-dominant Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), now feared their lands would 
be appropriated by the government. They feared Kibaki’s regime would only serve Kikuyu 
interests. ODM responded to their electoral loss by removing Kikuyu (PNU sympathizers) 
from the Rift Valley.  
Previous studies do not frame insider/outsider disputes in the context of 
winning/losing under the status quo citizenship regime, or as an ethnic security dilemma. 
Furthermore, I go farther than others by suggesting that winner/loser status is a determinant 
of insider/outsider balance of power. My argument also lays the groundwork for why 
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nationality laws, an understudied factor in the literature, deserve more attention in political 
violence studies. Unlike prior studies, I look at how exclusionary laws, rather than land or 
election mechanisms, affect collective action and violence. 
As a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, I theorize that nationality laws 
reinforce beliefs about the extent to which status quo citizenship rules pose an existential 
threat. They also create a path for resolving group grievances. Although exclusionary 
nationality laws exacerbate the ethnic security dilemma within a polity, these laws are 
political constructs that can be changed. Revising laws to support group interests is seen as 
a way to address the group’s security dilemma by securing their hold on power. Restricting 
citizenship criteria, for example, can “fix” each group’s status to ensure a favorable balance 
of power. In extreme cases, insiders call to denationalize an outsider group. I return to this 
idea later.   
I focus on winner/loser competition as the motivation for actors to violently contest 
the status quo citizenship regime. However, competition does not address the mechanism 
by which mobilization occurs. Therefore, I now turn to research on political narratives to 
explain the causal mechanism in my theory: contentious citizenship narratives. Recall that 
narratives are stories group members use to understand where they fit in to the political 
order and wider social networks. Narratives also explain what actions are legitimate or off-
limits, what is to be feared, and what is to be valued. Importantly, narratives shape beliefs 
about what constitutes a problem and how to fix it. 
I argue that citizenship regime winner/loser competition produces contentious 
citizenship narratives questioning where outsiders belong. I build on studies explaining 
that exclusionary discourse is an effective mobilization tactic, and one that it is violence 
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prone (Geschiere 2009; Bøås and Dunn 2013). Like autochthony discourses, citizenship 
narratives comprise a potent mix of the tangible (e.g. votes, jobs, and land) and the 
relational (e.g. individual rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state). They therefore tap into 
grievance and greed mechanisms of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, exclusive narratives have 
an inherent appeal because they advocate for ethnically-defined communities (Geschiere 
2009; Lynch 2011). These narratives justify winner/loser claims to state resources by 
making ethnic appeals, thereby reinforcing the insider/outsider cleavage. For instance, 
Klaus and Mitchell (2015) show that elites mobilize followers during elections around the 
defense of existing land rights (pre-emptive logic) and the chance to reclaim land that was 
allegedly lost (opportunistic logic). Recall that land claims are inseparable from ethnic 
identity in African politics. Similarly, I argue that contentious citizenship narratives 
mobilize groups according to the dual logics of threat and opportunity. Elites frame the 
citizenship regime as a threat to group resources (logic of threat), and suggest that groups 
can improve their condition by revising the status quo citizenship rules (logic of 
opportunity).  
Contentious citizenship narratives facilitate collective violence by stoking ethnic 
grievances and an ethnic security dilemma. Their specific appeals vary by country, time 
period, and whether the audience is composed of insiders or outsiders. However, insider-
oriented narratives call for restrictive citizenship rules, while outsider-oriented narratives 
push for liberal rules. Insiders and outsiders try to legitimize their claims by appealing to 
their group’s membership in the Nation. Examples of contentious citizenship narratives are 




Table 1: Political Entrepreneur Narratives for Mobilization 
 Insider Audience Outsider Audience 
Narrative of 
Threat 
“Foreigners are taking the good 
jobs.” 
“The government wants to 
take away our citizenship.”  
Narrative of 
Opportunity 
“We should take back our 
ancestral land.” 
“By amending the laws, we can 
guarantee our citizenship status.” 
 
To see these narratives in action, we can look to Côte d’Ivoire’s recent history. 
Ahead of the 1995 election, Alassane Ouattara defended the rights of citizenship insecure 
Northerners and fought to clarify their citizenship status through inclusive nationality laws. 
In the same campaign, interim president Henri Konan Bédié called into question whether 
Northerners should be considered Ivoirian at all. Bédié presented himself as a champion of 
autochthonous rights, which he claimed were trampled by the migrant-friendly regime. 
Similar tactics have been used in Cameroon, the DRC, and Kenya (Nyamnjoh and 
Rowlands 1998; Jackson 2007; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).  
A final note on citizenship narratives: they are disseminated through top-down and 
bottom-up processes (Geschiere and Jackson 2006). Elites manipulate citizenship rules for 
political expediency, but often claim these maneuvers reflect the will of the “true” people 
(Marshall-Fratani 2007; McGovern 2011; Bah 2010). However, elites do not have a 
monopoly of manipulating ethnic identity out of political expediency. Whether motivated 
by elites or by communalism, even grassroots movements seek to address exclusion 
through violence and identity politics (Vlassenroot 2002). 
In summary, exclusionary and politicized citizenship policy, expressed through 
restrictive nationality laws, exacerbate marginalization and fuel insider/outsider 
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competition. Consequently, I expect nationality laws to increase the severity of VOB in 
general. Further, I expect these laws to impact conflict processes at the individual level.  
Escalation 
The second line of argument in this dissertation concerns the conditions under 
which insider/outsider violence leads to war. I argue that exclusionary nationality laws 
produce widespread marginalization, exacerbate insider/outsider tension, and thus 
encourage violent mobilization. A confluence of factors bring insider/outsider competition 
to a head; namely political and economic competition between winners and losers under 
the prevailing regime. The question of violence onset is beyond the scope of this study, 
which focuses on how exclusive nationality laws impact escalation, which speaks to VOB 
magnitude. Episode magnitude matters because as severity increases, so too do the costs 
of fighting (both in terms of human suffering and material losses). Moreover, the conflict 
studies field revolves around distinct conceptual categories, such as minor as opposed to 
major conflict, all premised on variation in violence magnitude. 
Previous work explains why citizenship debates moves from the local to the 
national level, including political or economic crisis (Geschiere; Côté and Mitchell 2016) 
and statist land tenure regimes that grant outsiders a favorable balance of power (Boone 
2014; Côté and Mitchell 2016). However, these studies assume that “national level 
conflict” is synonymous with electoral violence. Consequently, they do not distinguish 
between cases of minor conflict and war. Understanding nationality legislation, though, 
sheds greater light on VOB episodes, indicating when such violence likely remains minor 
conflict, and when it is most likely to escalate to war. In a deviation from traditional 
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explanations of civil conflict, I contend that the risk of war spikes when an outsider group 
is faced with denationalization.  
Insiders credibly threaten outsiders with denationalization when the outsider group 
has contested foreign origins, which occurs when the outsider group is composed of 
internal and external migrants. It is then easier to make the case that outsiders are truly 
foreigners who should be removed from the national political community. By extension, 
an outsider group is unlikely to have contested foreign origins when members are 
principally in-migrants.11  
Denationalization is a sufficient incentive for rebellion because its consequences 
are so stark. Individuals considered foreign-nationals under the law are vulnerable because 
the state is not under the same obligation to protect and serve them as it is to citizens. 
Therefore, rescinded citizenship status means groups are cut off from state resources, 
denied a wide range of rights, and often relegated to an alternative (and arbitrary) legal 
track. Also, they may not qualify for citizenship elsewhere, which leaves them stateless.  
Recall too that the insider/outsider violence stems from an ethnic security dilemma. 
The future, then, looks particularly bleak for denationalized groups. Considering that 
                                                             
 
11 This pattern is reflected in the war-cases of DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, but the Rwanda case is a 
slight deviation. Hutus and Tutsis were not distinct ethnic groups before European colonization. 
The indigenous Twa were present in the territory before the Hutu arrived between the 5th and 11th 
centuries. The Tutsi migrated around the 14th century. Hutu Nationalism in the 1950s espoused the 
fiction that Tutsis were foreign invaders. The Bahutu Manifesto helped turn that fiction into a 
dominant narrative (Mamdani 2001b; Keller 2014). In line with my theory, the Social Revolution 
(1959-1962) and the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994) reflect efforts by insiders (Hutu) to 
physically remove outsiders with contested foreign origins (Tutsi). I would argue that is the most 
extreme form of denationalization. 
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peaceful, institutionalized channels of dispute resolution are closed off to denationalized 
groups, armed organization may be the only way for groups to defend their “right to have 
rights” (Arendt 1966). 
In summary, I expect insider/outsider clashes to remain localized where the criteria 
for conflict are not met. Where these criteria obtain, VOB escalates to the national level. 
Major conflict is likely where outsiders are threatened with denationalization, whereas 
minor conflict is likely where nationality laws are not at stake and outsiders are not 
threatened with denationalization.  
Assumptions 
My theory relies on assumptions about institutionalizing citizenship, the 
composition and incentives of actors, and characteristics of violence. Firstly, constructed, 
negotiable, and subject to social and political processes, I assume that citizenship rules 
evolve through endogenous processes that are not explained here. These rules are 
formalized through nationality laws, although the provisions of these laws varies across 
countries and over time. I understand citizenship rules as flexible criteria that are negotiated 
through debates over belonging. As these debates deepen, they inform policymaking at 
higher levels of government. Determining the conditions under which these narratives turn 
into policy is beyond the scope of this project.12 Instead, I focus on how exclusionary 
provisions impact patterns in violence. Violence certainly impacts the development of 
nationality law itself, but I account for this endogeneity in my testing strategy. In Chapter 
                                                             
 
12 Côté and Mitchell (2015) have made inroads to that question. 
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4, I lag ACPI scores so that measurement of legal provisions precedes measurement of 
frequency and fatality rates. Most importantly, I use process-tracing in four case studies to 
demonstrate that violence worsened as a consequence of changes in nationality laws, rather 
than the other way around. 
I emphasize rights protected by nationality laws, yet the gap between de jure and 
de facto rights is quite large in many countries. In fact, informal barriers to citizenship are 
a common form of exclusion (Manby 2009). For example, Anglophones in Cameroon were 
discriminated against in government appointments, development projects, and public 
services due to English-language dominance in the administration (Konings and Nyamnjoh 
2004). Their story is familiar to migrants in Nigeria, non-Swazis in Swaziland, Somalis 
and Nubians in Kenya, and many other groups around the world. Informal institutions 
remain outside the scope of this project largely because data availability remains sparse. 
Oftentimes, informal barriers, such as corruption, are unobservable and stubbornly hard to 
quantify. In contrast, nationality laws provide an observable and systematic metric of 
exclusion from citizenship rights. Moreover, when individuals are denied formal 
citizenship, they face a more pernicious form of exclusion. I therefore measure the effect 
of de jure exclusion, and leave it to future researchers to measure the effect of de facto 
exclusion. I assume that where individuals are denied rights through nationality laws, they 
are also denied rights through informal institutions.  
The formal criteria for citizenship change over time. Laws can be revised to expand 
access to citizenship, as happened after the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, or they 
can uphold new restrictions. One high-profile case is that of Kenneth Kaunda, former 
president of Zambia (1964-1991). In 1996 he was deemed ineligible to contest upcoming 
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presidential elections on the opposition United National Independence Party ticket after the 
ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy party amended the constitution to require that 
both parents of presidential candidates had to be Zambian citizens. In 1999 the High Court 
of Zambia ruled Kaunda a stateless person on the grounds that he was a Malawian citizen 
by descent. The inherent flexibility of citizenship requirements creates uncertainty about 
membership in the political community, which hardens into the core of citizenship debates. 
My theory of winner/loser competition locates agency at the group level. However, 
I assume that groups respond to a strategic environment structured by public policy. Just 
as exclusionary nationality laws can exacerbate communal tensions, state policies can 
peacefully manage ethnic relations. Early-independence presidents Houphouët-Boigny of 
Côte d’Ivoire, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta or Kenya, and Ahmadou Ahidjo 
of Cameroon achieved this goal through ethnic balancing policies. On the other hand, 
governments may take actions that enflame citizenship debates—even those that formerly 
sought national integration.  For example, Cameroon’s 1992 electoral code required 
indigenous, Anglophone candidates to be represented on the list (Fru Awasom 2004). In 
1996, a provision promising state protection for autochthonous minorities was added to the 
constitution (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2004). These policies strengthened Anglophone 
identity and intensified hostilities between indigenous Anglophones and Francophone 
settlers. My theory addresses how nationality laws shape the strategic environment in 
which groups operate. 
My argument is as much a story of disenfranchised, losing groups rising up against 
the center, as it is a story about winning groups defending their share of the national pie. 
For this reason, I do not make predictions about whether winners or losers will mobilize 
61 
 
first. For example, Mugabe’s promises of land and wealth redistribution during the fast-
track land reform program mobilized winners/insiders (veterans of the anti-colonial 
liberation war) against losers/outsiders (white farmers). In South Africa, losers/insiders 
(Black South Africans) mobilized through the Inkatha Freedom Party, the African National 
Congress, Azanian People’s liberation Army, and other organizations against Afrikaners. 
Of course, winners/outsiders (Afrikaners) mobilized as well through the National Party, 
the Boer Resistance Movement, and the Afrikaner Resistance Movement. This perspective 
deviates from other grievance-based accounts of ethnic conflict. It allows me to go farther 
than many studies in exploring insider/outsider violence, which tend to privilege insider- 
or outsider-driven activity, rather than examining both at the same time. 
It is beyond the scope of this project to predict VOB onset. At times citizenship 
debates turn violent, but other times they do not. For instance, the quest among Arab leaders 
of Sudan to make the country an Arab-Islamic state led to genocide against Southerners, 
Nubians, and Darfurians alike and fueled the decades-long civil war (Idris 2012). However, 
the denationalization of about 3,500 Galje’el Somalis in the Tana River District, Kenya has 
not sparked conflict (Manby 2009). Clearly violence is not a pre-determined outcome of 
exclusive nationality laws, so I do not put forward a deterministic formula for predicting 
VOB onset. Instead, I examine how nationality laws shape conflict processes, specifically 
with reference to magnitude (i.e. localized violence versus minor conflict versus civil war). 
My theory would not apply to the Galje’el Somalis case because the criteria for violence 
onset have not been met. After onset takes place, then my theory applies. 
Any study of political violence faces the difficulty of setting appropriate scope 
conditions. Citizenship struggles manifest as demonstrations, xenophobic riots, ethnic 
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clashes, election violence, and even armed conflict. Episodes can be local, regional, or 
national in scale. Furthermore, citizenship debates are entangled in other issues, such as 
land, ethnicity, and elections. Many studies of citizenship debates focus on “sons of the 
soil” (SOS) conflicts, defined as clashes between indigenous ethnic groups and internal 
migrants (Côté and Mitchell 2015, 2016; Fearon and Laitin 2011). A different strand of the 
literature addresses anti-immigrant or xenophobic violence (Olzak 1992; Landau 2010; 
Nyamnjoh 2006). In contrast, I consider violence between indigenous groups and outsiders 
generally, whether they are internal or external migrants. I therefore leverage the full 
variation in insider/outsider violence. This is a new, more holistic approach to the study of 
VOB.  
Self-determination movements are a sub-set of VOB in which a minority group 
demands special treatment for their ethno-cultural nation. This “treatment” can be anything 
from protected status for cultural practices to an independent state. Africa is no stranger to 
such movements, which have disrupted life in Cameroon, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and 
over a dozen other countries (Cunningham 2014). The theory of citizenship security applies 
weakly to these cases because losing groups seeking self-determination challenge the status 
quo by denying their place in the national political community. Therefore, my theory does 
not fully apply. A different theory is needed to explain conditions of violence onset and 
escalation in these cases. 
Finally, I focus on how exclusionary nationality laws produce violence. However, 
there is evidence that inclusionary shifts in citizenship policy can generate pushback from 
hardliners. Winning groups may resent expanded citizenship rules that allocate scarce state 
resources among a larger number of groups. Their competition with losing groups may 
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intensify this resentment, prompting collective action. For instance, Afrikaner nationalist 
groups violently resisted liberalization in South Africa. The Confederacy also resisted 
liberalization in the United States. A modified version of my theory applies loosely in these 
cases too: winner/loser competition produced insider/outsider violence at the national 
level, and violence intensified when nationality laws were at stake. In my sample of Sub-
Saharan African countries, though, I do not find a case where inclusionary shifts in 
nationality law led to war. As much violence as apartheid loyalists employed, VOB did not 
reach the level of major conflict. Perhaps a study drawing upon a global sample can more 
fully test this research question. That line of inquiry is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
At this point, it seems that exclusionary nationality laws (and denationalization of an 
outsider group specifically) remain the key factor that escalates insider/outsider violence 
from minor conflict to war. 
Alternative Explanations 
How does my theory mesh with alternative explanations of conflict? The following 
section explains how I account for the role of ethnic competition, electoral contests, and 
overlapping land claims in VOB. 
The first alternative explanation is that VOB is another story of ethnic insiders 
battling ethnic outsiders over scarce resources. However, this line of argument leaves too 
many open questions. Ethnic competition is everywhere, yet we observe markedly different 
levels of ethnic violence. Therefore, ethnic competition is an insufficient explanation in 
and of itself for explaining violence severity. I apply a citizenship rules lens to disentangle 
ethnic contests from one another and show why they follow different trajectories. 
Additionally, existing ethnic competition analyses tend to assume that the ethnic groups in 
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question are homogenous coalitions, whereas I examine multi-ethnic coalitions built 
around the identity of autochthony or a pan-ethnic, nationalist ideology.13  
A more fundamental problem with ethnic competition theses is the endogeneity 
problem. Ethnic labels are unstable over time and disputed by groups themselves. 
Moreover, ethnic coalitions, not to mention ethnic groups themselves, are built for strategic 
purposes (Bates 1983; Posner 2005). The competition between ethnic groups can be 
endogenous to the origination of the respective ethnic identities. For instance, the “Bété” 
ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire is a colonial-era artifact, an “agglomeration of more than seventy 
tribal groupings with no shared language” (Boone 2014, 134). Bété consciousness 
developed in reaction to losing under early-independence citizenship regime that ignored 
autochthonous land rights. In this regard, a strong parallel exists between the Ivoirian Bété, 
Kenyan Kalenjin, and Rwandan Hutu groups (Keller 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015; 
Boone 2014). A nationality law lens, with its emphasis on citizenship regime winners and 
losers, helps stabilize unstable ethnic categories in a way that permits wide comparison of 
groups across countries and over time. Through cross-national analysis, generalizable 
trends in insider/outsider violence become clear.  
In addition to ethnic competition theses, political competition is a common thread 
running through literature on VOB. In line with previous work, I acknowledge that 
elections are often the stage on which citizenship debates play out. Although elections may 
trigger events, grievances drive the dynamics (c.f. Klaus and Mitchell 2015; Boone 2014; 
                                                             
 
13 Although autochthony is tied to ethnicity, the category refers to the date of the group’s arrival 
in a territory. 
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Marshall-Fratani 2007; McGovern 2011). Furthermore, the electoral competition lens 
helps explain some VOB outcomes, but it cannot explain them all. I add to these accounts 
by capturing the full variation in VOB, and advancing new causal factors in insider/outsider 
violence (i.e. winner/loser competition and denationalization of outsiders).  
Theories of land competition also fall short of explaining the divergence in national 
level conflict. Autochtonous ideology certainly matters in citizenship politics, but 
competing land claims cannot explain variation in VOB severity. We see autochthonous 
discourse featured prominently in cases of national-level conflict (Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda), as well as in lower-level episodes (Ghana, Cameroon, 
Burkina Faso, South Africa, and Guinea). Theorizing about autochthonous movements is 
better suited for filling in the contours of citizenship narratives and explaining 
insider/outsider violence onset.  
Of course, a full account of VOB severity blends multiple lines of argument. 
Conflict is multi-causal, and factors in onset and escalation are not necessarily the same. 
Exclusionary nationality laws are frequently overlooked as a conflict process. By 
evaluating the intersection of citizenship, law, and narratives in cross-national perspective, 
I shed new light on VOB processes and patterns.  
Hypotheses 
The preceding discussion generates several testable hypothesis. In Chapters 4-8, I 
examine these propositions empirically using a mixed-methodology approach. I theorize 
that the codification of exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality law shapes patterns 
in violence. I first address how exclusionary nationality laws impact VOB severity in 




H1: Exclusionary nationality laws increase the severity of collective violence. 
 
I address Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 4 to motivate the rest of the dissertation. 
Employing an original dataset on Africa’s nationality laws, I find that exclusionary laws 
increase the severity of VOB. I operationalize severity as event frequency and fatality rates, 
and limit testing to violence over land, ethnicity, and elections. This decision is 
theoretically motivated as these issue-areas are historically related to citizenship struggles 
in Africa. 
Next, I examine how exclusionary nationality laws affect national level violence in 
particular, leading to Hypothesis 2: 
 
H2a: Violence at the national level will escalate to war once nationality are revised 
to denationalize one or more groups in society. 
H2b: Violence at the national level will fall short of war if nationality laws are not 
in question. 
 
Comparative case studies in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 show that the situation in 
Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC deteriorated as nationality laws became more exclusive. In 
support of H2a, I find that VOB there turned into war because an outsider group faced 
denationalization. In support of H2b, I find that VOB fell short of war in Kenya and Ghana 
because national citizenship criteria never came into question. Through these case studies, 
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I also illustrate how the causal mechanism of contentious narratives propels ethnic 
mobilization and intensifies VOB episodes.  
An important contribution of my research is that I apply the nationality law lens to 
conflict processes at the individual level. To my knowledge, no previous study has cross-
nationally examined the impact of exclusionary nationality laws at this level of analysis. I 
theorize that exclusionary laws incentivize violent collective action because they make 
individuals feel citizenship insecure, leading to Hypothesis 3: 
 
H3a: Citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will fear 
becoming a victim of political violence. 
H3b: Citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will use 
political violence. 
 
Citizenship insecurity refers to the ability to exercise citizenship rights. In Chapter 
Chapter 7, I use Afrobarometer survey data to measure of citizenship insecurity at the 
individual level. I find that individuals who face difficulty obtaining national identity 
documents (which prove their citizenship status) exhibit a greater likelihood of fearing and 
using political violence. Also, I find that the worst-off individuals (very insecure and 
discriminated against) are actually less likely to use political violence than the moderately 
worse off (somewhat insecure and discriminated against). These findings contradict most 
of the literature, but are in line with recent research suggesting that moderately-aggrieved 
groups are more likely to rebel than highly-aggrieved ones (Lacina 2014). 
I then use Afrobarometer data to measure the cross-national effect of contentious 
narratives at the individual level. I propose that this discourse mobilizes individuals along 
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ethnic lines according to the logics of threat and opportunity. This argument leads to 
Hypothesis 4: 
 
H4a: Contentious narratives increase the likelihood that an individual will fear 
becoming a victim of political violence. 
H4b: Contentious narratives increase the likelihood that an individual will use 
political violence. 
 
I cannot directly measure contentious narratives or their logics with available data, 
so I look for observable implications of an individual’s susceptibility to those narratives 
instead. Since insider groups typically mobilize around narrowing citizenship criteria, I use 
support for restrictive citizenship criteria as a proxy for susceptibility to insider-oriented 
narratives. Since outsider groups typically mobilize around denial of their citizenship 
rights, I classify individuals who were prevented from voting in the last election as 
susceptible to outsider-oriented narratives. I find that susceptibility to contentious 
narratives increases the likelihood an individual will use, but not fear, political violence.  
In Chapter Chapter 8, I explore the lingering effects of a violent politics of 
belonging through original survey data from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Citizenship is not a 
politicized issue in Ghana, but the issue led to war in Côte’s d’Ivoire (2002 to 2007 with a 
relapse of fighting in 2010). In October 2015, Côte d’Ivoire’s first election since the 2010 
Crise passed off peacefully, and Alassane Ouattara began his second presidential term. 
With economic growth on the rise, the country seems to be rebounding, and Ivoirians 
outwardly express stronger support for ethnic inclusion than Ghanaians. My survey reveals 
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not simply that ethnic divisions persist in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire, but that these 
cleavages remain potent risk factor in conflict relapse. I argue that the situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire illustrates the lingering effects of an exclusionary and violent politics of belonging. 
I capture this argument in my final hypothesis: 
 
H5: A history of violence of belonging increases support for using political 
violence, even after conflict has ended. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I look for observable implications of elevated risk factors 
in violence in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Ivoirians willing to mobilize around leaders are 
more likely to support the use of violence, but the same is not true in Ghana. Additionally, 
strong ethnic identification and the perception of ethnic bias in the government both predict 
of support for violence in Côte d’Ivoire, but not in Ghana. In fact, the only predictive 
measure of support for violence in Ghana is the perception that the regime favors its clients 
in the distribution of resources. This factor has a similar effect in Côte d’Ivoire. Taken 
together, Ivoirian ethnic entrepreneurs have a favorable recruitment environment, and 
collective action is violence-prone. The implication is that Ivorian stability, roundly 
cheered after the 2015 election, is precarious and that insider/outsider mobilization remains 
a serious threat.  
Final Remarks 
Citizenship struggles represent a form of redistributive conflict. Exclusionary 
nationality laws fuel competition between citizenship regime winners and losers. This 
competition encourages challenges to the prevailing citizenship rules, and insider/outsider 
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narratives develop. These narratives encourage ethnic mobilization around the logics of 
threat (depleted resources) and opportunity (improved standing). I expect that where the 
conditions for national level conflict are not met, localized VOB breaks out even if 
nationality laws are restrictive. Characteristics of nationality law reveal why episodes 
follow different trajectories. Where the national citizenship rules are at stake, nationality 
laws come into question and the risk of war increases. If the government denationalizes an 
outsider group, VOB escalates to war. This situation is most likely where outsiders have 
contested foreign origins because the group is composed of internal and external migrants. 
However, I expect VOB to remain at the minor conflict level where nationality laws are 
not in question, and debates only concern sub-national rules of belonging. 
Examining nationality laws as a causal factor is a novel approach to studying ethnic 
conflict. Most conflict scholars do not address the role of these laws at all. Even in accounts 
of VOB that acknowledge how important nationality laws are, scholars tend to treat these 
laws as a by-product of existing institutions rather than a force with explanatory power. 
Moreover, the qualitative-bent in VOB research has obscured factors that explain cross-
national variation in VOB severity. And yet, exclusionary nationality laws are clearly an 
important causal factor in political violence. They shape violence severity and contribute 
to pushing minor conflict towards war. 
To my knowledge, I have conducted the first cross-national study into the impact 
of nationality laws on political violence.14 By placing laws front and center of statistical 
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analysis, I expand the scope of testing to include all Sub-Saharan African countries, many 
forms of violence, and thousands of discrete events. Consequently, my work provides a 
much broader perspective on VOB than what has come before. It also demonstrates the 
conditions under which citizenship struggles are most likely to lead to war, a new direction 
for the literature. Finally, I have developed a generalizable framework for studying 






Chapter 4. Nationality Laws and Violence Severity: Evidence from 
the African Citizenship Policy Index 
 
Much has been written about the conceptual dimensions of citizenship in Africa, 
such as what citizenship means and how the institution has evolved over time. And yet the 
letter of citizenship law has received far less attention. Moreover, the field is built around 
a constellation of qualitative studies that speak to the interplay between context, 
mechanisms, and processes, yet are not grounded in a standard set of “measurements, 
criteria, and analyses” (Howard 2006, 444). Consequently, it is difficult to theorize about 
general patterns in citizenship policy, to understand the empirical implications of spatial 
and temporal variation in these laws, and to replicate findings from previous research.  
In this chapter, I present the first cross-national investigation of how provisions in 
nationality laws shape patterns in collective violence. I introduce a new tool for analyzing 
the impact of citizenship policy: the African Citizenship Policy Index (ACPI). The ACPI 
covers laws in 42 Sub-Saharan African countries from 1989 to 2015. It is the first country-
year measure of African citizenship policy, and the most comprehensive metric available. 
I find that more exclusionary provisions increase the frequency of inter-ethnic violence and 
the fatality rate of violence over land, elections, and ethnicity. Furthermore, years in which 
a new nationality law passes exhibit greater violence frequency, but not greater fatality 
rates.  
A Empirical Exploration of Citizenship Policy 
Contested citizenship threatens the stability of many African countries and yet 
cross-national data on laws are scarce. Notable exceptions include work by Geoffrey 
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Herbst (1999), who classifies countries according to jus soli or jus sanguinis nationality 
laws, and Bronwen Manby (2009, 2010, 2015), who catalogues discriminatory policies and 
practices throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Dual nationality provisions in particular have 
captured scholarly interest (Whitaker 2011; Sejersen 2008; Dahlin and Hironaka 2008), 
but much work remains to be done in terms of understanding the range, content, and 
implications of Africa’s legal landscape. Moreover, existing studies do not merge their data 
on citizenship-related laws with conflict data. As such, the field is not equipped to 
interrogate the diverse effects of exclusive nationality laws on violence.  Therefore, one of 
my primary contributions is an assessment of how the legal framework of belonging affects 
violence severity.  
The following chapter describes the methodology used to construct the ACPI and 
what the indicator reveals about citizenship policy over time. I also test my first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Exclusionary nationality laws increase the severity of collective violence. 
 
I define severity in terms of event count and fatalities. This coding decision is in 
line with the conflict literature, which defines social conflict, minor conflict, and major 
conflict based on how many battle-related deaths the episode had. Furthermore, I examine 
violent events related to elections, land, and ethnicity. Citizenship struggles typically 
manifest in these issue-areas. Land underlies understandings of citizenship and attachments 
to ethnic identity (Boone 2014; Mamdani 1996; Berry 2009). Assertion of land rights is 
linked to ambitions for political power and sentiments of belonging. During elections, 
politicians mobilize constituents by using land as patronage to reward supporters and 
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punish opponents (Boone 2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).  In Africa, land rights and 
political competition are tied to identity politics and ethnic cleavages (Raleigh 2014; 
Stewart 2008; Dorman 2014).  
Methodology and Measurement 
I created the African Citizenship Policy Index to test causal arguments about 
Africa’s nationality laws. The ACPI describes country performance in multi-dimensional 
space. Indices “provide simple comparisons of countries that can be used to illustrate 
complex and sometimes elusive issues” (OECD 2008, 13). By summarizing complex 
information, indices make it easier to evaluate abstract concepts and to interpret a wide 
array of causes or effects, as compared to juggling many separate indicators (OECD 2008). 
Examples of effective indices, include the gross domestic product (GDP), the Human 
Development Index, Polity IV, Freedom House scores, and the Fragile States Index, among 
many others.  
The downsides of composite indicators lie in their construction and application. 
Muro, Mazziotta, and Pareto (2010) consider two problems paramount: selecting the 
dimensions under consideration and deciding how to measure these dimensions. Of course, 
issues related to normalization, weighting, aggregation, and robustness should not be 
discounted (OECD 2008). Misinterpretation, lack of transparency, and simplistic policy 
prescriptions are perennial issues of composite indicators. In this section, I walk through 





To measure exclusionary citizenship rules, I first define what exclusion from 
citizenship means. I define it as the denial of rights and resources associated with formal 
citizenship status (e.g. the right to vote, own property, personal security, travel freely, etc.). 
National legislation is an implication of exclusion from citizenship that is measureable in 
an objective, systematic way. Informal barriers lead to exclusion as well, but they are not 
necessarily observable. Moreover, without formal citizenship rights individuals are 
prevented from participating fully in the political, economic, and social area. This type of 
marginalization is not necessarily the case when individuals lack informal recognition of 
their belonging. Therefore, I reserve this line of inquiry for future studies. 
The ACPI index builds upon previous efforts to construct comprehensive records 
of nationality laws in Europe (Howard 2005), Africa (Herbst 1999; Manby 2009; Seely 
2013), and elsewhere (Money 2002). My goal is to produce a metric akin to the Citizenship 
Policy Index (Howard 2005, 2006), an additive index evaluating nationality laws in 
Europe.15  
The ACPI is a composite of six sub-indicators. I determined ACPI dimensions 
based upon Manby’s (2009) identification of areas in citizenship policy producing 
exclusion: citizenship principle, gender equity, ethnicity and race, naturalization 
requirements and delayed political rights, and multiple nationalities. Citizenship principle 
                                                             
 
15 Marc Marjoré Howard’s (2005, 2006) Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) has three dimensions: jus 
soli principles, residency requirements for naturalization, and dual nationality for naturalized 
immigrants. The CPI allocates up to 2 points for each indicator, leading to a 6-point additive scale. 
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refers to the fact that citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis) sets a higher bar for national 
belonging than citizenship by birth in the territory (jus soli). Countries that do not recognize 
a woman’s right to pass citizenship to her foreign spouse or her children also create undue 
barriers to access, as do countries that show preferences for particular ethnic or racial 
groups. Finally, governments often set up barriers to those interested in naturalizing, such 
as lengthy dual nationality residency requirements and restrictions on political rights for 
naturalized citizens.   
Components of the African Citizenship Policy Index 
The master list of relevant nationality, naturalization, and constitutional laws comes 
primarily from Manby (2015), although it has been supplemented by additional material 
collected by the author. To be included in the study, a law had to pertain to one of the six 
dimensions of the ACPI. Data comes from constitutions, nationality laws, naturalization 
laws, amendments and policy notes. I obtained copies of these documents from the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s Refworld database, academic 
books and journal articles, and websites of governments or non-governmental 
organizations.16 
Following Howard (2005, 2006), I allocate up to 2 points for each ACPI sub-
indicator. By keeping ACPI components in the same units, it is not necessary to normalize 
scores at the sub-indicator level. Countries are coded on whether evidence of a type of 
provision can be found. Where no evidence to the contrary can be found, countries are 
                                                             
 




coded as if that exclusionary practice is absent. Therefore, I do not distinguish between 
countries that disavow an exclusionary practice from those with laws that say nothing one 
way or the other on the practice. In addition, the sub-indicators are not continuous 
measures, they are categorical. As such, I identify natural breaks and thresholds of 
exclusion rather than a gradation in policies and treatment of individuals. The strength of 
this coding procedure is that the ACPI framework is highly generalizable. Furthermore, 
each sub-indicator has full coverage and no missing values. Figure 1 summarizes the 
distribution of observations across ACPI sub-indicators.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Index Components, All Years 
 
Citizenship Principle: I distinguish nationality laws by the extent to which they are 

























Note: Scores are cumulative for all years
Distribution of ACPI Sub-indicator Scores
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respectively. In some cases, law allows individuals born in the country to foreign parents 
to acquire citizenship at the age of majority, after a residency period, or after meeting other 
criteria. I assign these cases of limited jus soli a value of “1”. By and large, African states 
enshrine jus sanguinis principles fully (54%) or through limited jus soli laws (40.7%). Only 
5.3% of country-years have pure jus soli laws, driven by Mozambique and Chad’s generous 
policies.17 On average, countries score a 1.49 on the ACPI’s Principle dimension. 
 Gender Equity: Most countries allow foreign women to acquire citizenship upon 
marriage to a national. However, many countries, including Burundi, Ghana, and Malawi, 
do not allow women nationals to pass citizenship on to their foreign husbands. I assign 
these cases a sub-indicator value of “1”. Countries that do not allow women to pass 
citizenship to their children on terms equal to men take a value of “2”. For example, Kenya 
only allowed fathers to pass citizenship to children born abroad until 2010. In Sudan, 
individuals whose mothers are citizens and whose fathers are foreign must apply for 
citizenship.  I assume that prohibitions against passing citizenship to children is more 
exclusionary than prohibitions against passing citizenship to foreign spouses. My logic is 
that foreign nationals (and thus foreign spouses) have historically been treated with 
skepticism in Africa and elsewhere. In fact, naturalization remains elusive in many African 
countries (Manby 2009). In contrast, the inability of a mother to pass citizenship to her 
child simply because the father is a non-citizen demonstrates a significant prejudice against 
women. The issue does not even arise for children born to non-citizen mothers. In the 
dataset, Gender Discrimination is distributed among country-years as follows: no evidence 
                                                             
 
17 Tanzania had jus soli laws until 1994.   
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of gender inequality at 36%, discrimination against foreign spouses at 37.5%, and against 
children at 26%. On average, countries score a 0.9 on the ACPI’s Gender Discrimination 
dimension. 
Ethnicity and Race: The index component Ethnic/Racial Discrimination reveals 
which countries require citizens to be from specific ethnic or racial backgrounds. I assign 
countries favoring members of particular ethnic or racial groups a sub-indicator score of 
“2”. For instance, since 1995 Uganda has required citizens be members of an indigenous 
ethnic group. Liberia and Sierra Leone require citizens to be of “negro descent.” When 
African origin is required to claim citizenship by birth (Malawi or Mali) or to naturalize 
(Chad, Tanzania 1962 to 1995, or Kenya 1963 to 2011), I assign the country a score of 
“1”.18 Without evidence of ethnic or racial discrimination, a country scores “0”. Formalized 
ethnic discrimination is relatively low, making up 20% of observations. Countries score an 
average 0.32 on this ACPI component. 
Multiple Nationalities: Dual nationality is permitted in 39 Sub-Saharan African 
countries, usually in response to pressures exerted by migration (Whitaker 2011, Manby 
2009). Permitting individuals to hold multiple nationalities addresses the complex 
migration history in many African states, and would contradict states’ efforts to deny 
citizenship based on foreign parentage (Manby 2015). I assign the Dual Nationality sub-
indicator a value of “2” if the practice is entirely forbidden; that is, any individual who 
takes a foreign nationality loses his or her citizenship. If multiple nationalities are permitted 
                                                             
 
18 Historically, and in the present day, countries have debates whether “African” origin refers to 
racial or geographic boundaries. In coding the ACPI, I assumed it meant geography considering 
that there was a clear precedent among some countries of specifying racial categories.    
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for a limited class of persons, such as women married to foreign nationals, Dual Nationality 
takes a value of “1”. Where multiple nationalities are permitted for all citizens, the value 
“0” is assigned. In 32.9% of country-years dual nationality is permitted across the board, 
with limited permission granted in 8.64% of country-years. The practice is prohibited in 
about 59% of country-years. The average score for the ACPI’S Dual Nationality 
component is 1.23. 
Naturalization and Residency: Although procedures vary from place to place 
residency periods are part of the requirements for naturalization. These requirements are 
often waived in the case of marriage. Following Howard (2005), I divide the Residency 
Requirements sub-indicator into three categories: Countries asking for ten or more years of 
residency are assigned a value of “2”, those asking for six to nine years take a value of “1”, 
and those asking for five years or less take a value of “0”. In 43.4% of country-years 
naturalization requires 5 years of residency or less, while 44.9% require 10 years or more. 
11.8% of observations fall in-between at 6 to 9 years. On average, countries score a 1.01 
on the ACPI’s Residency Requirements dimensions. 
Delayed Rights: Naturalized citizens are often treated differently than citizens by 
birth or acquisition. One area of difference is that laws may impose a delay on the political 
rights of naturalized citizens. It may be years (if ever) before a naturalized citizen is allowed 
to vote, work as a civil servant, register at the bar, hold ministerial office, or serve in the 
military. I assign the sub-indicator Delayed Rights a value of “1” if there is up to a five 
year delay in political rights for naturalized citizens, and a value of “2” if this waiting 
period is six years or more. A score of “0” indicates that there is no evidence of a delay, 
which is the case for 57% of observations. A delay of five years or less is imposed in 
84 
 
13.14% of country-years, and 29.5% have a delay of 6 years or more. On average, countries 
score a 0.721 on this ACPI component.  
To calculate a country’s ACPI score, a composite of all sub-indicator values, I 
deviate from Howard (2005)’s additive scale in favor of a geometric mean.19 Geometric 
averages are less influenced by outlier values and account for wide variation across sub-
indicator values better than additive scales do. 20 Without a strong theoretical foundation to 
indicate precise weighting of each dimension, I do not weight ACPI sub-indicators in the 
primary analysis. For robustness checks, though, I use the variables ACPI2w and ACPI3w, 
which employ alternative weighting schemes. ACPI2w weights Principle, Gender, and 
Ethnicity twice as much as Dual, Residency, and Delay on the assumption that dimensions 
applying to citizens by birth have a stronger impact on outcomes than dimensions applying 
to naturalized citizens. The logic: naturalization is allowed by law in most African 
countries, but rare in practice (Manby 2009). ACPI3w weights Gender, and Ethnicity twice 
as much and Ethnicity three times as much as Dual, Residency, and Delay. ACPI3w follows 
the same logic as ACPI2w, but assumes that ethnic discrimination is the most potent form 
of exclusion. The extensive literature on ethnic conflict lends confidence to this 
assumption. Table 2 summarizes the three weighting schemes. Higher ACPI values 
                                                             
 
19 To find the geometric mean, I add “1” to the raw ACPI scores, calculate the product of the 6 sub-
indicator scores, and take the 6th root of the product. 
20 Assume Index IC has sub-indicators J1-3. On an additive scale, Country C1 with sub-indicators 
J1=2, J2=2, J3=2 would score a 6 and Country C2 with sub-indicators J1=1, J2=1, and J3=6 would 
score an 8. A geometric mean, on the other hand, would score C1 as 2 and C2 as 1.817, taking into 
account the even performance of C1 and the varied performance of C2. 
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indicate more exclusionary policy. Additional descriptive statistics are available in Table 
6 and Table 7 in the appendix. 
 
Table 2: Weighting the composite ACPI 
Dimension Regulates ACPI ACPI2w ACPI3w 
Principle Citizens by birth 1x 2x 2x 
Gender Citizens by birth + Naturalization 1x 2x 2x 
Ethnicity Citizens by birth + Naturalization 1x 2x 3x 
Dual Naturalization 1x 1x 1x 
Residency Naturalization 1x 1x 1x 
Delay Naturalization 1x 1x 1x 
 Dataset Average Score: 1.77 2.51 2.68 
 
Trends in Citizenship Law According to the African Citizenship Policy Index 
Citizenship policy is by no means static. To get a sense for its evolution, it is useful 
to look at ACPI scores at several points in time. Figure 2 compares for all countries in 1989 
(panel 1) and 2014 (panel 2). Institutions are notoriously slow to change, so ACPI scores 
do not change from year to year. For example Benin, Madagascar, and Zambia, among 
others, exhibit zero change in their scores for the entire period. That said, there has been 
marked improvement in citizenship policy in the last 25 years or so. Rwanda’s score 
dropped 55% (1.12 in 2014), the DRC’s score dropped 31% (1.94 in 2014), and Sierra 
Leone’s score also dropped 31% (2.08 in 2014). Moreover, it is rare that nationality laws 
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become more exclusionary over time. Swaziland and Mauritania are the exceptions, with 
a 0.11-point and 0.09-point increase, respectively.21   
Figure 3 presents annual data for selected cases to illustrate several patterns of 
change observed in the dataset. Exclusion dropped off precipitously in Angola in 1991 and 
more gradually in Kenya and South Africa. Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire remained more 
exclusive for longer periods of time, while Angola and South Africa have seen low 
exclusion for the majority of the observation period. In summary, there is an encouraging 
trend in Africa’s nationality laws.  
 
  
                                                             
 
21  Swaziland’s index rose from 1.62 to 1.73 when dual nationality was prohibited in 1992. 
Mauritania’s score went from 1.82 to 1.91 in 2010. In this year, women gained the right to pass 
citizenship to their children (if not their foreign spouses) on terms equal to men and dual nationality 
was legalized. However, naturalization residency requirements were reduced only for individuals 











Figure 3: Citizenship Policy Scores Over Time, Selected Cases
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Patterns in Violence 
I hypothesize that exclusionary nationality laws increase the severity of political 
violence. To test this proposition, I use two count dependent variables capturing the 
frequency and fatality rate of violent events. Data comes from the Social Conflict in Africa 
Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012), an event-level database compiling a record of 
social conflict events based on reports from the Associated Press (AP) and Associated 
French Press (AFP).22 Social conflict is defined as contentious political activity that falls 
short of war. Given the dataset’s event-level nature, I use country-year counts of events 
and fatalities. At the time of data collection, SCAD included information for 42 Sub-
Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2013.23 Descriptive statistics of violence 
events are available in Table 6 and Table 7 in the appendix. 
In their original form, SCAD events are categorized according to issue type and are 
accompanied by a description of the event and the actor involved. I compile counts of the 
number of events and the number of fatalities in each country-year for land, election, and 
inter-ethnic violence. 24  I then create the following dependent variables: Election 
Frequency, Election Fatalities, Land Frequency, Land Fatalities, Inter-ethnic Frequency, 
and Inter-ethnic Fatalities. I preserve SCAD’s categorization of election and ethnic 
violence events. According to the SCAD codebook, an event constitutes election violence 
                                                             
 
22 SCAD coders identified events by conducting keyword searches in Lexis-Nexis searches of the 
AP and AFP.  
23 At the time of this writing, SCAD covers events between 1990 and 2014 in Africa, Mexico, 
Central America, and the Caribbean. 
24 SCAD fatality estimates come from source (e.g. AP, AFP) reports about the event.  
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if an election is the source of unrest, and inter-ethnic violence occurs when religion or 
ethnicity was an issue in the event. SCAD does not identify which events are related to 
land issues. To identify these incidents, I reviewed event descriptions to determine which 
events fit the land violence definition from the existing literature. I coded an event as land-
related if the SCAD description stated that contested borders or land or water resources 
were at issue.25 This compilation of land violence events is an added bonus of the ACPI 
data collection because there is not currently a dataset like this on land violence events.  
Some events can be classified as several different types of violence because these 
issue-areas are not mutually exclusive categories. For instance, it is possible for a SCAD 
event to be classified as both land and ethnic violence. This fact makes sense because some 
confrontations are strictly single-issue events (e.g. election outcomes), but other times they 
reflect tensions over multiple or overlapping issues (e.g. land and immigration). For this 
reason, I run separate analysis for each type of violence.  
In total 8,582 violent events are analyzed across 42 countries for the period 1990 to 
2013. Almost 80% of the country-years in the dataset suffer from at least one violent event. 
Generally speaking, more than 8 events occur per year. With 246 reported events in 2012 
alone, Nigeria suffered the highest number of recorded events in a given year. On average, 
events lead to 95 fatalities per year, although some lead to thousands. The maximum 
                                                             
 
25  Events related to self-determination are excluded from this analysis. See Chapter 
 
Chapter 3, “Assumptions”. 
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number of fatalities recorded in the dataset is the DRC with over 5,500 fatalities 
documented in 1993.  
Figure 4 breaks down event frequency by issue area. Inter-ethnic violence is well 
documented in the dataset with 1,331 events total. 27.4% of country-years experienced 
inter-ethnic violence, with an average of 1.3 events per year. Nigeria had the highest 
number of ethnic events in any given year: 66 in 2011. Electoral violence arises less often 
with 775 events total, coming just shy of 23% of country-years. Nigeria had the highest 
number of election violence events too: 20 in 2011. Averaging less than one event per year, 
land violence is not well documented by SCAD. Only 240 land events appear in the dataset. 
Likely this deficit is caused by underreporting in international newspapers. Although most 
countries did not experience land violence, some had quite a bit. For instance, Sudan had 




Figure 4: Event Frequency by Issue-Area 
Empirical Analysis 
I run a series of regressions with robust standard errors using Frequency and 
Fatalities dependent variables. These count variables exhibit a right-skew and 
overdispersion, which necessitates the use of negative binomial regressions (NBREG).26 
Standard errors are clustered on country to account for serial correlation within countries. 
I do not use fixed effects because ACPI scores do not typically vary within countries over 
the period of observation. Therefore, I leverage variation across countries to determine the 
effect of exclusionary nationality laws on patterns in violence. 
                                                             
 
26 I use NBREG rather than Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression (ZINB) because most of 
the ZINB models fail to converge. 
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In each model, I control for forces in a country affecting the nature of law generally 
or citizenship policy specifically. I include population density, the size of the immigrant 
population, and ethnic fractionalization because I expect these demographic characteristics 
to shape society’s understanding of belonging and where the bounds of citizenship should 
be. Population density and migration flows are sources of economic and political 
competition that drive tensions in society. Ethnicity is a powerful mobilizing force, 
especially in weak democracies, and intrinsically related to understandings of citizenship 
in Africa. For all of these reasons, ethnicity and population variables are standard factors 
to include in studies of political violence (cf. Fox and Hoelscher 2012). The ethnic 
fractionalization measure comes from the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) dataset (Birnir 
et al. 2016), while population data comes from the World Bank.27  
Regime type is added to the model given that political openness should push 
citizenship policy to be more inclusive as a wider segment of the population achieves 
political representation. Regime data comes from the Polity IV project (Polity2 variable). 
The models also feature political and economic controls. The size of the excluded 
population comes from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR).28 The World Bank 
provides data for GDP per capita and unemployment. I also include dummies for a year in 
which citizenship law changes, election years, and the presence of minor conflict or war. 
These factors are likely to intensify any violence that does break out. Descriptive statistics 
for all controls are available in Table 6 and Table 7 in the appendix. 
                                                             
 
27 The World Bank estimates of total migrant stock includes the size of the refugee population. 
28 EPR data ends in 2010, but the Excluded Population measure very rarely varies within country. 
I fill in the missing four years based on the last observed value of Excluded Population. 
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The final way I control for confounding factors is by narrowing the scope to events 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. This region is comprised of young states on the same continent 
undergoing democratization and economic development in the same international context. 
Regimes face similar challenges and opportunities including colonial legacies, poverty, 
economic and educational inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, dependence on mineral wealth 
or cash crops, traditions of centralized leadership and autocratic rule, complex migration 
patterns, and brutal conflicts. At the same time, many of these states endeavor to harness 
the potential that lies in youth bulges, contrasts between large rural populations and surging 
in urban centers, vast natural resources, and strategic friendships in the international 
system.  
In the primary analysis I use unweighted ACPI scores lagged by one year to address 
concerns that violence severity drives the development of nationality laws.29 Estimates are 
presented as incidence rate ratios.30  I then conduct multiple robustness checks: Other 
Violence models, which use the total number of violent events or fatalities as the dependent 
variable; models using weighted ACPI scores; and models in which all independent 
variables are lagged by one year. Finally, I test the effect of each ACPI sub-indicator on 
Frequency and Fatalities dependent variables to ensure that one single dimension of the 
ACPI is not driving the results.  
                                                             
 
29  The lag addresses this endogeneity concern by ensuring that policies are measured before 
violence outcomes are measured and it accounts for learning by actors and the time it takes for 
contentious politics to turn violent.  
30 When standard error bars cross “1”, the coefficient estimate loses statistical significance. Values 





In support of Hypothesis 1, citizenship policy has a stronger effect on fatality rates 
than event frequency. It also affects inter-ethnic violence more than any other issue-area. 
Higher ACPI scores, indicating more restrictive citizenship policy, are positively correlated 
with the number of inter-ethnic events. For every unit increase in the ACPI, we can expect 
more than five times as many inter-ethnic violence events, on average, holding all else 
constant. Considering that inter-ethnic events average 59 fatalities each, any increase in 
event count is costly in human and economic terms.  
The ACPI does not have a significant effect on the number of election, land, or 
other violence events. However, the number of election, land, and ethnic violence events 
jumps the year a new citizenship law comes into force. In fact, there are four times more 
land events in a new-law year than in other years, on average holding all else constant. This 
increase is substantively significant, especially considering how few land events there are 
in the dataset. On average, there are only 0.23 per year and the maximum in any year is 
nine events. A new citizenship law also increases the frequency of inter-ethnic violence 
(2.3 times more events) and election violence (2.5 times more events). I find that the 
introduction of a new citizenship law has no effect on “other” types of violence. 
In terms of control variables, the size of the immigrant population has a small, 
negative relationship with the number of land and ethnicity-related events. Figure 5 shows 
these results graphically as incidence rate ratios, and Table 8 in the appendix presents the 








Figure 5: ACPI Scores and Event Frequency
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Another way to operationalize violence severity is to look at the event fatality rate. 
Using fatality rates as a measure of episode intensity is theoretically grounded. The conflict 
literature often defines conflict levels based on battle-related death estimates.31  
In support of Hypothesis 1, the ACPI has a strong effect on fatality rates across 
election, land, and inter-ethnic violence. The ACPI’s effect is stronger in Fatality models 
than in Frequency ones. For every unit increase in the ACPI, there are 76 times more 
election fatalities (average: 10 fatalities), nearly 10 times more land fatalities (average: 11 
fatalities), about 19 times more inter-ethnic fatalities (average: 59 fatalities), and about 2 
times more “other” fatalities (average: 15 fatalities).32  
The coefficient on Law Year loses is statistical significance in these models. The 
introduction of a new law may influence frequency more than fatalities because laws 
represent a culmination of debates over criteria and serve as focal points for mobilization. 
The law year itself has less effect on marginalization than exclusionary provisions 
themselves (captured by higher ACPI values).  
Ethnic fractionalization has a positive and significant effect on fatalities from land 
and inter-ethnic violence. The size of the immigrant population has a significant but 
negative effect. Ethnic diversity has been shown to increase low-level violence (Fox and 
Hoelscher 2012; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). It is surprising that immigration flows would 
decrease the fatality rate because so much of the literature describes xenophobic 
                                                             
 
31 The Uppsala Conflict Database Program and Correlates of War definitions of minor and major 
conflict are just two examples.  




contestation. Ongoing war or minor conflict increases fatalities generally, likely because 
these episodes are defined by battle-related deaths. The ACPI actually has a larger effect 
on the severity of events than war or minor conflict does. Likely, this result arises because 
citizenship policy taps into localized understandings of belongings, and even national VOB 
has local roots (Côté and Mitchell 2016). Figure 6 shows these results graphically as 
incidence rate ratios, and Table 10 in the appendix presents the full regression results. 
[Insert Figure 6] 
Robustness checks 
Although weighting individual components of the ACPI may improve the metric’s 
efficiency, there is not a strong theoretical grounding for weight specification. Therefore, 
I use unweighted ACPI scores in the primary analysis. I now present robustness checks 
using alternative weighting schemes, ACPI2w, and ACPI3w. Results hold across all 
Weighted models (Tables 12, 14, 16, and 18 in the appendix), although coefficients are 
smaller than in the primary models. 
In a second robustness check, I lag most control variables by one year in order to 
account for the progression of contentious politics over time.33 Results hold across Lagged 
models (Tables 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 in the appendix). Plus, ACPI and Other Frequency 
are now positively and significantly related (p<0.05). The coefficients in Lagged models 
tend to be smaller than in the Primary models.  
                                                             
 
33 Control variables expected to impact events in the moment, rather than over time, are not lagged: 





Figure 6: ACPI Scores and Violence Fatalities
Lastly, I investigated whether one dimension drives the ACPI’s overall effect. 
Table 3 summarizes the findings, indicating the direction of the relationship 
between ACPI sub-indicators and each outcome of interest. I also present the coefficient 
sign for Law Year. Interestingly, I find that several provisions have a significant and 
positive coefficient in Frequency models, even though the composite ACPI score has 
limited effect on Frequency. Specifically, ethnic discrimination increases the number of 
events across types of violence. Gender discrimination increases the number of events tied 
to land, ethnicity, and other issue-areas. Longer residency requirements for naturalized 
citizens reduces the number of election and land events in a given year. This last finding 
may indicate that such requirements can be a tool to lessen political competition between 
citizens and recent migrants from abroad. In addition, new-law years have a strong 
significant and positive correlation in Frequency as well. This relationship likely arises 
because laws are excellent focal points for mobilization and typically the result of bitter 
disputes over where to draw the lines of the political community. Thus, the coefficient 
estimates for Law Year may capture the effect of a culmination of debates over citizenship. 
Certain dimensions of the ACPI increase event fatality rates as well. Gender 
discrimination has a positive effect in Fatalities models, and ethnic discrimination 
increases fatalities during electoral, inter-ethnic, and “other” violence. Dual nationality 
increases fatalities during inter-ethnic and “other” violence, while delayed political rights 
increases election fatalities. Again, the relationship between residency requirements and 
violence outcomes is negative, likely for the reason mentioned previously. In addition, Law 
Year largely loses its significance in fatality models. Where the Law Year coefficient does 
achieve significance, it affects fatalities from land and inter-ethnic violence.   
Table 3: ACPI Components and Patterns in Violence 
 Frequency Fatalities 
 
Elections Land Ethnicity Other Elections Land Ethnicity Other 
Citizenship Principle . . . . . . . . 
Law Year + + + . . . + . 
Gender Discrimination . + + + + + + + 
Law Year + + + . . . . . 
Ethnic Discrimination + + + + + . + + 
Law Year + + + . - + . . 
Dual Nationality . . . . . . + + 
Law Year + + + . . . . . 
Residency Requirements - - . . . . . - 
Law Year + + + + . . + . 
Delayed Political Rights . . . . + . . . 
Law Year + + + + . + + . 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that citizenship policy, an area often overlooked by 
conflict scholars, deserves closer attention and continued research. I draw on evidence from 
the African Citizenship Policy Index, a metric I designed to investigate generalizable trends 
in nationality laws. Results show that exclusionary laws increase the severity of collective 
violence, particularly in terms of fatalities. I find that every unit increase in the ACPI, leads 
to more than five inter-ethnic violence events, about 76 times more election fatalities, 10 
times more land fatalities, 19 times more inter-ethnic fatalities, and about two times more 
“other” fatalities, on average. I also find that new-law years see greater violence severity 
as well. There are four times more land events, 2.3 times more ethnic events, and 2.5 times 
more electoral violence events in such years. The implication is that even if policies 
become more inclusionary over time, violence may still occur in the year nationality laws 
change. Contested citizenship causes deep divisions in society. The years in which these 
debates reach their zenith, when the laws are in flux, are more violent than others. It is 
important to note that no single ACPI dimension is driving the results.  
After testing three different weighting schemes I determined that results remain 
robust to alternate specifications. My analysis of individual sub-indicators suggests that 
gender and ethnic discrimination should be weighted more heavily than other dimensions, 
but it is unclear what the exact weighting values should be. Continued empirical work is 
needed to understand the best path forward. Another caveat of the ACPI is that the index 
is built on fine-grained information about provisions, but is constructed as a composite of 
categorical variables. Some details about provisions are lost in the process of aggregation. 
At the same time, my methodology supports my overarching goal to find a balance between 
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meaningful information about exclusionary practices and facilitate broad comparison 
across laws, countries, and time periods. I pursue this balance by supplementing the 
aggregated ACPI scores with detailed notes about exact provisions in the full ACPI dataset. 
Future researchers can thus recode ACPI scores to suit their specific research questions.  
My approach maintains consistency with previous work, thereby promoting cross-
national and inter-regional comparisons. However, this analysis represents several “firsts”. 
I built the first cross-national dataset on Africa’s nationality laws. I then conducted the first 
analysis of how exclusionary nationality laws shape patterns in violence. In addition, land 
disputes are increasingly common and yet there is no comprehensive land violence dataset 
available. I identify land violence events using SCAD and conduct a cross-national, 
statistical examination on their determinants. This too is a novel contribution since previous 
statistical analyses of land violence only consider episodes of major conflict (cf. Fearon 
and Laitin 2011). My findings are conservative estimates given that SCAD has limited 
documentation of land disputes. Future research will only broaden our understanding of 
land-related conflict.  
Where do we go from here? The immediate next step is to address why nationality 
laws shape patterns in violence. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the causal pathway more 
carefully, and illuminate the conditions under which citizenship struggles do or do not 
escalate to war. In the longer-term, analysts can update the ACPI framework to incorporate 
measures of de facto exclusion from citizenship rights, such as the quality of civil 
administration systems, responsible for birth and voter registration levels. Finally, Chapters 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 apply the nationality law lens to conflict processes at the individual 
104 
 
level. I demonstrate how citizenship security and contentious citizenship narratives shape 




Chapter 5. Nationality Laws and Civil War: Evidence from Côte 
d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
This chapter illustrates how contested citizenship rules contribute to VOB, and the 
role nationality laws play in escalating events to the point of war. I offer a different 
perspective on why individuals mobilized during VOB in Côte d’Ivoire and the Congo. 
Moreover, I go beyond the standard ethnic identification arguments to make the case that 
exclusionary nationality laws shaped conflict processes in these countries. Essentially, I 
test the first part of Hypothesis 2: 
 
H2a: Violence at the national level will escalate to war once nationality are revised 
to denationalize one or more groups in society. 
 
Restrictive laws increase citizenship insecurity, which fuels winner/loser 
competition and stokes contentious insider/outsider narratives, which guide ethnic 
mobilization. Although mobilization is typically elite-directed, I focus here on the joint 
production of violence by elites and individuals. When the conditions are met, VOB 
escalates from the local to the national level. At this point, VOB escalates to war once an 
outsider group faces denationalization. I argue that this situation is most likely where an 
outsider group has contested foreign origins because popular imagination conflates internal 
migrants and foreign nationals. However, when national citizenship rules are not at stake, 
national level VOB is likely to remain a minor conflict. Where an outsider group is 




As evidence, I present four case studies that span two chapters. In this chapter, I 
use process tracing to explain how events in Côte d’Ivoire escalated to the point of civil 
war (2002-2007). Next, I show that events in the DRC followed a similar trajectory (1996-
2003). In both cases, citizenship regime winner/loser competition culminated in an attempt 
by winning insiders to denationalize a losing outsider group. In Chapter 5, I use process 
tracing to explain why citizenship conflict in Kenya and Ghana fell short of war. Namely, 
although winner/loser competition led to insider/outsider narratives and violence, there 
were no serious efforts by the government to denationalize outsiders. 
The case selection is justifiably non-random. I examine cases with the necessary 
variation on the dependent and independent variables, while controlling for potentially 
confounding factors and addressing alternative explanations. The dependent variable under 
study is violence severity. Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC both succumbed to civil wars, and 
Kenya has experienced bouts of minor conflict. I use Ghana, which has only seen the 
outbreak of localized skirmishes, as the “negative” case. National citizenship rules were 
thrown into question and formally revised in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC. In Kenya and 
Ghana, the national citizenship rules were never at stake, even though sub-national 
citizenship rules came under fire.  
The case analysis complements existing scholarship on ethnic competition, 
electoral competition, and competing land claims. Land-related and inter-ethnic violence 
is present in all four cases. Elections triggered VOB in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, and Kenya, 
but not in Ghana. Additionally, nationality law provisions vary within and across all four 
cases. The long time horizon of the study also allows me to control for exclusionary and 
inclusionary periods in each country’s history. See Table 4 for a summary of the case 
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selection methodology. Data comes from secondary source material and original 
interviews I conducted with political researchers in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and Accra, 














2. The DRC 
Major 
Conflict 
Citizenship politicized at the national 
level 
 
Outsider group (internal and external 
migrants) 
threatened with denationalization 
 Elections triggered widespread violence 
 Insider group 
o Lost ancestral land to outsiders 
o Economically disadvantaged vis-à-vis 
outsiders 
 Outsider group 
o Demographic majority/near-majority 
o Favored by colonial and post-colonial 
state 
o Powerful (if still “potential”) electoral 
bloc 




Citizenship politicized at the national 
level 
 
Outsider group (internal migrants) 
not threatened 
with denationalization 
 Elections triggered widespread violence 
 Insider group 
o Lost ancestral land to outsiders 
o Economically disadvantaged vis-à-vis 
outsiders 
 Outsider group 
o Demographic majority/near-majority 
o Favored by colonial and post-colonial 
state 
o Powerful electoral bloc 
 Statist land regime 







Citizenship not politicized at the 
national level 
 
Outsider group (internal and external 
migrants) not threatened 
with denationalization 
 
 Insider group 
o Lost ancestral land to outsiders 
o Economically advantaged vis-à-vis 
outsiders 
 Outsider group 
o Demographic minority 
o Substantial electoral bloc 
 Customary land regime 
110 
 
Côte d’Ivoire  
To understand the trajectory of citizenship debates in Côte d’Ivoire, it is essential 
to understand the ethnogenesis of the “Dioula” ethnic group. The label is too often 
simplified in terms of the Muslim North/Christian South cleavage. A full explanation 
requires some appreciation of the demographics in the northern part of the country. It is 
easiest to describe the landscape of Ivoirian ethnic groups after carving the country up into 
figurative quadrants (cf. McGovern 2011). The northwestern quadrant has a majority 
Mande-speakers (the Malinke/Jula, Gouro, Toura, and Dan), who are related to the Mande-
speakers of Mali, Guinea, and Liberia.34 Mande languages in Côte d’Ivoire can be divided 
into the northern subgroups (Maninka/Jula and Bamana) and southern subgroups (Mano, 
Gouro, and Dan). The Northern Mande are generally Muslim, while Southern Mande are 
Christians or follow traditional religions. The northeastern quadrant has a majority Voltaic-
speakers (the Senufo, Lobi, and Koulango), who are related to the Voltaic language 
speakers in Mali and Burkina Faso. The southern half of the country has its own set of 
ethnic groups, which also have historical ties to groups in Liberia and Ghana.  
Over time, the terms “Northerners” and “Dioula” came to refer indiscriminately to 
the northern Mande and Voltaic speakers. The terms conflate groups that do not share the 
same language, culture, religion, or history. Their common link is only the trading 
language, Dioula. The terms contribute to contentious identity politics by presuming that 
all Dioula are Muslim. They also fail to distinguish between families that have historically 
                                                             
 
34 The Jula language is sometimes spelled “Dioula” or “Dyula”. 
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lived in present-day Côte d’Ivoire and those who have emigrated from elsewhere (Mali, 
Guinea, or Burkina Faso) (Marshall-Fratani 2007; McGovern 2011; Manby 2009). In my 
discussion, I use the terms Northerners and Dioula interchangeably. 
 
Figure 7: Map of Côte d'Ivoire 35 
Colonial Foundations 
 The colonial state territorialized and ethnicized political identification through 
“colonial ethnography, colonial government, and economic policy” (Marshall-Fratani 
                                                             
 
35 Map courtesy of the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at 
Austin. Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/cote_divoire_ref04.jpg. Accessed 
August 26, 2016. 
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2007, 16; see also Mamdani 1996; Chauveau and Dozon 1987).36 Citizenship rules during 
this period distinguished between citizens (Europeans) and subjects (non-whites), as well 
as between African “natives” and “settlers” (Mamdani 1996).37  The colonial land tenure 
regime consistently favored migrants. Even after independence the state continued to 
allocate land “at the expense of aggrieved communities claiming ancestral rights to land 
(Boone 2014, 260, emphasis in original).” Autochthonous groups were even pressured into 
leasing land to outsiders through tutorat arrangements (Lewis 2003; Boone 2014; Berry 
2009) in which an ongoing exchange of “gifts” served as a signature by both parties on the 
informal dotted line (Boone 2014; Manby 2009; Dozon 1985). As such, the relationship 
between hosts and strangers in the country more closely resembled a patron-client bond 
than tenancy (Berry 2009).  
Cash crop revenues slumped in the 1940s. In an effort to fuel flagging production, 
the French administration moved thousands of people from eastern Côte d’Ivoire (e.g. the 
Baoulé) and the northern reaches of the colony (e.g. Iovirian Jula and Senoufo, Burkinabés, 
and Malians) to the southwestern frontier, home of the We, Bété, and Dan (Boone 2014). 
These colonial resettlement schemes spurred an ethnic consciousness for many groups 
(Dozon 1985). At the core of this consciousness was the ideology of autochthony, which 
                                                             
 
36 For instance, the sixty distinct Ivoirian societies were carved up and assigned to administrative 
units under the fiction that the new ethnic groupings represented primordial nations (Boone 2014, 
130). 
37  In the literature, “hosts” are also referred to as natives, indigenes, and autochthons, and 




developed “in large part in opposition to a state that was seen as the architect of this [land] 
dispossession” (Boone 2014, 134; Chauveau and Dozon 1987).   
Within a decade, strangers outnumbered the indigenous population. 38 
Insider/outsider tensions boiled over as land pressures increased throughout the 1940s and 
1950s (Boone 2014; Dozon 1985; McGovern 2011; Marshall-Fratani 2007). After WWII, 
the political space opened up and civil society organizations stepped up to voice grievances 
of indigenous groups. For example, the Mouvement Socialist Africain’s (MSA) platform 
was to fight against the “colonization” of indigenous communities by strangers (Dozon 
1985, 343).39  
In summary, the French colonial administration laid the groundwork for future 
citizenship debates by producing overlapping claims to land, hierarchical definitions of 
citizenship, and political boundaries that conflicted with localized understanding of 
belonging. Combined with a repressive system of government characterized by 
exploitation and violence, independence-era elites had a wealth of tragic history to draw 
upon as political capital. Additionally, land tenure became a zero-sum game in which one 
group’s loss meant another group’s gain. During colonialism, Africans were rarely granted 
citizenship. However, certain groups received preferential treatment. In Côte d’Ivoire, 
outsiders were favored and insiders lost out under the colonial regime. Winner/loser 
                                                             
 
38 In some places, autochthons made up less than a third of the population (McGovern 2011, 78). 
By 1960, half the population of the country’s southwestern quadrant were strangers (Boone 2014, 
129). 
39  The MSA pit themselves against the Syndicat African Africole (SAA) union, which was 
perceived as a vehicle of Baoulé and Dioula interests (Boone 2014; Dozon 1985). 
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competition produced insecurity that elites later framed in terms of threats and 
opportunities in order to mobilize constituents for political violence. Since the outsider 
group “Dioula” refers to a composite grouping of internal and external migrants, the group 
came to be seen as foreign. 
Independence 
Côte d’Ivoire became independent on 7 August 1960 under the leadership of Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny of the PDCI. The country remained a single-party state until 1990, and 
under PDCI control until 1999. As the leading producer of the cocoa in the world, Côte 
d’Ivoire appeared to have struck the elusive balance between cash crops and a diversified 
economy (Keller 2014). 40  In the open, the PDCI supported the heavy investment in 
development projects, while behind the scenes coffee and cocoa revenues fueled a 
personalistic patronage state (McGovern 2011; Woods 2003). Economic prosperity and the 
substantial political support of migrants bolstered Houphouët’s consolidation of power. 
The period became known as the Ivoirian Miracle.41 
Although Houphouët favored his group, the Baoulé, part of the Akan family 
(Manby 2009), “all major ethnic groups were represented in Côte d’Ivoire’s main political 
institutions” (Langer 2005, 31). However, the fatal flaw in Côte d’Ivoire’s success was that 
                                                             
 
40 From 1965 to 1975, GDP grew by 8 percent per year with generous spill-over into other areas of 
the economy (Keller 2014, 93). 
41 According to Mike McGovern, the true miracle was “that Houphouët-Boigny succeeded in 
sharing the wealth to a sufficient extent that he, his close associates, and many French business and 
political interests all became rich, while many previously poor Ivoirian families also experienced 
significant improvements in their lives” (2011, 140). 
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it was contingent on the economic productivity and political support of Dioula, and 
perpetuated by ill-defined citizenship criteria. For instance, Houphouët famously 
proclaimed that “land belongs to those who cultivate it” to encourage farmers from within 
and outside the country to migrate to southwestern plantations. He then upheld the colonial 
practice of enforcing a land tenure regime that treated migrants preferentially in order to 
shore up popular support (Boone 2014). To turn this loyalty into a political base, 
Houphouët embraced “fuzzy citizenship policies” that blurred the line between formal 
citizenship status and de facto political rights (Bah 2010; Marshall-Fratani 2007; Woods 
2003). Citizenship and national identity were never precisely defined so that strangers loyal 
to the PDCI could vote, purchase land, and hold government office (Woods 2003). During 
Houphouët’s tenure, outsiders were the unequivocal winners of the citizenship regime. 
After agriculture revenues dropped, calls to restrict citizenship rights, notably from the 
citizenship regime losers (e.g. the Bété and Baoulé) grew stronger (Woods 2003).42   
The line between “Ivoirian” and “foreigner” became increasingly blurry in the 
political arena. Further, contradictory understandings of the place of migrants in society at 
the local level began to infuse national discourse. Indigenous groups perceived strangers 
as guests who were granted temporary access to land under the tutorat system. Settlers, on 
the other hand, buying fully into the PDCI system, understood themselves as land owners 
with guaranteed property rights (Keller 2014; Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). Overlapping 
claims became intractable, seemingly impossible to resolve given that transactions were 
made according to tutorat rather than through official channels. Moreover, getting official 
                                                             
 
42 Recall that the Bété are “hosts” in the southwestern region and the Baoulé are internal migrants. 
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documentation to prove ownership is an expensive and burdensome task, eliminating it as 
an option for many people (then and now).43  
An additional problem arose in the contradictory understandings of land ownership 
as a practice. One interviewee explained to me that Dioula groups are historically nomadic 
and therefore understand land as a commodity to be used for a period of time before it is 
discarded for new land. Autochthonous groups, on the other hand, come from a sedentary 
farming tradition in which it is inconceivable that land could be transferred outside 
indigenous lineages.44 In other words, tutorat was not a compromise between natives and 
settlers. Autochthons believed that land always had and always would belong to sons of 
the soil; it was not possible for anyone else to legitimately claim it.  
Economic crisis brought these divergent world views crashing to a head. The cocoa 
economy breached its structural limits right when global markets entered a significant 
downturn (Woods 2003). Economic volatility in the 1970s and 1980s hit Côte d’Ivoire 
hard, prompting heavy borrowing by the government (Keller 2014). Independence had only 
“accelerated the rhythm of the ‘massive alienation of land to outsiders’" (Dozon 1985, 
129).45  Structural adjustment programs managed by the World Bank and IMF forced 
privatization reforms and brought the Ivoirian Miracle to a definitive end (Keller 2014). 
With the economy in a tailspin, and in response to a presidential back to the land 
program, many urban residents, mostly unemployed youth, moved back to villages 
                                                             
 
43 Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (2) 
44 Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (3) 
45 In the mid-to-late seventies, strangers made up 64% of Divo Department and almost 50% of 
Gagnoa Department (Boone 2014; Hecht 1985; Dozon 1985).  
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(McGovern 2011; Berry 2009; Boone 2014). They arrived to find their family’s land in the 
hands of well-off strangers and their own prospects exceedingly limited. Sara Berry’s 
description of the consequences is worth quoting at length: 
Obliged to take menial jobs in order to survive, urban returnees 
seethed at their perceived dispossession at the hands of 
‘northerners’—both Ivoirian and foreign-born—and the PDCI 
regime, whose Baulé leaders were suspected of favoring members 
of their own ethnic group (2009, 32).  
 
At a time of falling incomes and rising land scarcity, demographic pressures exerted 
their full force. Three decades of extensive migration to the southwestern regions generated 
“bitter conflict between indigenes and strangers over land and employment” (Crook 1997, 
222). Narrowing citizenship criteria became a way for “losing” autochthons to reverse their 
economic and political marginalization. For “winning” Dioula, formal citizenship status 
was the best way to address land disputes and protect their property rights, the root of their 
economic and political power. After all, as one of my interviews eloquently said, “La terre 
est la richesse,” land is wealth.46 
Although contested citizenship was not yet a salient issue, land conflicts were a 
recurrent feature of this period (Boone 2014). The Gagnoa revolt is one example worth 
describing in detail. On October 26, 1970 hundreds of planters in the Gagnoa region rallied 
around Nragbé Kragbé and rebelled against the state. A “peasant army” raised a flag of the 
République d’Éburnie over government buildings and called for the return of 
autochthonous land and the exodus of migrants. The Ivoirian army brutally suppressed the 
                                                             
 
46 Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (1) 
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movement in a small massacre (Dozon 1985; Boone 2014; McGovern 2011).  The Guébié 
“genocide”, as the event is known among the Bété (Boone 2014), “cemented Bété feelings 
of exclusion and resentment against PDCI regime and the strangers it ‘backed’” 
(McGovern 2011, 83; see also Bøås and Dunn 2013). The political identity of the Bété 
became synonymous with autochthony (Marshall-Fratani 2007).  
In summary, winners and losers under the Ivorian citizenship regime faced off in 
the early years of independence. Their competition encouraged the development of 
contentious insider/outsider narratives. Elites strategically exploited concerns about 
citizenship security and mobilized co-ethnics according to the dual logics of threat and 
opportunity. Amidst deepening land scarcity, “losing” autochthons resented the PDCI for 
giving their ancestral land to immigrants. Further, they saw liberal voting laws as a thinly-
veiled ploy for the PDCI to maintain their hold on power. In contrast, “winning” Dioula 
felt threatened by vehement calls by autochthons to reclaim land and drive settlers away. 
Both winners and losers saw nationality laws as a way to secure citizenship rights and state 
resources.  
Ultimately, violence of belonging broke out. Two contributing factors to onset 
deserve a note. Economic decline exacerbated disputes over land ownership and belonging. 
Moreover, land institutions were poorly organized and managed. The population did not 
understand the laws on the books (which were not enforced well besides) and a crise de 
confiance, where people distrusted or outright rejected formal institutions, brought the 
country to its knees.47 There was also the widespread belief that the same people who 
                                                             
 
47 Focus Group-Abidjan-December 3, 2014 
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created the institutions were also responsible for the unfolding crisis.48 Consequently, the 
gap between formal laws and informal practices widened.49 When the de facto contradicts 
the de jure rules, dysfunction prevails.  
Multi-party era 
Côte d’Ivoire entered the new decade in full-swing of an economic and political 
crisis. Real growth sank below one percent in 1990 and the country remained deeply in 
debt (Keller 2014). International organizations insisted that Allasane Ouattara, a former 
IMF technocrat, be installed as Prime Minister. Aside from the disastrous economic 
performance, PDCI policies had generated so much bad-blood over the years that 
Houphouët was the only glue holding together the PDCI’s fragile multi-ethnic coalition. A 
scramble to exploit the remaining forest in the south-west compounded these problems and 
led to intense fighting between hosts and strangers (Woods 2003).  
Succumbing to international pressure, Côte d’Ivoire held its first multi-party 
elections in 1990 and winners and losers under the old regime jockeyed for control of the 
state. Henri Konan Bédié, in a daring challenge to Houphouët’s grip on the PDCI, took an 
anti-northerner stance. Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) positioned 
himself as the anti-immigrant candidate. Gbagbo staked his ground by accusing the PDCI 
of systematically favoring Baoulé, northerners, and foreigners (Woods 2003; Crook 1997; 
Langer 2005), using them as “electoral cattle” (Marshall-Fratani 2007, 22). The FPI also 
began rumors that Prime Minister Ouattara was himself a foreigner because his father was 
                                                             
 
48 Ibid 
49 Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (2), Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (1) 
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born in present-day Burkina Faso (Marshall-Fratani 2007). In the background “a growing 
northern consciousness…contributed to the escalation of ethnic tensions” (Langer 2005, 
32). A Charter of the North, Le Charte du Grand Nord, surfaced in 1992. It called for 
“fuller recognition of the Muslim region…more efforts to reduce regional inequalities, 
greater political recognition of the north’s political loyalty during the upheavals of the 
1980s and (most worryingly) an end to Baoulé nepotism in recruitment to public jobs” 
(Crook 1997, 226).  
With Houphouët’s death in December 1993, the political sphere fractured. Two 
factions within the PDCI battled one another and the opposition FPI, carving out separate 
trenches for the Baoulé, the northerner/immigrant (Dioula), and the Bété ethnic blocs. In 
1994 the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) put Ouattara forward as their 
presidential candidate. This PDCI-splinter represented the northern/immigrant/Muslim 
bloc, and took on a reformist tenor (Crook 1997). The old guard, new PDCI recruits, and 
the Baoulé threw their support behind interim President (and former President of the 
National Assembly) Henri Konan Bédíe of the PDCI. Bédié drew heavily on resentment of 
migrants to strategically out-maneuver his opponents. He was especially concerned about 
Ouattara, the first politician capable of mobilizing northern migrants as a coherent electoral 
bloc (Marshall-Fratani 2007). Without support in the Grand Nord, Bédié had very little 
chance of securing a winning coalition (Crook 1997).  
In the 1990 elections, Bédié had solicited foreigners’ votes to challenge Houphouët, 
but he sought to deny their rights all together ahead of the 1995 elections. His about-face 
stems from two important developments. First, Bédié saw in the RDR the collapse of the 
PDCI’s Baoulé-northerner/immigrant coalition (Crook 1997; Bah 2010). Secondly, Baoulé 
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cocoa producers were suffering economically and failing to compete with migrants from 
Burkina Faso. They blamed their misfortunes on ‘foreigners’ and demanded recompense 
(Crook 1997). Bédié’s strategy thus became to nullify, rather than to win over, the Dioula 
vote (McGovern 2011). He labelled the RDR “a northern regional party with a sinister 
‘Muslim’ agenda likely to tear the country apart” (Crook 1997, 225). He then exploited 
rising xenophobia and, alongside other ethnic entrepreneurs, called to make autochthony a 
requirement for citizenship (Marshall-Fratani 2007; McGovern 2011).  
Out of this nationalist frenzy, Ivoirité was born. The ideology turned on the claim 
that only “pure” Ivoirians should have citizenship. Purity meant indigeneity, and very few 
ethnic groups made this cut.50 As such, Ivoirité resurrected the colonial-era bifurcated 
citizenship framework, distinguishing between indigenous Ivoirians and those of “mixed” 
heritage (Marshall-Fratani 2007; Bah 2010). Combining nativism and nationalism, elites 
in the movement revitalized anti-imperialist discourse through demands for “liberation” of 
land from strangers (McGovern 2011). Railing against immigrants and northerners, ethnic 
entrepreneurs lumped the disparate groups together in an effort to marginalize them both. 
This type of ethnic nationalism became the basis for conflict and ethnic cleansing 
(McGovern 2011). 
Bédié moved quickly to institutionalize Ivoirité by reforming electoral rules, land 
tenure policies, public sector employment, and national identification programs. For 
example, a 1994 law required presidential and legislative candidates to prove that they and 
                                                             
 
50 Namely, it was Akan cultural cluster, which includes the Baoulé, Bété, and Kru sub-groups 
(Keller 2014; McGovern 2011). 
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their parents were Ivoirian by birth. This law later made its way into the 2000 Constitution 
as the notorious Article 35. In 1995 Bédié revised the electoral code such that presidential 
candidates were required to “have lived in the country for the past 5 years” and “foreigners 
were no longer allowed to vote in Ivoirian elections” (Langer 2005, 33). The 1994 and 
1995 laws specifically targeted Ouattara, whose father was reputed to be Burkinabé, but 
they renounced the rights of anyone considered to be of “foreign” stock (Manby 2009; Bah 
2010; Crook 1997).  
Until 1999 the RDR and the FPI were united as the Front Républicain.51 After a 
violent election season, Bédié declared victory; the Front Républicain immediately decried 
the illegality of the process (Crook 1997). Under Bédié’s rule, the Dioula lost their voting 
and property rights (Manby 2009; Bah 2010; Crook 1997). Bédié also ended the 
Houphouët-era balancing policies that had provided representation to the country’s diverse 
ethno-regional interests. In their place he implemented “Baoulisation” and filled civil and 
military positions with Baoulé (Langer 2005).52  
An obsession with national identity proliferated Ivoirian society, supported by the 
efforts of pseudo-scientists. The Cellule Universitaire de Recherche et de Diffusion des 
Idées et Actions Politiques du Président Henri Konan Bédié (CURDIPHE) produced a 
                                                             
 
51 The irony of this political union was two-fold: Gbagbo, future supporter of Ivoirité, denounced 
xenophobic policy-making and Ouattara, staunch critic of ethnic politics, built an ethno-regional 
coalition (Crook 1997). 
52 According to Langer (2005), “Baoulé over-representation in the government as a whole increased 
from 1.43 in the December 1993 government to 1.86 times its relative demographic size in the 
August 1998 government” (Langer 2005, 41). As a comparison: 40% of the key positions in the 
Bédié administration were held by members of the Baoulé ethnic group, while only 3% of ministers 
came from the Northern Mandé group (Langer 2005, 41). 
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manifesto on Ivoirité in 1996 that urged Ivoirians to “affirm their sovereignty, their 
authority in the face of the threat of dispossession and subjection: be it a question of 
immigration or political and economic power” (Touré 1996, 21 as quoted in Marshall-
Fratani 2007, 23).53 As if heeding CURDIPHE’s appeal, Bédié spearheaded legislation that 
required individuals to prove their authenticity as Ivoirians. The process required 
individuals to return to their ancestral village and obtain a certificate stating their 
nationality-qua-ethnicity. Those who could not prove Ivoirian ancestry were 
disenfranchised (Keller 2014; Manby 2009). 
 In 1998, Bédié introduced a new land law that reserved property rights for the state 
and autochthons. Foreigners had no legal claim to land on which they lived, and internal 
migrants had difficulty owning property outside their home regions. Traditional leaders 
wasted no time confiscating and then redistributing land “according to their own 
interpretation of customary law” (Keller 2014, 96; see also Englebert 2009).54  
Understandably, Dioula felt they were “victims of state-sponsored discrimination 
in the application of nationality laws” (Bah 2010, 603), and did not take the denial of their 
citizenship rights lightly. The opposition attacked the PDCI in the press, presenting 
divisions in ethnic terms and coating their imagery in blood. Richard Crook (1997) offers 
several excerpts from L’Ivoire, an RDR weekly based in Abidjan. Describing life in the 
                                                             
 
53 According to the mythology, the “great ethnic groups” were already present in Côte d’Ivoire at 
the nation’s birth on March 10, 1893. Their descendants were “pure” Ivoirians by virtue of their 
autochthony. 
54 In the ensuing land conflicts, Mossi farmers from Burkina Faso received the brunt of anti-
immigrant hostility (Woods 2003).  
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town of Dimbokro, the 10 October 1995 edition says, “All one could hear in the streets was 
the Baoulé language, and where Baoulés acted as if they owned the place, doing only 
business with each other” (Crook 1997, 234). Regarding officers accused of a killing spree, 
the 20 October 1995 edition of L’Ivoire says:  
They are Akans. They are gendarmes, full of hate…ready to kill on the 
22nd. The Toroghué battalion of around 600, 'dyed-in-the-wool' Baoulés, 
fully trained and ready to go, are due to serve in squads commanded by 
freshly promoted Baoulé officers . . .they have sworn to cement Akan power 
in blood (Crook 1997, 234).  
 
This discourse translated into real actions. In Gagnoa, “Baoulé migrant farmers were set 
upon in their village and 18 people killed. The result was a massive exodus of Baoulé 
'refugees' from the rural areas of the centre west, creating further havoc” (Crook 1997, 
235). 
On the heels of widespread unrest, General Robert Guei toppled Bédié in a coup on 
December 24, 1999. Concerns about Baoulisation and the denationalization of non-
indigenous groups motivated the take-over (Langer 2005). At first, General Guei publically 
opposed Ivoirité. However, after promising elections in 2000 he embedded ethno-
nationalist principles in the constitution and leveraged Ivoirité to garner popular support 
(Manby 2009; Keller 2014; Bah 2010; Akindès 2003). Combining language from 1994 and 
1995 laws, the now-infamous Article 35 stated that presidential candidates: 
Must be Ivoirian by birth, born of a father and of a mother themselves 
Ivoirian by birth. He must never have renounced the Ivoirian nationality. 
He must never have had another nationality. He must have resided in 
Côte d’Ivoire continuously during the five years preceding the date of 
the elections and have totaled ten years of effective presence 




In October 2000, the Supreme Court deemed Ouattara ineligible to run for president 
based on Article 35, while Bédié was disqualified on procedural grounds. This decision 
left Gbagbo as Guei’s only formidable rival. Once Guei lost his lead in the polls, he stopped 
ballot counting, dismissed the electoral commission, and declared himself the winner. 
Gbagbo’s supporters attacked the palace in anger, police and soldiers mutinied, and Bédié 
and RDR supporters rioted and called for new elections. The clashes forced Guei to flee 
the city (Manby 2009; Keller 2014; Bah 2010). 
Ultimately, Gbagbo was installed as president. In contradiction to his national 
reconciliation efforts, Gbagbo expanded the reach of Ivoirité. For instance, he created the 
Office of National Identification (ONI) in 2001after the RDR did well in local elections. 
Charged with identifying true citizens, village councils across the country sought to 
ascertain who was autochthonous to the community and who was not. The ONI’s logic was 
that if every Ivoirian has a village of origin, then issuing identity cards in these villages 
was the best way to identify true Ivoirians (Manby 2009; Keller 2014; Marshall-Fratani 
2007; Englebert 2009). Ahead of departmental elections in 2002, only 20 percent of 
potential voters had received registration cards—many were given a foreign resident’s card 
instead of a national identity card, which left them unable to vote (Manby 2009).  
Gbagbo unwittingly lit the match that sparked the civil war when he initiated a 
demobilization program after setting up a government of national reconciliation. The 
program was widely understood to constitute an Ivoirité-inspired purge of northerners from 
the military (Bah 2010). Furthermore, accusing Gbagbo and the ONI of denying their 
legitimate citizenship rights, northerners and immigrants mobilized against the threat under 
the RDR’s direction. This incident represents a critical juncture in the Ivoirian story. The 
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formalization of autochthony-based citizenship rules led to the first civil war. The rebels 
and their leaders said as much: 
We needed a war because we needed our identity cards. Without an 
identity card you are nothing in this country (Forces Nouvelles fighter 
as quoted in Manby 2009, 1). 
 
Give us our identity cards and we hand over our Kalashnikovs 
(Guillaume Soro, MPCI leader as quoted in Manby 2009, 90. The 
original quote appeared in Bouquet 2007). 
 
In summary, ethnic entrepreneurs in the multi-party era leveraged citizenship rules 
as a tool for redressing grievances of losing groups. They sought to reverse the balance of 
power between citizenship regime winners and losers, galvanize popular support, and 
eliminate political opposition. Previously, citizenship rights had been stretched to 
accommodate strangers because they were loyal to the PDCI regime. Land pressures drove 
debates over the place of Dioula in society and nebulous citizenship rules. Riding a wave 
of xenophobia, representatives of indigenous groups came to power and capitalized on 
popular resentment of “invading foreigners”. They revised laws to narrow citizenship 
criteria, thereby ensuring that autochthons “won” under the new citizenship regime.  
Narratives that framed citizenship security set in motion logics of violence that 
escalated VOB towards civil war. Ivoirité was a response by autochthons to their losing 
position. Narrow citizenship criteria was a way to counteract threats posed by winning 
Dioula groups, and an opportunity to advance nativist ideology. Autochthons saw Dioula 
as invaders protected by a corrupt regime and a broken citizenship system. Restricting 
citizenship provided a way for autochthons to reclaim ancestral land, improve their political 
influence, and increase their share of state resources. Ivoirité threatened the Dioula’s 
winning position by linking citizenship with a territorialized, ethnicized identity. Elites 
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representing the northerner/immigrant bloc advocated clarifying the status of strangers as 
legitimate citizens. Nationality law thus provided an opportunity to protect Dioula political 
status. Importantly, the “Dioula” label blurred the distinction between internal and external 
migrants. In the next section, I address how Ivoirité calls to strip “immigrants” of their 
citizenship led to a civil war. 
The War Years 
The Ivoirian civil war began in September 2002 with a mutiny: Exiled soldiers in 
Burkina Faso revolted after Gbagbo proposed decommissioning them. The rebel 
Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) attacked the economic capital Abidjan, 
the second largest city in the country, Bouaké, and the main northern town, Korhogo. 
Although the take-over of Abidjan failed, half the country fell to rebel control within days. 
In short order, two additional rebel movements surfaced, the Mouvement pour la Justice et 
la Paix (MJP) and the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO), sponsored 
by Liberian president Charles Taylor. MJP and MPIGO echoed the MPCI’s mission to 
bring down Gbagbo, and eventually the three rebel groups formed an alliance under the 
Forces Nouvelles (FN) banner. Within a month of forming, the Forces Nouvelles signed 
an accord with the Gbagbo government to end hostilities, but peace remained elusive. 
Peacekeepers from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) soon 
joined French soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire.  
FN recruits were motivated by citizenship insecurity generally, and Gbagbo’s 
national identification program in particular. One recruit summed up attitudes held by 
himself and his comrades when he said he joined the rebellion “because the Malinké had 
been here since the twelfth century, and soon they’ll [the government] be giving us a 
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foreign resident’s card to be able to live here” (International Crisis Group 2003, 7; see also 
Marshall-Fratani 2007, 26). MPCI leader Guillaume Soro claimed the rebellion was an 
effort to reinstate the citizenship rights of northerners and guarantee their political 
participation. He criticized Ivoirité as xenophobic, and said that very word “in its true sense 
means nothing other than: ‘Côte d’Ivoire to Ivorians’, which is to clearly say, according to 
those from the south northerners are considered foreigners in their own country” (Bah 
2010, 20).  
The Gbagbo regime relied on paramilitarization of civil society to achieve “political 
order through terror, and an ultranationalist radicalization” (Marshall-Fratani 2007, 29). 
Self-defense militias formed in rural areas too, quickly establishing organizational 
structures and linking their activities with national networks (Marshall-Fratani 2007). 
Reaffirming autochthonous land rights, these organizations seized property from strangers 
and justified land expropriation as a defense of heritage and innate rights (Marshall-Fratani 
2007). Such movements were not limited to the south. Fighting between the Guéré and 
northern Ivoirians, Burkinabé, and Malians was “provoked a spiral of revenge and counter-
revenge” (Marshall-Fratani 2007, 32). Deadly attacks near Bangolo, Guiglo, Toulépleu, 
and Bloléquin drove much of the indigenous population away. These attacks were labelled 
genocide by the government and used to “legitimate the local Guéré militias” (International 
Crisis Group 2003, 26). 
In January 2003, international mediators helped broker the Linas-Marcoussis 
Accord (LMA) peace agreement. The LMA proposed a government of national unity and 
new laws on citizenship and land rights. However, it was ultimately ineffective because it 
did not adequately address the question of citizenship, instead narrowing the focus to the 
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distribution of power (Bah 2010). Citizenship and land tenure institutions, not to mention 
electoral and economic reforms, were relegated to the LMA annex. More importantly, the 
agreement accepted the jus sanguinis principles of the 1961 and 1972 nationality laws as 
valid, taking issue with their application rather than their content. In other words, the LMA 
assumed the citizenship question was a simple administrative problem. Therefore, rather 
than addressing root causes of the grievances, the government was asked to reform the 
application of these laws, and establish a new national identification program under the 
supervision of an independent commission.  
The Gbagbo regime continued to pursue a strict definition of citizenship based on 
ancestry, while northerners maintained that indigeneity criteria amounted to 
denationalization. They staunchly opposed using any basis for citizenship other than one’s 
place of birth  Furthermore, the LMA recommendations for constitutional revisions (such 
as presidential candidates must have Ivoirian citizenship and at least one Ivoirian parent) 
neglected the fundamental contention of this war: how to define and prove Ivoirian 
citizenship (Bah 2010). Subsequent agreements, such as Accra II of March 2003 and Accra 
III of July 2004, continued to treat the issue as a struggle for power (Bah 2010). Therefore, 
parties to the LMA continued to fight over definitions, birth records, and nationality 
certificates, and peace proved exceedingly hard to keep.  
Fighting continued through 2004 and by 2005 the LMA was in shambles. At this 
time, a tract began circulating in Abidjan. It captures the discourse autochthonous elites 
used to mobilize individuals to their cause and so is worth quoting at length (Marshall-




People of the Greater West, 
 
The current political situation of our country is linked to its recent 
history lived by the sons and daughters of our tribes. For forty years, 
misfortune, injustice, inequality, and crimes have been inflicted on our 
tribes. 
 
For forty years the Akans and the despot Houphouët-Boigny, the 
greatest thief of all time, have fought our tribes without respite. Odious 
crimes have been ordered and executed. One of our illustrious sons, 
Kragbé Gnagbé, aka Opadjélé was decapitated, and with him perished 
nearly 4,000 of our people. A genocide such as this cannot remain 
unpunished. 
 
Our lands, our most precious possession, were torn from us by force 
by the Akans, led by Houphouët-Boigny with the treacherous collusion 
of the Dioula and a handful of our own people. 
 
The people of the Greater West must thus unite around one of their 
own, Laurent Gbagbo, the reincarnation of Opadjélé. It is through him 
we shall be saved. 
 
The 24 December 1999, God, in giving the power to one of our sons, 
wanted to show us the way. Daughters and sons of the Greater West, 
link hands together, the hour has come for us to be heard. The hour has 
come to kill the Akans and chase them from our lands. The hour has 
come to recuperate our land. The hour has come to clean our villages 
and towns of the Dioulas (Mossi) and the Akans, who are objective 
allies.  
 
Yes, the hour of grand vengeance has struck. We too want our cities to 
become capitals like Abidjan, Yamoussoukro and Daoukro.  
 
People of the Greater West, unite, so that power will never leave us 
again. We must use our guns, our machetes. Get ready. Let us kill for 
the survival of our tribes, to prevent the confiscation of power. 
 




Under mounting pressure to liberalize the nationality laws, Gbagbo passed 
conciliatory bills on nationality and naturalization, identity documents, and land ownership 
in 2005 (Manby 2009). As part of the new national identification program mobile courts 
with independent judges ran disseminated forgery-proof identification documents (Keller 
2014). Drafters of the agreement took care to embed lenient procedures. Courts accepted 
verbal testimony and incomplete documentation, witnesses could verify the place of birth 
or citizenship of the claimant’s parents, cases were heard in the claimant’s village of birth 
rather than in their ancestral village, and children of unknown parentage were automatically 
entitled to an Ivoirian identity certificate (Keller 2014). Gbagbo also suspended Article 35, 
thereby allowing Ouattara to run for president in future elections.55  
In March 2007, a breakthrough peace agreement was reached in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso. The agreement’s success is attributable to several factors. Ivoirians 
spearheaded the process, stipulations directly addressed citizenship questions, and the 
Gbagbo regime made important concessions (Bah 2010; Keller 2014; Manby 2009). For 
example, the government rescinded identity certificate legislation, created a path to 
naturalization for long-term immigrants, and modified the 1998 Rural Land Law. 
Additionally, the agreement stated that rebel forces would be demobilized and incorporated 
into the national army, which would have an equal proportion of northerners and 
southerners. Lastly, Gbagbo pledged to hold elections in early 2008 after implementing 
reconciliation initiatives.  
                                                             
 
55 Originally scheduled for September 2005, the elections were postponed through 2007. They were 
delayed because of the precarious security situation and voter registration problems linked to the 
national identification program (Keller 2014; McGovern 2011; Manby 2009). 
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Despite these strengths, we should not overlook the drawbacks of this agreement. 
First, it did not specify citizenship criteria, thereby creating space for Ivoirité sympathizers 
to rail against northerners fraudulently claiming citizenship. This lack of clarity angered 
opposition supporters as well, who accused the government of continuing to deny the rights 
of legitimate citizens. Secondly, the Ouagadougou Agreement did not resolve disputes over 
the 1998 Rural Land Law, leaving property rights controversially tied to indigeneity (Bah 
2010; Manby 2009; Keller 2014). 
The Ivorian civil war officially ended in 2007, but elections were postponed until 
2010. Ouattara defeated Gbagbo after two rounds of voting deemed free and fair by 
international monitors and the United Nations. The Constitutional Council declared 
Gbagbo the winner anyway, and supporters on both sides resumed fighting. In April 2011, 
the so-called Crise came to a close with the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo. Violence continued 
until after Ouattara was installed as president. In October 2011, the International Criminal 
Court investigated Gbagbo for crimes against humanity committed during the 2010 post-
election crisis. He became the first former head of state to be tried by ICC. 
The Ivoirian civil war represents an extreme outcome of debates between 
citizenship regime winners and losers. Concerns about citizenship security took center 
stage and contentious insider/outsider narratives propelled violence forward. Dual logics 
of threat and opportunity guided collective action. Losing autochthons felt threatened by 
the growing economic and political power of Dioula in the country. Feeling colonized and 
marginalized, they sought to reclaim land and power through nationality law reform. They 




The death of Houphouët-Boigny opened a Pandora’s Box of trouble for the Dioula. 
They had been citizenship regime winners up to this point, but they were protected by 
regime preferences rather than positive law. Never formally integrated into Côte d’Ivoire’s 
national political community, their ambiguous citizenship status left them vulnerable and 
insecure. With their lands expropriated, and their citizenship rights revoked, the tide 
eventually turned against the Dioula. They became citizenship regime losers under the 
weight of mounting political, economic, and security threats. Fighting offered an 
opportunity to end the erosion of their rights and security, clarify their citizenship status, 
and formalize their belongingness. Narratives framed the Dioula’s grievances as questions 
of citizenship, denationalization, and justice. Insurgents fought for “a new political 
order…[and] the redefinition of Ivoirian citizenship and sovereignty” (International Crisis 
Group 2003, 4; see also McGovern 2011). 
Final remarks 
Citizenship insecurity characterizes the Ivoirian civil war. Since legal foundations 
were not well established in the early independence era, citizenship became deeply 
contested during democratization. Winners and losers competed with one another, but 
things really fell apart when elites could no longer pacify competing interests through 
patronage. Violence broke out as groups clambered to demand their inheritance, seeking 
to legitimize their claims by revising nationality laws. 56  The escalation to full-blown 
rebellion is largely attributed to laws that formally excluded Dioula from the polity.57 
                                                             
 
56 Interview with Joel Baroan-Abidjan-December 5, 2014 
57 Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (2) 
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Identity politics became the justification for acts of violence, as each group denied 
the humanity and “Ivorianness” of the other.58 It was as if the entire country suffered from 
collective prosopagnosia and they could no longer see faces. The problems persist to this 
day. As Joel Baroan, a former minister in then-Prime Minister Ouattara’s cabinet put during 
our interview, while politicians talk of the tous (of “everyone”) there is no tous in Côte 
d’Ivoire.59 According to another contact, the Ivoirian “Nation” is fiction.60 Some blame 
this state of affairs as a consequence of colonialism.61 Others point to “le marketing” elites 
used to rally supporters around them.62 For example, RDR elites used the sentiment of “Je 
suis au Nord” to mobilize people, preying on the fear that “Because I am from the North, 
I am excluded”.63 At the same time, to Southerners, Ouattara represented Burkinabé (read: 
“foreign”) domination.  
The question then became how to preserve what rightfully belonged to each 
group.64 Autochthonous communities perceived land scarcity and economic competition 
with migrants as a multi-pronged attack on their livelihoods, their heritage, and the ethnic 
purity of the Ivoirian Nation. They saw revising nationality laws as a means of reclaiming 
what once belonged to them. Ivoirité discourses helped autochthons to “make sense of that 
loss and to rectify it” (Bøås and Dunn 2013, 1). The discourses also legitimized political 
                                                             
 
58 Interview with Joel Baroan-Abidjan-December 5, 2014 
59 Interview with Joel Baroan-Abidjan-December 5, 2014 
60 Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (2) 
61 Interview with Joel Baroan-Abidjan-December 5, 2014 
62 Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (1) 
63 Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (1), Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (2) 
64 Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (1) 
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violence against foreigners, who were blamed for the loss. International intervention only 
compounded the problem, and France’s role in particular casts a long shadow over the 
country.65 
Political entrepreneurs manipulated nationality laws (and therefore citizenship 
security) as part of an explicit political strategy. For many years, the habitude among 
Ivoirian leadership has been demagoguery rather than democracy. 66  Stretching from 
present day to colonial times, the desire to stay in power overrides liberalization. It has 
been difficult to break free of the tradition of charismatic leaders given the weak civil 
society in Côte d’Ivoire, which is easily manipulated by powerful actors.67   
Elites connect institutional processes of laws, policies, and formal practices to 
group agency. Their motivation becomes clear when one considers how citizenship 
insecurity benefits actors at many different levels of government and civil society 
(McGovern 2011). At the national level, President Gbagbo and the FPI cater to their 
autochthonous base and disqualify political opponents. Alassane Ouattara and the RDR 
built a coalition around claims to expanded rights and political power. Autochthon 
ministers demonstrate a commitment to protecting the community against invading 
foreigners. Moreover, by confiscating land from strangers and selling it to locals, they can 
use land as patronage and promote themselves as defenders of “authentic” Ivoirians. Chiefs 
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can reassert their authority in a time where swells of migrants with economic and political 
power have weakened their position. Militias of any stripe accumulate power, material 
resources, and perhaps personal fulfillment fighting for a just cause. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo 
What happened in Côte d’Ivoire is not in fact unique to Ivoirian politics. A 2004 
study by the Open Society Justice Initiative found that nationality and nationality laws have 
taken a concerning turn towards exclusion in recent decades, from mass deportations of 
foreigners and political opponents to legal reforms. I now turn to the “Banyarwanda 
Question” in the DRC, a citizenship debate even more explosive than the saga in Côte 
d’Ivoire. The Banyarawanda live in the lush Kivu provinces of eastern Congo. Their 
citizenship status is so contested that it has “literally been switched on and off as 




Figure 8: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo 68 
The Banyarwanda Question 
The term “Banyarwanda” collectively refers to majority Hutu and minority Tutsi 
Kinyarwanda-speakers (Rwandaphones) in the Kivus. The variant “Banyamulenge” refers 
more specifically to Tutsi from South Kivu. I return to this point later. The Banyarwanda’s 
precise arrival date is disputed, but evidence suggests Tutsi settlers resided in South Kivu 
before colonial conquest, and were joined later by successive waves of co-ethnic migrants. 
The territory that became present-day Congo was once ruled by a Rwandan king. Similar 
                                                             
 
68 Map courtesy of the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at 
Austin. Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/congo_demrep_pol98.jpg. Accessed 
August 26, 2016. 
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to tutorat Côte d’Ivoire, a system called ubugabire evolved whereby Banyarwanda could 
use land controlled by customary leaders in exchange for tribute (Vlassenroot 2002; Court 
2013). The territory came under colonial rule in the late 19th century. By 1885 all residents 
in the territory became citizens of the Congo Free State, presided over by King Leopold II 
of Belgium. In fact, an 1892 law granted citizenship to children born in Congo to Congolese 
parents. In 1910 parts of the Congo Free State were assumed by the Germany colony of 
Rwanda, only later to be returned to Belgium in 1922. During colonialism, the state owned 
the land and administered it indirectly through chieftancies called chefferies. The 
Banyamulenge had several chefferies until 1933 when these areas were subsumed into 
larger territorial units controlled by indigenous authorities.  
To understand the Banyarwanda’s contested nationality, it is helpful to start with 
the group’s ethnogensis. Demographic shifts in Kivu province (now split into North and 
South Kivu) complicates and politicizes their citizenship status to this day (Manby 2009; 
Jackson 2006, 2007; Vlassenroot 2002; Court 2013). The self-proclaimed indigenous 
groups in the Kivus are the Hunde, Nande, Bashi, and Barega. In North Kivu, the 
Rwandophones are a mix of Tutsi pastoralists and Hutu Banyabwisha, some of whom 
arrived in pre-colonial times. In South Kivu, the Rwandophones are Tutsi pastoralists with 
origins in the territory pre-dating the Congo Free State. They call themselves the 
Banyamulenge (the people of “Mulenge” village) to distinguish themselves from later-
arrivals (Ruhimbika 2001; Jackson 2007; Manby 2009).  
Some Congolese distinguish between Hutu and Tutsi Rwandophones, reserving 
their greatest enmity for Banyamulenge specifically, whereas others make no such 
distinction (Jackson 2007). Generally speaking, Hutus that arrived as refugees of the 
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Rwandan genocide are “exonerated” based on their opposition to Rwanda’s invasions 
during the Second Congo War (1998-2003) (Lemarchand 2009). For the purposes of this 
chapter, I use “Banyarwanda” to refer to all Rwandophones in the Congo and I specify 
Banyamulenge where appropriate. 
Through coercive colonial migration schemes and voluntarily exit from Rwandan 
chiefs, a steady stream of Rwandophones settled in then-unified Kivu province throughout 
the colonial era. To avoid overpopulation in Rwanda and support plantation agriculture in 
the Congo, the Belgian government transplanted tens of thousands of Rwandans into Kivu 
province from the 1930s onward (Boone 2014; Jackson 2006). About 100,000 came during 
a UNHCR program from the early 1960s (Boone 2014). Conflict at home and in 
neighboring states served as another significant push-factor in Banyarwanda migration. In 
addition to refugees from Rwanda’s Social Revolution (a Hutu uprising against a Tutsi 
regime formerly supported by Belgium), thousands of Rwandophones arrived in the Kivus 
when they fled conflict in Rwanda (early 1960s, 1973, early 1990s) and Burundi (1972, 
1978, early 1990s). Hutu refugees arrived after the Hutu extremist government in Rwandan 
was overthrown in 1994. As successive waves of Rwandan transplantés arrived in the 
Congo, the local population grew increasingly resentful of the continued land expropriation 
(Boone 2014).  
Important parallels exist between the Banyarwanda in the Congo and the Dioula in 
Côte d’Ivoire. First, the origins of both groups are deeply contested, rendering their “true” 
nationality a point of contention. Some Banyarwanda and Dioula families resided in the 
respective territories before colonialism, which implies a legitimate claim to indigeneity as 
vaguely defined by nativist movements. However, many more group members arrived 
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during waves of colonial-era migration, leading sceptics to believe the groups had foreign 
ethnic homelands. In popular imagination, the labels “Dioula” and “Banyarwanda” connote 
foreign nationality. 
Secondly, local struggles over customary authority and land rights dating back to 
the colonial period are integral to citizenship disputes in both countries. The Banyarwanda 
and Dioula were winners under the colonial citizenship regime. Colonial administrators 
treated migrants preferentially and sidelined local workers (Jackson 2007; Boone 2014). 
This preference contributed to the growing migrant population, which was as large as or 
larger than the indigenous population in some places. From 1950 through the 1990s, for 
example, in-migrants represented 50% of the total population in both North Kivu and 
Southwestern Côte d’Ivoire (Boone 2014). In the background, the informal land tenure 
systems known as tutorat (Côte d’Ivoire) and ubugabire (Congo) laid the foundations for 
competing land claims.  
A Tragic Trajectory 
The trajectory of conflict follows a similar pattern in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC. 
Political and economic competition intensified and intersected with external forces, which 
elevated issues in local politics to the national level. Nationality law became a politically 
expedient way for winning and losing groups to address threats to their community and to 
seize opportunities to claim rights and resources. Debates over nationality questions 
became progressively heated and framed in insider/outsider terms. Low-level violence 
morphed into regional conflict as the threat of Banyarwanda denationalization increased. 
The Banyarawanda’s contested nationality status can be traced to a legal 
technicality during the colonial period. They were denied a “native” administration under 
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Belgian rule, which hurts their claims to indigeneity today. Further, their contested 
nationality became “fodder for local anti-Banyamulenge campaigns” in the lead-up to 
independence (Court 2013, 424; Pottier 2002). However, Rwandophones served as large 
potential voting bloc so many leaders desired their political support, even though it was 
politically damaging to grant them full citizenship rights in the newly independent country 
(then Zaire). In the negotiations at the Brussels Round Table on the transition to 
independence, the parties involved agreed that only current citizens (granted citizenship 
through the jus sanguinis principles of the 1892 decree on nationality) would be allowed 
to vote and run for office in the 1960 election. Recently-arrived Banyarwanda were only 
allowed to vote (Manby 2009).  
Congo achieved independence on June 30, 1960. Seemingly overnight, debates 
over local belonging erupted into ethnic conflict. Katanga and Kasai provinces tried to 
secede. Rwandophones stopped paying customary rent to Hunde chiefs and many were 
expelled from North Kivu, sparking the “Banyarwanda War” (1963-1965). One interview 
conducted by Stephen Jackson is worth quoting at length to illustrate the contested 
citizenship narratives that persist event today: 
It was often the administrators who alerted the people to be against 
the Rwandans, the immigrants…they were numerous and every time 
they arrived they looked for power…when they started to try to enter 
and share power with the others, the others would say, ‘No, you are 
Rwandans, you have no claim on anything here…if you don’t 
immediately quit your lands we are going to massacre you!’ (2006, 
101 quoting interview with “Juma,” Goma, June 10, 1999)  
Mobutu Sese Seko came to power in 1965 by a Belgian and United States-backed 
coup. He rewarded Banyamulenge for their loyalty during the Simba rebellion (1964-1965) 
by granting them expanded citizenship rights (i.e. education, social services, employment, 
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etc), much to the chagrin of autochthonous groups in South Kivu (Turner 2013; Court 2013; 
Vlassenroot 2002). Local politicians pointed to Rwandophone refugees who arrived in 
1959 (Rwandan Tutsis) and 1972 (Burundian Hutus) to demonstrate that all Banyarwanda 
were foreigners. In response, Tutsi leaders in South Kivu, who could traced their origins in 
the Congo to pre-colonial times, changed their ethnic label to “Banyamulenge”. The goal 
of identifying with an indigenous identity backfired. Ever since, other Congolese accuse 
the Banyamulenge of adopting a “counterfeit identity” (Jackson 2006, 484; see also 
Vlassenroot 2002, Ruhimbika 2001). 
Citizenship insecurity remained high for the entire Congolese population during 
Mobutu’s tenure. On one hand, the Banyamulenge were citizenship regime winners 
because they gained political and economic power under Mobutu. However, they were 
precariously winning because their official status remained ambiguous. Their strong 
influence threatened autochthons and bred widespread resentment.  
During the Mobutu regime, Banyarwanda nationality became a bargaining chip, 
easily manipulated for political gain. The 1964 Luluabourg Constitution, written amidst an 
influx of refugees from Rwanda’s liberation war, limited citizenship to individuals whose 
ancestors were members of an ethnic group in Congo before October 18, 1908.69 The law 
denied citizenship to all Banyarwanda and Hunde authorities moved quickly to claim their 
land, property, and chieftaincies (Boone 2014, 169). However, Mobutu aimed to build a 
power base out of minority groups that would be unable to effectively challenge, much less 
                                                             
 
69 1908 is the year when the territory transferred hands and became a formal colony of Belgium, 
rather than private property of King Leopold. 
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topple, him (Jackson 2006; Williame 1997). The Banyamulenge were thus given 
agricultural concessions, political appointments, and expanded access to rights and state 
services (Manby 2009; Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 2007; Boone 2014). By 1967 
Barthélémy Bisengimana, a Tutsi from North Kivu, had enough influence in the President’s 
Office to restore citizenship to the Banyarwanda. He pushed through a decree in 1971 that 
granted citizenship to Rwandophones established in the territory since June 30, 1960. A 
1972 law reinforced the 1971 decree by moving the date of arrival to January 1, 1950. This 
legislation elevated the nationality question from a local or regional level to a national one 
(Manby 2009).  
Resentment towards Banyarwanda continued to grow as their economic conditions 
improved their citizenship status remained ambiguous. Their sprawling plantations and 
ranches were acquired through the expropriation of autochthons’ land and their political 
power obtained after steamrolling customary traditions (Boone 2014). Many Congolese 
believed that Banyarwanda success came only by the grace of the patronage state, seeing 
as they were the prime beneficiaries of Mobutu’s divide-and-rule strategies (Jackson 2007; 
Manby 2009; Boone 2014; Autesserre 2009). 
Unable to ignore the popular pressure, Mobutu eventually turned on his 
Banyarwanda allies as he attempted to centralize power. Bisengimana was dismissed 
following corruption charges. A 1971 constitutional amendment and a 1973 property law 
brought all public land under state control. The Banyamulenge had purchased much of their 
land privately and so retained access to much of their property. Families relying on 
customary land rights, though, stood to lose everything. Absent proper enforcement of the 
new land law, the result was uncertain land rights and heightened volatility (Court 2013). 
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In response to the growing economic and political power of the Banyamulenge, and their 
own losing position, autochthons mobilized around the threat of “occupation of land and 
territory by immigrants” (Mathieu and Tsongo 1999, 45). They channeled mounting 
animosity into the development of armed organizations, such as the Mai-Mai (Jackson 
2007; Boone 2014).70 
In 1981 the date of eligibility for citizenship reverted to August 1, 1885, the date of 
the Berlin Conference that carved up Africa for European empires. A 1982 decree then 
annulled the nationality for anyone who acquired citizenship under the 1972 law, forcing 
them to apply for naturalization if they wanted to be Congolese citizens. Proof of eligibility 
was hard to come by even for those who met the new restrictive criteria. Many, but not all, 
Banyarwanda were effectively denationalized and some were expelled (Manby 2009). 
Further, ambiguous citizenship rules still prevailed. Banyamulenge candidates were not 
allowed to contest the 1982 and 1987 national elections, but they were allowed to vote in 
them—even though they were barred from local elections (Manby 2009; Vlassenroot 
2002). Banyamuelenge boycotted the elections. In response to the 1981/1982 legislation, 
Banyarwanda formed the organization the Peoples of Rwandan Origin in Zaire and asked 
the United Nations to create an independent state in North Kivu for their safety (Jackson 
2007; Williame 1997).  
Under international pressure, the DRC was forced to accept a liberalization 
program in the early 1990s. However, Banyarwanda were largely excluded from the 
                                                             
 
70 Mai-Mai is an acronym in the local language for the nationalist slogan “Tutsi get out! Congolese 
guard your country!” (Jackson 2006, 106). 
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Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS) in 1991, which concerned the transition to 
multipartyism. Embracing the policy of géopolitique (the politics of geography), Mobutu 
required all CNS delegates to be indigenous to the area they represented. Politicians began 
to use géopolitique as part of campaigning and leaders at the CNS “increasingly challenged 
the right of Banyamulenge and other Kinyarwanda-speakers to citizenship” (Turner 2013, 
94; see also Jackson 2006). For example, the North Kivu delegation denounced “the 
political and economic exploitation of the province by ‘Rwandan foreigners’” (Jackson 
2006, 105-6). National identity cards were regularly withheld from Banyarwanda by local 
administrators during this period (Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 2006; Ruhimbika 2001). By 
virtue of their exclusion from the CNS and the withholding of their nationality cards, the 
Banyarwanda were treated as foreign nationals by the central government. They 
unequivocally lost under the prevailing citizenship regime.  
A CNS sub-commission then proposed a census to identify “true” Congolese 
citizens ahead of elections. However, the census would only be conducted in the Kivus and 
two territories in Katanga bordering South Kivu. The census fed into a popular skepticism 
of Banyarwanda nationality, and served as an extension of the Mission d’Identification des 
Zaïrois au Kivu conducted in 1989. Ostensibly launched to determine whether 
Banyarwanda could in fact claim Congolese nationality, the Mission became a witch-hunt 
for “foreigners” that parroted the dominant narrative that Banyarwanda were not 
autochthons (Court 2013; Vlassenroot 2002).  
With national and local administrators denying the Banyarwanda’s right to 
Congolese nationality, grassroots organizations (e.g Groupe Milima and Ugeafi) lobbied 
to reinstate the liberal 1971/1972 nationality laws (Vlassenroot 2002). Many Banyarwanda 
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understood the Mission and CNS census as a “notice of intension for ethnic cleansing” 
(Jackson 2007, 488). In response to the threat, Rwandophone self-defense militias cropped 
up in the Kivus, matched by ethnic militias of autochthonous groups (Jackson 2007). 
International events only made the situation worse. In 1990, the RPF began their assault on 
the Hutu government in Rwanda. This conflict, along with a Tutsi-led coup in Burundi in 
1993, sent refugees streaming into Congo and intensified hostility towards all 
Banyarwanda. As early as 1991, Banyamulenge began joining the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF), driven out of South Kivu by marginalization (Williame 1997; Vlassenroot 2002).  
The Masisi war broke out in North Kivu in March 1993. The cycle of attacks and 
counter-attacks between Banyarwanda and Mai-Mai militias led to 6,000 deaths and 
250,000 displaced persons (Turner 2013, 103). The shifting coalitions meant that 
sometimes Tutsis allied with Hutus under the Banyarwanda umbrella, but other times the 
two groups fought each other (Manby 2009; Jackson 2006). The ethnic cleansing, which 
has continued to date, changed previously diverse areas into ethnic enclaves (Manby 2009).  
In the run-up to the 1993 election, several Banyarwanda (mostly Hutu) were killed 
at Ntoto market by autochthonous Hunde and Nyanga youths. This seemingly isolated 
incident escalated to the “Inter-ethnic war” in North Kivu, and spread south into mineral-
rich Katanga and Kasai provinces. What started as a clash in a market became a trigger for 
two civil wars in the late 1990s (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Jackson 2007). The proximate cause 
of the Ntoto market incident was an attempt to dislodge Rwandophones from the area to 
limit their political influence. The underlying cause was defense of ancestral land rights. 
Indigenous groups maintained their exclusive rights to land and authority in the provinces, 
but the Banyarwanda had long ago stopped paying tribute to local chiefs for the land they 
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occupied. This act of defiance supported the proliferation of sons-of-the-soil movements 
bent on land reclamation (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Autesserre 2009). The fragmented 
collection of Mai-Mai militias blame their disadvantage and the expropriation of their lands 
on Banyarwanda. They are motivated by a “nostalgia for a lost past that can be brought 
back only if certainty about people and places reestablished” (Bøås and Dunn 2013, 97). 
Moreover, they desire a new order in which autochthons are predominant (Bøås and Dunn 
2013).  
In 1994, Hutu-extremist Interahamwe fled Rwanda for Congo. They landed in 
refugee camps alongside moderate Hutus and Tutsis. The line between Congolese and 
Rwandan Hutu thus became even more blurred (Manby 2009). In response to the surge of 
refugees, the 1995 Transitional Parliament sent the Vangu Commission to investigate. The 
body adopted a resolution on nationality alleging that all Banyarwanda had fraudulently 
acquired citizenship (Jackson 2007). According to Thomas Turner, 
The commission’s conclusions reflected a spirit of “ethnic cleansing”… 
It alleged that Rwanda had been attempting to acquire Congolese 
territory and to supplant its indigenous inhabitants for years and that the 
Tutsi now were preparing to create a “Hamitic Kingdom,” to be known 
as the United States of Central Africa or the Republic of the Volcanoes 
(2013, 95). 
 
Heeding the Commission’s report, Banyarwanda identity cards were confiscated or 
destroyed. In South Kivu, the regional government expropriated Banyamulenge property, 
evicted Banyamulenge families, and deported many people to Rwanda or Burundi. 
Indigenous militias sang anthems of ethnic cleansing and brutally “cleaned” villages and 
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drove “Rwandans to Rwanda” (Manby 2009, 75). 71  Then, in early October 1996, 
Banyamulenge in South Kivu were ushered into temporary camps. By the end of the month, 
they, along with any other suspected Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan nationals, were 
expelled from the country.  
The Banyarwanda quickly organized in response to these threats, joining other 
militias under the banner of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du 
Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). Their objective was to defend themselves and rebel against the 
government that had exorcised them from the polity. Led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the 
rebels received massive support from Rwanda and Uganda. Hostility against the 
Banyarwanda only intensified after Rwandan troops crossed the border in 1996 (Manby 
2009). 
In summary, parallels between the path to war in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC 
continue into the independence era. Insider/outsider competition intensified in both 
countries as land scarcity and liberalization efforts affected the balance of power between 
citizenship regime winners and losers. Dioula and Banyarwanda claims to land and 
leadership were not seen as legitimate because the groups were widely perceived as 
foreign. Their landholdings were considered illegal and their political authority null. 
Furthermore, resentment among losing autochthons undercut Dioula and Banyarwanda 
economic success and political influence.   
                                                             
 
71  The Interahamwe alternately fought indigenous groups and allied with them to attack 
Banyamulenge (Manby 2009, 74-5). 
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In both cases, efforts to identify “true” citizens came to a head during elections, 
which then triggered violence leading to civil war. In the lead-up to each conflict, 
individuals mobilized around contentious narratives highlighting citizenship insecurity and 
leadership that endorsed violence. The logics of threat and opportunity were clearly active 
as well. Autochthons in both countries saw their land gobbled up by “foreigners” and their 
political power diminish as outsiders curried favor with the regime. The Banyarwanda and 
Dioula, on the other hand, were threatened by their ambiguous and allegedly fraudulent 
citizenship status. In addition, they became targets of ethnic cleansing. Nationality laws 
provided a compelling opportunity to address citizenship insecurity on all sides. 
Autochthonous movements pushed for new laws that would restrict citizenship to 
indigenous groups, while the Banyarwanda and Dioula sought to legitimate their 
nationality status through inclusionary legislation.  
The 1995 resolution on nationality represents the critical juncture in which 
citizenship became the focal point of conflict in the Kivus. Effective denationalization 
through the 1981/1982 nationality laws, combined with ethnic cleansing of the 1990s, left 
the Banyarwanda with few options outside of armed resistance. However, the 1995 law 
stating that the Banyarwanda had fraudulently acquired citizenship prompted the group to 
mobilize in self-defense and to reclaim their nationality rights (Court 2013; Manby 2009; 
Vlassenroot 2002). Nationality law is a way to upend the balance of power between 
citizenship regime winners and losers, but is not a sufficient cause for conflict. Other initial 
conditions must be met for onset to take place. I now turn to these conditions. 
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War in the Congo 
The first Congo War (1996-1997) toppled Mobutu. The second (1998-2003) 
attempted to do the same to Kabila. In 1998, the Banyarwanda still lacked official 
citizenship and Kabila steadily lost their support. When he expelled Rwandans and 
Ugandans from his army, the Banyarwanda formed a new rebel group, the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma).72 The RCD-Goma’s stated mission 
was to advance the cause of Congolese Rwandophones, and protect the security of Tutsis 
in particular. The government and the Congolese population saw the RCD-Goma as 
Rwanda’s puppet because the rebels were backed by Rwanda and refugees fled there to 
escape the fighting. Reacting to Rwanda’s violation of Congolese sovereignty, Kabila 
supported Mai-Mai and Congolese Hutu militia. Hate speech by Congolese elite labelled 
Banyarwanda “invaders”, “vermin”, and Rwandan “puppets”. Rwandophones were again 
accused of wanting to annex Kivu to create a Hamitic Kingdom. In this toxic climate, Tutsis 
became targets of massacres (Manby 2009; Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 2007).  
A bodyguard assassinated Laurent-Désiré Kabila in January 2001. Kabila’s son 
Joseph took charge and began the slow process of ending the war. A Transitional 
Government formed in 2003 and a year later the entity returned citizenship to the 
Banyarwanda, although it retained ethnicity-based nationality criteria. By 2004, anyone 
born of an ethnic group or nationality present in the territory at independence could claim 
                                                             
 
72 At one point the DRC had 14 foreign armies, three rebel groups, and numerous militia groups 
operating within its borders. After 1999 the fighting was concentrated in the east: North Kivu, 
South Kivu, northern Katanga, and Ituri district (Autesserre 2009). 
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citizenship. 73  This date represented a formal concession to many Banyarwanda, but 
informal barriers continued to pervasive denial of the group’s rights. For example, to prove 
their identity, applications for voter registration had to include statements by five witnesses 
who were already registered and who had been resident in the country for at least five years 
(Manby 2009). 
The 2006 Constitution upheld the 2004 law, which is still in force today. The 2004 
nationality law is intended to be the final word in Congo’s citizenship debate, but the 
language “leaves a dangerous level of ambiguity in its interpretation” (Manby 2009, 79). 
First, the terms “ethnic groups” and “nationalities” are not precisely defined and therefore 
subject to interpretation and political manipulation. Second, authority to prove ethnic 
identity is left indeterminate. If this authority falls to customary leaders, Banyarwanda 
nationality will remain precarious. They have little chance of convincing an autochthonous 
chief of their legitimate claim to citizenship. In short, even when law concedes 
Banyarwanda citizenship, exercising their rights proves difficult, inconsistent, and 
arbitrary (Manby 2009; Jackson 2007). 
 Peace talks in 2008 could still not resolve the Banyarwanda nationality question. 
Since then, the Banyarwanda have suffered setbacks in their quest for citizenship. 
Indigenous groups remained steadfast in their claims that all Banyarwanda are immigrants, 
possibly even double-agents for the Rwandan government (Manby 2009). Inflammatory 
rhetoric and hate speech marred the 2011 federal elections; the Banyarwanda were depicted 
as alien exploiters of Congo and the Congolese (Human Rights Watch 2011; Jackson 2007; 
                                                             
 
73 The upper house of parliament did not approve this provision (Manby 2009). 
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Bøås and Dunn 2013). When North Kivu fell to M23, a Rwanda-backed rebel group, in 
late 2012, Rwandophone communities were blamed. Seen as complicit in M23 activities, 
Banyarwanda were repeatedly threatened and attacked (International Crisis Group 2012). 
74 Then, a draft electoral law in 2014 proposed updating the voter roll through a national 
census. Protests ensued and the provision was dropped. The current plan is to use the 2011 
voter roll without registering new voters.75 The 2011 roll is controversial due to lack of 
transparency and poor verification procedures.76 The Banyarwanda nationality question 
will likely gain renewed traction in the next few years. In March 2015, the government 
began the process of Découpage, a plan to divide the DRC’s 11 existing provinces into 
26.77  
In summary, the politics of Ivoirité in Côte d’Ivoire and Géopolitique in the DRC 
are similar in many respects. A response to the balance of power between citizenship 
regime winners and losers, the ideologies impose broad restrictions on Dioula and 
Banyarwanda citizenship rights. For example, Côte d’Ivoire’s 1998 land law withdrew 
property rights from “foreigners” and other legislation required individuals to prove their 
                                                             
 
74 M23 refers to peace agreement of March 23, 2009 between Kinshasa and the CNDP. By the end 
of 2013 Rwanda had withdrawn support for M23 and the group was defeated. 
75 “Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible?” The International Crisis Group, Africa Report no. 
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authenticity as citizens through certificates of nationality. Eventually the government 
created the Office of National Identification to systematize the process of obtaining 
documents from one’s from ancestral village. These measures resemble efforts by the 
Mission d’Identification des Zaïrois au Kivu and the Conférence Nationale Souveraine to 
identify “true” citizens in the Congo. Furthermore, contentious citizenship narratives in 
Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC used the language of past injustices and future redemption to 
mobilize people along insider/outsider lines. Collective violence then followed a logic of 
threat (decreased citizenship security) and opportunity (increased citizenship security).78 
Faced with denationalization, armed resistance by Banyarwanda escalated to war, which 
parallels what happened in Côte d’Ivoire.  
Conclusion 
It is undeniable that the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and eastern the DRC have many 
layers: land rights, elections, nationality disputes, and natural resources, among others. 
However, Catherine Boone’s observation about land regimes applies to citizenship regimes 
as well. Citizenship rules “structure (or de-structure) political grievances and political 
action” (Boone 2011, 1315). Understanding citizenship politics as identity politics, which 
is the norm in the literature, is extremely useful because identity and citizenship are nearly 
inseparable. At the same time, by emphasizing the redistributive element of citizenship 
politics, we gain better purchase on the variation in violence severity. Varying levels of 
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competition between winners and losers drives varying levels of violence. The depth of 
winner/loser competition is linked to the depth of exclusion in nationality laws. At the same 
time, these two cases illustrate how VOB can lead to increasing restrictions in nationality 
laws that then fuel greater episodes of violence. Where we see this downward spiral of 
violence and exclusion, violence severity continues to risk and the risk of war weighs heavy 
on the country.  
I find that contentious citizenship narratives help explain the joint production of 
violence by elites and individuals. These messages highlight citizenship insecurity of 
citizenship regime winners and losers, and emphasize the insider/outsider cleavage. 
Citizenship debates are more likely to implicate the national citizenship rules if the outsider 
group is composed of both internal and external migrants. As nationality law becomes more 
exclusionary, VOB escalates. War is likely when denationalization is a credible threat to 
outsiders. The next chapter shows that outcomes are constrained when the national 
citizenship rules are not at stake. Further, the “negative case” of Ghana illustrates that VOB 
does not break out if initial conditions are not met.  
Finally, the Ivoirian and Congolese wars clearly diverge in their duration and 
intensity. I attribute this divergence to the depth of exclusion in the citizenship regime. 
Although institutions in Côte d’Ivoire narrowed citizenship criteria, Dioula exclusion was 
less severe and less prolonged than that of Congolese Banyarwanda. The Banyarwanda 
faced threats to their nationality as early as the Brussels Round Table of 1960. The Dioula, 
on the other hand, informally exercised important citizenship rights, such as the right to 
vote and own land, under Houphouet Boigny (1960-1993). The 1994 and 1995 electoral 
laws were the first major pieces of Ivoirité legislation, followed later by Article 35 in the 
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2000 Constitution. These restrictions limited who could run for presidential office, but did 
not revoke Dioula citizenship completely. The 1998 land law prevented Dioula from 
owning property, but did not deny their nationality. Even the Office of National 
Identification, with its unwieldly procedures for nationality documents, did not explicitly 
withdraw Dioula nationality; rather, it denied their citizenship in practice. The 
Banyarwanda, on the other hand, formally lost their citizenship multiple times: under the 
1964 Constitution (restored 1971/1972) and under the 1981/1982 nationality laws. From 
1981 to 2004 most Banyarwanda were not officially citizens of the DRC (Jackson 2007).  
In short, the Dioula were effectively denationalized through formal means, but the 




Chapter 6. The Wars that Never Happened: Evidence from Ghana 
and Kenya 
 
The previous chapter explained why the politics of belonging led to war in Côte 
d’Ivoire and the DRC. This chapter addresses cases of non-escalation and minor conflict. 
Evidence from Ghana shows why some insider/outsider violence remains at the local level, 
and evidence from Kenya sheds light on processes driving episodes towards minor conflict 
that stops short of war. In this chapter I test the second part of Hypothesis 2: 
 
H2b: Violence at the national level will fall short of war if nationality laws are not 
in question. 
 
Ghana meets the basic criteria you would expect for VOB escalation. Foreign 
migrants lived and worked in the country for several generations, and growing land scarcity 
increased insider/outsider competition. The country’s nationality laws also changed several 
times and became progressively more restrictive. In the midst of exclusionary reforms, the 
government required “foreigners” to acquire residence permits or leave the country.  
Furthermore, economic crisis and political liberalization meant citizenship insecurity was 
on the rise and intra-elite competition was fierce. Even more striking, rural areas saw land 
disputes turn violent, and election violence over fraud broke out. Yet the politics of 
belonging never led to minor conflict. Why? I argue that Ghana did not meet the necessary 
conditions for conflict onset.  
The nature of Ghana’s citizenship regime, and its network of institutions more 
broadly, prevented the politicization of citizenship. Furthermore, low citizenship insecurity 
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minimized winner/loser competition and limited the momentum of citizenship debates. 
Therefore, national citizenship did not become a politicized issue in Ghana. Importantly, 
the country’s formal and informal institutions effectively managed insider/outsider 
tensions. A disconnect between winner/loser status and insider/outsider identity had a 
dampening effect on contentious narratives, which in turn prevented widespread ethnic 
mobilization. Additional factors suppressed widespread VOB in Ghana as well. For 
example, political and economic liberalization did not happen at the same time, meaning 
the government could manage each change before it turned into a crisis. Also, land 
authority rests with Ghana’s chiefs so the insider/outsider axis of contention does not 
involve the national political community. A critic may point to the clashes between the 
Konkomba and the Nanumba, Dagomba, and Gonja groups in the northern regions of the 
country. I address this episode of minor conflict later.  
In Kenya’s Rift Valley, competition between citizenship regime winners and losers 
exacerbated insider/outsider divisions. The statist land tenure regime, the clientelization of 
land, the breakdown of patronage networks, and the combined force of political and 
economic crises elevated insider/outsider violence in Kenya to the national level. Although 
the nationality laws liberalized in 1986 and again in 2010, widespread violence broke out 
during the 1992, 1997, and 2007 elections. Inflammatory rhetoric during these campaigns 
amounted to calls for ethnic cleansing, reflecting the extent of elite impunity and 
normalization of political violence in the country. Kenya reached the brink, but did not 
succumb to civil war. Why?  
Kenya experienced VOB at the minor conflict level because the criteria for conflict 
onset were met. Citizenship became a nationally politicized issue, but insider/outsider 
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violence ultimately fell short of war because only sub-national belonging came under fire. 
Since outsiders did not have contested foreign origins, nationality laws were not come 
under threat. Even though citizenship insecurity peaked, war did not break out because 
outsiders never faced denationalization. In contrast, outsiders in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC 
had strong ties, at least in popular imagination, to neighboring countries. This fact made it 
easier for politicians to claim that the Dioula and Banyarwanda, respectively, had no right 
to national citizenship. When the government moved to denationalize them, it raised the 
stakes sufficiently high for outsiders to rebel. A critic may point to the case of the 
marginalized Somali and Nubian communities in Kenya. I address these plausible outliers 
at the end of this section.   
Data for this chapter comes from secondary source material and original interviews 
I conducted with political researchers in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and Accra, Ghana 
(November-December 2014). See Table 4 in Chapter 5 for an overview of variables under 
consideration. Recall that case selection is purposive in order to harness the necessary 
variation on the dependent and independent variables, while also controlling for potentially 
confounding factors. 
Ghana 
Present-day Ghana is divided into 10 regions: Upper West, Upper East, Northern, 
Brong-Ahafo, Ashanti, Eastern, Volta, Greater Accra, Central, and Western. The largest 
ethnic groups are the Akan (49%), Mole-Dagbani (17%), Ewe (13%) and Ga-Dangme (8%) 
(Fremong 2012). These ethnic groups are highly fragmented, though. In fact, the Akan can 
be divided into about 20 sub-groups (Langer 2009).  
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“Stools” are a form of religio-political organization throughout Ghana.79 Part of 
chiefly estates, stool lands are managed on behalf of the community. Chiefs have land 
authority, which they use to allocate plots, extract revenue and rents, and arbitrate disputes 
(Boone 2014; Crook 2008). Since property rights are governed by customary law in Ghana, 
land conflicts remain outside the national political arena. Furthermore, chiefly land 
authority has a dampening effect on insider/outsider cleavages. Autochthons tend to 
economically outperform migrants, and land is not exploited by politicians as a patronage 
resource. Therefore, migration is not a politically charged issue during Ghanaian elections. 
Even when nativist discourse does rear its head, the messages do not encourage armed 
organization (Boone 2014; Boni 2005; Boone and Duku 2012; Côté and Mitchell 2016; 
Kobo 2010).  
                                                             
 
79 As Hammer (1998) explains, “It is through the current occupier of the Stool that the spiritual and 
political power of the people is exercised…the Stool represents the centre of political gravitation” 
(317, Note 6). The 1979 Constitution extended the power of chiefs over “stool lands” to northern 




Figure 9: Map of Ghana 80 
The structure of insider/outsider relations 
Chiefs and their stool rights were the foundation of indirect, colonial rule in Ghana. 
Migrants entered into abusa (sharecropping) contracts in which they paid tribute to chiefs 
for access to stool lands  (Fred-Mensah 1999; Addae-Mensah 1986; Boni 2006; Berry 
2009; Berry 2001; Boone 2014). However, unlike in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC, migrants 
in Ghana could acquire land titles that proved their ownership of a plot—even if the tribute 
requirement often remained in place. Furthermore, the transactions were well documented 
                                                             
 
80 Map courtesy of the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at 
Austin. Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/ghana_admin_2007.jpg. Accessed 
August 26, 2016. 
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and professionally surveyed (Boone 2014; Boone and Duku 2012; Benneh 1988; Boni 
2005). Lastly, the size of the in-migrant population was smaller in Ghana, as compared to 
places with national level land conflict. For example, Boone (2014, 82-85) notes that 
districts with national level land violence had in-migrant populations that made up 50 to 
60% of the total district population, whereas in-migrants in Ghana represented closer to 
30%. In short, even though outsiders remained at a disadvantage under customary land 
regime, citizenship insecurity was kept in check. Migrants had land rights, manageable 
population sizes, and throughout Ghana’s independence period the government has taken 
significant steps to minimize ethnic divisions and support migrant communities.  
Cocoa cultivation arrived in the eastern Volta Region just before the First World 
War. After WWII, migrants came to take advantage of Ghana’s booming cocoa industry. 
They originated from other parts of the colony, Haute Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), 
Niger, Mali, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria. Cocoa production expanded east to west as 
declining yields forced migrants to search for uncultivated land. Outsiders leaving Eastern 
and Ashanti Regions were welcomed in Western Region because population densities were 
low and indigenous groups did not take a strong interest in export crop production (Boone 
and Duku 2012; Boni 2005; Côté and Mitchell 2016). So long as farmers could find new 
land to cultivate, scarcity and declining yields did not exacerbate host/migrant relations.  
Eventually the spread of commercial production overwhelmed exhausted natural 
resources. Communities began to accuse their chiefs of betrayal for selling ancestral land 
to non-indigenes. Popular pressure thus forced chiefs to curb or eliminate property rights 
of strangers (Boone 2014; Boni 2005; Addae-Mensah 1986; Alhassan and Manuh 2005; 
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Benneh 1988).81 Competition intensified and land conflict broke out. However, fighting 
was constrained to the local level. Even though the outsider group in Ghana was comprised 
of internal and foreign migrants, contention never reached the national stage because 
autochthons blamed their chiefs for land-related problems (Boone 2014; Mitchell 2011). 
Therefore, citizenship was not politicized in the national political arena. Moreover, 
indigenous populations in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC competed directly with migrants for 
land and political power. In Ghana, though, migrants remained subservient to hosts, 
thereby posing less of a threat (Crook 2001; Mitchell 2011). This reduced the salience of 
the citizenship security cleavage and weakened winner/loser competition   
The evolution of state-society relations in Ghana also contributed to non-escalation 
there. Essentially, the government’s policies prevented citizenship regime winner/loser 
status from exacerbating ethnic cleavages. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention 
People’s Party (CPP) led Ghana to independence on March 6, 1957. Although the CPP 
took an anti-migrant platform (Boone 2014; Mikell 1992), it supported an inclusionary 
citizenship regime. For example, the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1 of 1957 (later 
replaced by the Nationality Act 62 of 1961) upheld jus soli citizenship principles. In 1966, 
the National Liberation Council (NLC) overthrew Nkrumah. 82 The NLC curried favor 
among the economically-powerful immigrant community. The Nationality Decree of 1967 
                                                             
 
81 Strangers responded by organizing politically. For example, the Association of Stranger Farmers 
of Wassa Amenfi, which had goal of representing (land) interests of stranger farmers (Benneh 1988; 
Boone and Duku 2012). 




then relaxed the criteria for acquiring citizenship for individuals born before independence 
(Whitaker 2015; Kobo 2010).83 
In addition, Nkrumah and his successors engaged in ethno-regional balancing to 
ensure that northerners were represented in the government. They also took concrete and 
symbolic steps to build an inclusive national identity. For instance, under the Avoidance 
of Discrimination Act of 1957 (ADA), Nkrumah banned political parties formed along 
ethnic or regional lines. The move remains controversial for its role in undercutting 
political opposition, but it is widely credited with reducing the salience of ethnic identities. 
Subsequent regimes have upheld ADA principles by passing additional legislation to 
prevent ethnicity-based mobilization and to prevent any local language from being elevated 
to the status of national language (Langer 2009).84  
Nkrumah and his successors openly celebrated Ghana’s pluralism as well. They 
adopted many forms of traditional dress or invited different traditional leaders at state 
events, in addition to participating in important cultural festivals around the country. 
Furthermore, the Ghanaian boarding school system sends students to institutions outside 
their home region in an effort to break down regional ties and promote national integration. 
The same is true for civil servants, which forces them to learn the local language and 
assimilate (Langer 2009).85  
                                                             
 
83 The 1967 Decree upheld jus soli principles. 
84 The Constitutions of 1969, 1979, and 1992, the 2000 Political Parties Act, and the (non-binding) 
2004 Political Parties Code of Conduct all aim to impede electoral mobilization along ethnic lines. 
85 These efforts were also stressed to me in field interviews. See Frempong Interview-Accra-
December 15, 2014; Nana Interview-Accra-December 17, 2014 
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In summary, Ghana’s state-society relations helps explain why insider/outsider 
violence does not escalate beyond the level of localized skirmishes there. Namely, formal 
and informal institutions support an inclusionary citizenship regime, which reduces 
citizenship insecurity and minimizes the salience of the insider/outsider cleavage. Jus soli 
nationality laws in the early years of independence supported a liberal conceptualization of 
national citizenship, even as indigeneity often held sway in rural areas. Efforts at national 
integration further reduced the salience of ethnicity and thus the likelihood of mobilization 
along cultural lines. Consequently, citizenship regime winner/loser status fell along party 
lines more than ethnic identity. Finally, the insider/outsider axis of contention implicates 
chieftaincies rather than the state, preventing national citizenship rules from becoming 
politicized. This confluence of factors helps explain why contentious citizenship narratives 
did not develop and VOB did not escalate to minor conflict soon after independence.  
Stability in instability 
In 1969, Ghana’s economy went into shock, leading to massive inflation, 
unemployment, food shortages (Beckman 1976). Opposition to foreigners grew, especially 
in the business sector where they posed the greatest threat. Land scarcity also contributed 
to growing resentment towards migrants (Whitaker 2015; Mitchell 2011; Kobo 2010). 
However, the foreign-born were by now an important part of the national economy—in 
part because of their substantial demographic footprint (Whitaker 2015; Peil 1974).86  
                                                             
 
86 According to the 1960 census, non-Ghanaians accounted for 12% of population (Peil 1974). 
Moreover, 18% of cocoa farmers, 65.6% of cocoa farm workers, and 40% of all farm workers were 
immigrants (Boone 2014).  
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Within a year of passing the Nationality Law of 1967, the NLC replaced it with the 
Nationality (Amendment) Decree 333 of 1969. In one fell swoop, jus soli provisions gave 
way to jus sanguinis rules.87 The Busia government then introduced the Aliens Compliance 
Order of 1969 (ACO) to enforce Nkrumah-era legislation.88 The ACO required foreigners 
to get residence permits within two weeks under threat of deportation. The result was a 
mass expulsion of 200,000 people within 6 months. The ACO intended to target 
immigrants from Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Syria in the urban retail and informal 
sectors (Boone 2014).89 Many of those expelled were Ghanaian in-migrants. As is common 
in many parts of Africa, autochthons did not distinguish between foreign-nationals and 
strangers from the northern or southern areas of the country (Peil 1974). 
The new laws represented a shift towards more exclusionary policies, but did not 
provoke violence or significant political mobilization.90 In fact, insider/outsider tension did 
not even influence the 1969 election campaign (Boone 2014). These laws were not wide-
reaching enough to exclude a significant portion of the population from citizenship, and 
                                                             
 
87 The 1969 law was reinforced by the 1969 Constitution, the Nationality Act 361 of 1971, and the 
Amendment Decree of 1972. The laws state: A person born in Ghana before independence is a 
citizen if one parent or grandparent was born in Ghana. A person born outside the country must 
have one parent born in Ghana. A person born in or outside of the country after independence and 
before the 1969 Constitution’s enactment must have one parent and one grandparent or great-
grandparent born in Ghana. The 1972 Amendment withdrew citizenship for those who did not 
qualify under the criteria of Act 361. For more information, see Manby (2015). 
88 The Aliens Acts of 1963 and 1965. 
89 The law even exempted foreign cocoa farm workers, but they still left their fields in droves—
only hurting the economy more by undercutting the labor supply (Peil 1974; Mikell 1992; Boone 
2014). 
90 The ripple effects of the ACO are still felt today. Discussions of citizenship issues are tempered 
by the long shadow cast by the ACO (Mohammed Interview-Accra-December 17, 2014). 
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therefore did not have a substantive impact on citizenship security or winner/loser 
competition. Furthermore, state-society relations that minimized ethnic divisions and 
protected basic rights kept citizenship insecurity in check. Most importantly, the customary 
land regime kept insider/outsider competition outside the national arena and prevented 
citizenship from becoming a nationally politicized issue. Therefore, critical factors in VOB 
onset remained absent. Finally, outsider fortunes changed soon enough. Starting in the 
1980s, the pendulum swung the other way and outsiders saw citizenship security improve 
dramatically. Insiders did not lose out under the new citizenship rules, so winner/loser 
competition remained manageable and only localized VOB broke out.  
In December 1981, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings seized power in a coup.91 
In the midst of growing land shortages, falling commodity prices, net-positive emigration, 
and structural adjustment programs, migrants’ fortunes changed. Rawlings and the 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) “subordinated [ethnic claims] to the 
language of class interest” (Lentz and Nugent 2000, 22; Langer 2009).92 The regime also 
encouraged registration and titling of land in an effort to support outsider property rights 
(Boone 2014). The new measures prompted periodic episodes of violence. In one instance, 
Sefwi chiefs in Western Region encouraged autochthons “to dispossess strangers” of land 
that had been purchased legally years earlier (Boone 2014; Boni 2005). However, the Asare 
                                                             
 
91 Rawlings was from the Ewe ethnic group, which had a history of secessionist tendencies. Some 
credit for Ghana’s stability goes to the alternation of ethnic groups in power. Even groups that 
complained of discrimination have controlled the executive at one point in time (Frempong 
Interview-Accra-December 15, 2014; Frempong 2012).  
92 Nonetheless, Rawlings showed favoritism towards his Ewe ethnic group, specifically in terms of 
political appointments (Langer 2009; see also Boahen 1992). 
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Committee of 1987 tasked with investigating the clashes ultimately took the migrants’ side, 
thus tipping the balance of power slightly in favor of outsiders (Boone and Duku 2012). 
Rawlings faced growing pressure from the international community to introduce 
free market reforms and open the political system, as did almost all of his contemporaries. 
In response, he founded the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and went on to win 
multiparty elections in 1992 and 1996. In Côte d’Ivoire, political and economic 
liberalization occurred at the same time as deepening land scarcity, which severely 
restricted patronage flows. This “perfect storm” politicized the migration issue and when 
the state could not address surging grievances, violence broke out (Mitchell 2011). A 
similar pattern is evident in Kenya and the DRC where violence of belonging escalated to 
the level of minor and major conflict, respectively. However, Ghana may have been “able 
to ‘weather the storm’ of exogenous shocks” because it liberalized economically during 
the first Rawlings regime (1981 to 1992), before it liberalized politically (Mitchell 2011, 
134). Staggering economic and political liberalization helps suppress xenophobic 
politicking. The government can manage the monumental transitions one at a time 
(Whitaker 2015) and the crisis does not rupture patronage networks. In Côte d’Ivoire, 
political and economic liberalization occurred at the same time as deepening land scarcity, 
which severely restricted patronage flows. This “perfect storm” politicized the migration 
issue and when the state could not address surging grievances, violence broke out (Mitchell 
2011). A similar pattern is evident in Kenya and the DRC. 
Citizenship insecurity remained low in Ghana for several reasons. First, Ghana 
deported many migrants rather than withdrawing their rights, but allowing them to stay in 
the country. By physically removing so many citizenship regime losers, the government 
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impeded collective action. The migrants’ departure before the cocoa crisis meant that they 
could not be so easily scapegoated for the country’s problems (Mitchell 2011). Therefore, 
contentious citizenship narratives did not gain much traction. Secondly, Ghana has 
experienced “stability in its instability” unlike Côte d’Ivoire which experienced “instability 
in its stability” (Frempong Interview-Accra-December 15, 2014). The military government 
in place during the cocoa crisis provided a degree of political certainty (Mitchell 2011), 
which improved citizenship security generally. Furthermore, Ghana’s economy had 
diversified during the independence era and it was much less dependent on cocoa when the 
crisis hit (Mitchell 2011), yet another boon for citizenship security. The same cannot be 
said of Côte d’Ivoire.  
Up to the present moment, Ghana’s migrant communities have seen deterioration 
in land rights in rural areas, but this trend has not been accompanied by violence. For 
example, Wassa Amenfi (Eastern Region) became one of the first districts to pilot the Land 
Administration Project (LAP) in 2003. The LAP upholds the primacy of indigenous rights 
by confirming chiefs’ land authority (Boone 2014; Alhassan and Manuh 2005). Migrants 
who acquired titles for land purchased 1950-1970s are effectively tenants under the new 
system (Boone and Duku 2012). Under the LAP, chiefs continue to force concessions from 
migrants, ranging from the renegotiation of titles to the repossession of land, and yet the 
policy has not engendered violent opposition (Boone 2014; Boone and Duku 2012; Boni 
2005). Since land rights fall under chiefly authority, the axis of contention does not involve 
the state or the national political community. Therefore, national citizenship is not a 
politicized issue and VOB does not escalate. 
169 
 
It is also important to note that Ghana’s institutions support a relatively inclusionary 
citizenship regime. Ghana’s nationality laws are clear on citizenship criteria and courts can 
manage disputes effectively, which reduces citizenship insecurity. 93  For example, the 
government has made a conscious effort to legislate on citizenship issues and detail 
precisely who can be a citizen, how one may obtain or lose citizenship, etc. Improvements 
in the registration process and distribution of identity cards also helped reduce the use of 
citizenship as a political weapon. The opposite was true in Côte d’Ivoire, where a history 
of leaving open questions regarding citizenship criteria and discriminatory identification 
policies created confusion and exacerbated winner/loser tensions.  
It is noteworthy that no political party has verbally (or physically) attacked 
foreigners since the 1990s (Côté and Mitchell 2016; Mohammed Interview 12/17/14).94 
Furthermore, rushing to defend the rights of migrants, the ruling NDC set a precedent for 
others to follow. In 2000, John Kufuor selected a running mate with foreign family ties, 
and it is believed that this move helped him win the election. Furthermore, Ghana’s 
(effective) two-party system incentivizes politicians to try to win every single vote, 
meaning that politicians on all sides try to woo the Zongo community (Whitaker 2015; 
Kobo 2010; Mohammed Interview 12/17/2014).95 Therefore, the status quo citizenship 
                                                             
 
93 Present-day nationality law in Ghana upholds jus sanguinis principles and discriminates against 
women with foreign spouses, but has relatively liberal provisions otherwise. It permits dual 
nationality and imposes low residency requirements (5 years) for naturalization. Further, there is 
no evidence of a probationary period before naturalized citizens can exercise their rights 
(Citizenship Act 591 of 2000; Dual Citizenship Regulation Act 91 of 2002). 
94 In 1996 the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) presidential candidate allegedly threatened in 
1996 to deport migrants if elected. 
95 The term “Zongo” refers to migrant-dense communities in urban areas.  
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rules do not lead to widespread exclusion, and thus citizenship insecurity is not a threat to 
stability. 
A second reason for Ghana’s stability stems from the country’s formal institutions. 
Strong institutions reduce elite leverage over citizenship questions, which is why the issue 
has not become politicized. Additionally, since respect for public institutions is rather high, 
elites and individuals try to work within the system rather than taking to the streets (Nana 
Interview 12/17/2014; Mohammed Interview 12/17/2014; Tsegah Interview 12/17/2014).96 
For instance, when NPP disputed the results of the 2012 elections, the party protested and 
brought their case before the Supreme Court. The judges ruled in favor of NDC candidate 
and incumbent president John Mahama. The NPP respected this decision rather than exiting 
the political process. 
To be clear, ethnicity still matters in Ghanaian politics. After the NLC handed over 
power in 1969, the military split along ethnic lines into Ashanti/Akan and Ewe factions. 
The resulting tensions have repeatedly resurfaced since then. However, state strategies and 
policies that diminish the political salience of ethnicity also serve to reduce the salience of 
nationality questions (Mitchell 2011; Langer 2009; Frempong Interview-Accra-December 
15, 2014). There is hope too that improvements in education will reduce the sway political 
entrepreneurs have over politicizing issues. Lack of education is a compounding factor in 
                                                             
 
96 During interviews, the role chiefs play in mediating disputes and facilitating cooperation came 
up in a positive light. Their moral authority is seen as a valuable dispute resolution tool. 
However, research by Crook, Asante, and Brobbey (2011) suggests that customary leaders are not 
as “congruent with popular values about fairness and just resolution of disputes” (65) as public 




violent mobilization by facilitating elite manipulation of latent resentment against 
foreigners among the population (Tsegah Interview-Accra-December 17, 2014).97  
In summary, Ghana has evaded large-scale violence over citizenship questions even 
though nationality laws have undergone contraction.98 I argue that Ghana’s non-escalation 
can be attributed to factors that served to suppress the politics of belonging and violence 
onset more generally. First, the citizenship regime is relatively inclusive and strongly 
supported by formal and informal institutions that reduce winner/loser competition. 
Citizenship security is thus a weak political cleavage in society and ethnic mobilization is 
rare.  
The Konkomba question 
I separate the discussion of clashes in northern Ghana (1981, 1992, 1994-95) from 
the preceding discussion because they represent episodes of minor conflict. The central 
issue in these clashes is a question of political organization. Although the groups involved 
make competing claims to autochthony, this dispute is not the crux of the contention. 
Rather, it is Ghana's chieftaincy system, which privileges centralized societies by following 
the colonial policy of placing non-centralized (acephalous) societies under the jurisdiction 
of centralized neighbors (Talton 2010). Tensions between the historically acephalous 
                                                             
 
97 See Collier (2007) on the general relationship between low education levels and conflict. 
98 A notable exception is fighting between Konkomba migrants and indigenous Dagomba, Gonja, 
and Krachis in northern Ghana. Between February and March 1996, clashes killed 1,000 people 
and destroyed 144 villages (Fred-Mensah 1999). 
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Konkomba and the Dagomba, Nanumba, and Gonja ethnic groups escalated to minor 
conflict because the Konkomba challenged wanted a chieftaincy of their own.  
Without a formal chieftaincy, the Konkomba remain marginalized politically even 
though they find great economic success in the commercial yam market. In 1978 General 
Acheampong established the Committee on Ownership of Land and Positions of Tenants 
in Northern and Upper Regions. The Alhassan Committee, as it was popularly known, was 
tasked with creating “a uniform system of land tenure for the entire nation, by determining 
the best process to transfer land control from the government to the region’s ‘original land 
owners’ in the north” (Talton 2010, 146-7). Konkoma leaders petitioned the state to 
recognize their paramount chief. The official reason for denying their request was that the 
Dagomba allegedly conquered the Konkomba before the colonial period. However, the 
petition was reviewed by the very chief the Konkomba sought to replace. 
The 1979 Constitution extended chiefly land authority to Northern and Upper 
Regions. In 1981 tensions between the Konkomba and Nanumba burst into four months of 
fighting that left over 1,000 people dead. In the lead-up to the confrontations, Konkomba 
leaders instructed their communities to stop paying tribute to non-Konkomba chiefs and to 
work within Konkomba traditions to resolve disputes. The central government intervened 
but never addressed the underlying inequalities of traditional politics, leaving grievances 
on both sides.  
In 1991, political competition between the Nawuri and Gonja led to a conflict and 
the Konkomba were dragged into the fray. Again they petitioned for recognition of a 
Konkomba paramount chief and again their request was denied. The 1991-1992 attacks 
precipitated largescale violence during the 1994-1995 “Guinea Fowl War”. Northern towns 
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of Tamale, Damango, Yendi, and Bimbilla were hit hardest and in the end as many as 3,000 
people died.  
The Konkomba case meets conditions for VOB escalation to minor conflict. As a 
historically non-centralized society, the Konkomba were citizenship insecure because they 
lacked land rights and, more generally, they were subordinated to non-Konkomba chiefs. 
As winner/loser competition heated up, it exacerbated ethnic tensions. Ethnic mobilization 
supported armed organization. VOB fell short of war each time, though, because national 
citizenship rules were not in dispute. Although sub-national belonging came under fire, no 
movement aimed to deny the Konkomba’s nationality status. Therefore, events did not 
escalate to war. 
Kenya 
Present-day Kenya is divided into eight provinces: Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, 
Central, Eastern, North Eastern, Nairobi, and Coast. None of Kenya’s 42 ethnic groups can 
claim a demographic edge. The largest groups are the Kikuyu (18.3%), Luhya (14%), 
Kalenjin (12%), Luo (10.7%), and Kamba (10.2%).99  
Three of Kenya’s last five elections (1992, 1997, and 2007) have been violent.100 
During these campaigns, contentious citizenship narratives deployed logics of threat and 
opportunity that encouraged ethnic cleansing.  Kenya meets the criteria for insider/outsider 
                                                             
 
99  The Luhya and the Kalenjin are colonial-era agglomerations of smaller groups. The label 
“Luhya” combines 16 groups (Bukusu, Dakho, Kabras, Khayo, Kisa, Marachi, Maragoli,  Marama,  
Nyala,  Nyole,  Samia,  Tachoni,  Tiriki,  Tsotso,  and Wanga) and the label “Kalenjin” combines 
11 groups (Kipsigis, Nandi,  Pokot/Suk,  Elgeyo, Marakwet, Keiyo, Tugen, Sabaot, Sebei, Dorobo,  
and Terik) (Human Rights Watch 1993, 5). 
100 Elections were peaceful in 2002 and 2013. 
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violence onset. The statist land tenure regime put insiders at a structural disadvantage vis-
à-vis a growing population of outsiders and encouraged the clientelization of land. Then, 
patronage resources dried up with the transition to economic and political liberalization. 
Why did cycles of violence in Kenya fall short of war? I argue that nationality laws were 
not at stake because outsiders did not have contested foreign origins, which reduced the 
chances of civil war onset. 
The Rift Valley Province (RVP) is the epi-center of insider/outsider violence in 
Kenya. This area has the most fertile farmland and is traditionally home to pastoralist 
groups (Kalenjin, Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana). The outsider group in RVP is 
predominately composed of Kenyan in-migrants (Kikuyu and Luo). Therefore, elites 
pushing a nativist agenda could not make a compelling case for denationalizing outsiders, 
which served to constrain VOB to the level of minor conflict.   
In Kenya, contentious insider narratives suggested that the nationalist orientation 
of the status quo rules undermined the land rights of autochthons (decreased citizenship 
security). They argued that the rules should instead reflect sub-national (ethnic) rules of 
belonging (increased citizenship security). Outsiders favored the nationalist status quo, 
which allowed any citizen to own land in any region of Kenya (increased citizenship 
security). Outsiders argued that if sub-national membership took precedence, their claims 




Figure 10: Map of Kenya 101 
Roots in the Rift  
In 1895, Kenya became part of the British East Africa Protectorate and all land 
came under the Crown’s jurisdiction. Three million hectares of the central Rift Valley were 
designated part of the Scheduled Areas, which became known as the White Highlands 
because Europeans had exclusive rights to this land. In 1915, Kenya’s forty-plus ethnic 
groups were forced onto Native Reserves, designated Tribal Trust Land.102 Unlike the 
Scheduled Areas, Trust Land was governed by customary law, meaning that indigeneity 
                                                             
 
101 Map courtesy of the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at 
Austin. Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/kenya_pol88.jpg. Accessed August 
26, 2016. 
102 This law also abolished Africans’ right to own land. 
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became the principle way to claim land rights there. To create the Scheduled Areas, 
colonial administrators expropriated land from indigenous groups in RVP (Maasai and 
Kalenjin) and in Central Province (Kikuyu), leading to massive internal displacement that 
exaggerated the effects of land scarcity across all ethnic groups. As in Côte d’Ivoire and 
the DRC, colonial administrators also resettled thousands of people to support commercial 
farming. The in-migrants farmed small plots in the White Highlands as “squatters”.103 The 
resulting economic pressures, combined with an emergent African intellectual class 
demanding broader political and economic rights, culminated in the Mau Mau rebellion 
from 1952 to 1957 (Keller 2014).  
Mau Mau fighters were primarily disenfranchised Kikuyu. 104  They sought to 
“break the white monopoly on best farmland, political and economic rights in the native 
reserves” (Boone 2014, 140-141). The colonial government came down with a heavy hand. 
More than 12,000 rebels and over 2,000 loyalists died in the fighting, compared to only 32 
Europeans. 105  As a result of Mau Mau, Europeans reconsidered African demands for 
independence. They also realized that some land would need to be transferred to Africans. 
In 1961 a new law allowed Africans to buy and farm land in the Scheduled Areas (Keller 
2014; Human Rights Watch 1993). 
                                                             
 
103 By the 1930s, about 150,000 Kikuyu resided in RVP (Boone 2014; Gisemba 2008). In 1939, the 
administration resettled an additional 4,000 Kikuyu (Keller 2014). 
104  Branch (2009) notes that Mau Mau represents a schism in the Kikuyu group where 
disenfranchised Kikuyu joined the rebellion while Kikuyu elite followed Kenyatta in 
institutionalized contestation of the colonial state. 
105 Some estimates are as high as 50,000 Africans killed (Boone 2014, 141) 
177 
 
Negotiations for the transition to independence took place during the Lancaster 
House Conference (1960-1963). Land rights in RVP were a particularly tense issue. 
Debates between indigenous and settler communities arose over competing claims to land 
there (Boone 2014; Human Rights Watch 1993). The Kenyan African Democratic Union 
(KADU), led by Masinde Muliro, Daniel arap Moi, and Ronald Ngala, supported a 
regionalist federalism called majimboism which would protect the interests of minority 
ethnic groups by privileging ancestral rights in local communities. The Kenyan African 
National Union (KANU), on the other hand, led by Jomo Kenyatta, Oginga Odinga, and 
Tom Mboya, supported a constitution that preserved the state’s control over land, and 
opened the land market to all Kenyans.106 Harambee, Kenyatta’s motto of “let’s all pull 
together”, came to represent a nationalist vision of Kenya’s citizenship rules, whereas 
majimboism represented an ideology of regionalism. Harambee and majimboism represent 
competing narratives about Kenya’s citizenship rules. 
KANU defeated KADU and the African People’s Party (APP) in the pre-
independence elections of 1961. Almost immediately upon entering office in 1963, 
Kenyatta centralized power in the executive. Importantly, he abolished regional powers, a 
provision agreed to during the Lancaster Conference to appease KADU concerns about 
ancestral land rights. In exchange for their cooperation, KANU included KADU in a 
power-sharing agreement. With the dissolution of KADU and APP, Kenya became a de 
                                                             
 
106 An ethnic cleavage is apparent in the KANU-KADU divide: KANU drew support from RVP 
settlers (e.g. Kikuyu and Luo), and KADU from RVP indigenes (e.g. Maasai and Kalenjin). 
However, Catherine Boone (2014) argues that the cleavage is more appropriately characterized as 
between land-rights winners (settlers) versus losers (autochthons). 
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facto one-party state (Leys 1975; Klopp 2002). By 1964 majimboism was subordinated to 
harambee.  
As in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC, colonialism in Kenya laid the foundation for 
violent land disputes through policies of forced migration, land appropriation, and 
fabricated ethnography. Resettlement schemes in Kenya were primarily oriented towards 
in-migration, which was not the case in Côte d’Ivoire and the Congo. These schemes 
reallocated ancestral land of RVP indigenes to settlers from other parts of the country. 
Citizenship debates over regionalism pitted losing autochthons against winning settlers. 
These disputes escalated to minor conflict during the 1990s and in the 2007/2008 election 
crisis. However, due to the outsider group’s ethnic make-up, these disputes did not reach 
the level of civil war. The Kikuyu did not have contested foreign origins, and there were 
no efforts to denationalize them. 
“Nyayo”: In the footsteps 
The 1960s and 1970s saw a land rush in the Rift Valley. Between 1960 and 1966, 
the government bought up parcels in the former White Highlands, mostly from exiting 
European settlers. The government transferred much of this land to African farmers 
through settlement schemes, such as the Million Acre Scheme, and state-backed land-
buying companies (Leys 1975). Kikuyu already in RVP purchased the land they worked 
on, and many more people escaped overcrowding in Central Province by migrating West 
(Keller 2014; Human Rights Watch 1993).107  
                                                             
 
107 In 1962, 43.5% of the RVP population were in-migrants and their numbers grew through the 
1970s. From 1968 to 1979, the number of settlers in RVP increased six-fold from 5,350 to 34,253 
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To a large extent, minority elites controlled local land allocation during Kenyatta’s 
rule (Leys 1975). As in-migration continued, though, winner/loser competition grew. The 
losing Kalenjin loathed the settlement schemes, which forced them to buy back their 
ancestral homeland—and sometimes they were outbid by outsiders. Rumors that Kikuyu 
went unpunished for defaulting on loans (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Anderson and Lochery 
2008; Lynch 2008) and accusations of corruption (Anderson and Lochery 2008; Harbeson 
1973) only deepened Kalenjin resentment of Kikuyu winners.108 
In 1978, Jomo Kenyatta died while in office. His successor, Daniel arap Moi, 
continued and expanded the “Imperial Presidency”. A 1982 constitutional amendment 
turned Kenya into a de jure one-party state, with KANU at the helm. The integrity of 
political institutions deteriorated precipitously during this period and Moi bolstered his 
absolutist rule with heavy repression (Onoma 2010). Under Moi, political violence became 
normalized and diffused (Mueller 2008; Kagwanja 2009). In addition, mounting pressures 
from economic crisis, declining aid flows, international scrutiny on human rights abuses, 
international pressure to liberalize, and structural adjustment programs hampered Moi’s 
ability to dole out patronage. He turned to land as an alternative (Klopp 2000; Boone 2011, 
2014; Southall 2005; Republic of Kenya 2004 [Ndung’u Report]).  
According to the Ndung’u Commission’s 2004 report, grand corruption through 
illegal land sales reached the level of kleptocracy under Moi. Insecure property rights 
                                                             
 
people. In comparison, the number of settlers in the Central Province only increased 60% during 
the same period (Boone 2014, 146).  
108 Vast tracks of land went to Kenyatta himself and Kikuyu elites. As in Côte d’Ivoire and the 
DRC, the regime turned farmers into economically dependent clients of the government. 
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overlapped with competing land claims to create a highly volatile political situation that 
heightened levels of citizenship insecurity for insiders and outsiders For example, it was 
common for the government to issue multiple titles for same piece of land. Some titles 
were issued for property that did not even exist.109 In addition, land registration and titling 
accelerated in rural areas, indicating the “growing exclusivity of land rights” (Boone 2014, 
155). Land titles were not granted if an individual failed to repay their loan or was a 
member of a cooperative society—and membership in co-ops was “nearly universal” 
(Harbeson 1973; Boone 2011, 2014; Bates 1981).  
Kalenjin landlessness became “acute” in the 1970s and 1980s (Bøås and Dunn 
2013, 60). Unlike Kenyatta, Moi had to appropriate land from other groups to distribute it 
to his Kalenjin constituents, displacing Kikuyu squatters in RVP. With the presidency 
firmly in control of land allocation, the locus of blame for land alienation also shifted to 
the center and to Daniel arap Moi in particular (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Boone 2014). 
Winner/loser competition intensified over land disputes as losing Kalenjin felt increasingly 
marginalized. Sporadic violence erupted in 1980s, but the Moi regime managed to contain 
these episodes (Boone 2014, 263).  
1986 marked a year of liberalization in nationality laws. First, the 21st amendment 
to the Constitution repealed Section 89 dictating jus sanguinis citizenship principles. Act 
15 of 1986 introduced limited jus soli provisions instead. Individuals born in Kenya to 
foreign parents could now claim citizenship if at least one of their parents was also born in 
                                                             
 
109 Between 1962 and 2002, nearly 2,000 land titles were issued illegally (with a significant jump 
after 1986). The government also routinely sold land below market value to individuals and 
companies who then sold it far above fair market value (Southall 2005). 
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Kenya. Secondly, women’s rights improved. Under the 1963 Constitution, women 
applying for naturalization needed parental or spousal consent. This provision was 
removed in 1986, but other discriminatory provisions remained. Kenyan women could not 
pass citizenship to their children born abroad or to their foreign spouses, but Kenyan men 
had these rights. In this year, Kenya also liberalized naturalization procedures. The 
government did away with the stipulation that naturalized citizens must be of African origin 
and reduced the residency requirements from ten to eight years continuous residence in the 
country.110  
In summary, I find that Kenyatta resembled his contemporaries in Côte d’Ivoire 
and the DRC in important ways. He privileged national identity by not recognizing the land 
rights of KAMATUSA communities, the self-proclaimed indigenes of RVP. The resulting 
grievances created tension between citizenship regime winners and losers. During Moi’s 
tenure, the balance of power shifted to his KAMATUSA base, thus elevating the status of 
sub-national membership. However, extensive land grabbing in the presence of combined 
economic and political liberalization exacerbated winner/loser competition. Still, 
nationality laws in Kenya have made steady progression towards inclusion. Despite liberal 
reforms made in 1986 and 2010, debates over who belonged where exploded in the multi-
party era under the weight of rising citizenship insecurity. However, they did not reach the 
level of war because outsiders did not have contested foreign origins. 
                                                             
 
110 The law still permitted citizens of certain African countries, such as former Commonwealth 




In 1992, the opposition Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), led by 
Kenneth Matiba (a Kikuyu) and Oginga Odinga (a Luo), contested the first-multi-party 
elections of the independence era. Their calls for reform were amplified by international 
donors, who threatened to withdraw aid if Kenya did not improve human rights and curb 
corruption. In spite of these pressures, Moi used the full force of the state to stay in power. 
He revised electoral laws and redrew electoral districts to dilute the strength of the 
opposition.111 He banned opposition parties from campaigning where ethnic clashes had 
broken out. He also resorted to political intimidation and violence.  
It is well documented that KANU encouraged ethnic violence through 
inflammatory rhetoric that revived chauvinist messages of majimboism. Government 
officials at every level were involved in planning and orchestrating ethnic violence from 
1991 to 1998 (Human Rights Watch 1993; Republic of Kenya 1999 [Akiwumi Report]).112 
This pattern of behavior continued through the notorious 2007 election, at which point 
“violence and political intimidation became a regular feature of elections and relations 
between the ruling party and opposition parties” (Keller 2014, 118; see also Mueller 2008; 
CIPEV 2008; Anderson and Lochery 2008). 
                                                             
 
111 Under the new laws, a candidate had to win 25% of the vote in 5 of 8 provinces plus a plurality 
of total votes. If these margins were not met, a run-off would be held between the top two candidates 
(Keller 2014). 
112  KANU went so far as to fund and transport so-called Kalenjin “warriors” responsible for 
widespread and systematic ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley (Human Rights Watch 1993; 
Republic of Kenya 1999 [Akiwumi Report]). Moi neither endorsed nor condemned his patronage 
bosses, allowing him to appear to be above the fray (Klopp 2002).  
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Violence during the 1991-1997 period targeted rural farmers in RVP that had 
received parcels of land through Kenyatta-era programs and triggered retaliatory attacks 
by non-Kalenjin. 113  Moi was attempting to transform RVP into a “KANU zone” by 
eliminating opposition supporters (Anderson and Lochery 2008; Human Rights Watch 
1993, 2008). The result was heightened citizenship insecurity that fueled contentious 
insider/outsider narratives and mobilized ethnic coalitions according to the logics of threat 
and opportunity. For instance, Kalenjin politicians promised their followers land 
redistribution and called for non-KAMATUSA groups to leave the Rift Valley. Such 
policies would increase Kalenjin citizenship security and decrease Kikuyu citizenship 
security. Furthermore, there were explicit calls to “destroy” members of the opposing party 
who posed a threat to autochthonous groups (Klopp 2002; Human Rights Watch 1993; 
Republic of Kenya 1999 [Akiwumi Report]).114 Meanwhile, Kikuyu and other “settler” 
politicians emphasized that all Kenyans had the right to live and work anywhere they 
wanted. Kikuyu citizenship rights were threatened by KANU efforts to prevent them from 
registering to vote or casting their ballot (Klopp 2001). 
                                                             
 
113 Estimates for the period 1991 to 1997, which covers 2 elections (in 1992 and 1997), put the 
death toll around 1,500, plus 300,000 persons displaced (Boone 2014; Human Rights Watch 1993; 
Klopp 2002; Republic of Kenya 1999 [Akiwumi Report]; Throup and Hornsby 1998). 
114 In April 1993, William ole Ntimama, an MP and Maasai Minister for Local Government, 
supported by Vice-President George Saitoti (also Maasai), deployed the logic of threat when he 
told an audience that the opposition “was arming itself as a plot to eliminate indigenous residents 
of the Rift Valley” (Human Rights Watch 1993, 20-21). He warned KAMATUSA members “to be 
on their guard and to spread the message so that they could defend themselves” (Human Rights 
Watch 1993, 20-21). 
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In 2002, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) peacefully ousted Moi 
and KANU. The new government, headed by President Mwai Kibaki, rejected majimboism 
outright. It affirmed the primacy of national identity, proclaiming that “Kenya belongs to 
all Kenyans” (The Nation, “Kenyans are ‘Free to Live Anywhere’,” 1 April 2005 as quoted 
in Boone 2014, 268). The Kibaki regime avoided taking a firm stance on insider/outsider 
tensions in RVP, choosing to focus instead of fulfilling specific campaign promises. In the 
end, Kibaki’s regime consolidated executive power along ethnic lines much like his 
predecessors had (Jenkins 2015; International Crisis Group 2008; Human Rights Watch 
2008).  
Raila Odinga formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) to contest the 2007 
national election. ODM presented itself as the harbinger of democratic reform in Kenya. 
Returning to a majimbo platform, the party called for enhanced regional autonomy, land 
redistribution, and a return of ancestral land to indigenous groups (Anderson and Lochery 
2008; Bøås and Dunn 2013; Keller 2014; Klopp 2000,  2001). ODM politicians led 
supporters to believe that Odinga supported majimboism (now called “Devolution”) and 
land redistribution. Some even hinted that Odinga would support expelling settlers. ODM 
narratives framed national citizenship rules as a threat to autochthons rights (decreased 
citizenship security) and sub-national citizenship rules as an opportunity to reclaim land 
and political power (increased citizenship security).  
People believed that with 41 tribes allied behind ODM, Odinga should win any free 
and fair election (Jenkins 2015). When the National Elections Commission declared Kibaki 
the winner by a slim three percent margin (47% to 44%), Odinga and other opposition 
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leaders claimed fraud and protested the results.115 On December 30, 2007, in the middle of 
a recount, Kibaki took the presidential oath. Violent protests erupted across Kenya. Within 
two days, Kenya was “on the brink of civil war” (International Crisis Group 2008, 9).  
The scale of the 2007 violence was unprecedented. Over 1,000 people were killed 
and hundreds of thousands were displaced.116 The violence began as ethnically-driven, 
spontaneous attacks by gangs, armed groups attached to politicians, and ordinary Kenyans. 
It quickly turned into communal clashes directed by elites.117 Majimbo-inspired violence 
hit urban and rural areas, with the most intense fighting in the Rift Valley—especially the 
capital, Nakuru. Lynch (2008) quotes one participant as saying that the violence was not 
so much about the disappointing election outcome, but about the opportunity to “right” 
historical grievances of the Kalenjin people. 
As they had in the 1990s, politicians drew upon unresolved land grievances and 
competing land claims to stoke ethnic hatreds. Insiders and outsiders challenged each 
other’s right to land. Citizenship rules were presented to both sides as an opportunity to 
remedy the imbalance in the distribution in land and power. Autochthons wanted to see 
revisions that would privilege indigeneity, while outsiders wanted to maintain (if not 
                                                             
 
115 According to the International Crisis Group (2008) all election observers agreed that the election 
was rigged. Results were inflated at the constituency and the national level. 
116 Human Rights Watch (2011) estimates that 1,300 were killed more than 650,000 displaced. The 
Waki Report (CIPEV 2008) estimates up to 700,000 displaced.  
117 The Kalenjin warriors and the Sabaot Land Defence Force returned, forming an alliance to expel 
settlers from KAMATUSA territory. The infamous Mungiki sect diversified their criminal 
activities to include targeting non-Kikuyus in and outside RVP. The police and security services 
played a role too, using excessive force against unarmed civilians and against peaceful protesters 




strengthen) the nationalist status quo. Narratives about historic grievances and 
marginalization justified violence on both sides.  
Hate speech resurfaced on the campaign trail (Jenkins 2015; Anderson and Lochery 
2008), and rumors played into the logics of threat by suggesting that settlers wanted to 
exterminate indigenes. Kalenjin evicted Kikuyu not only to defend their property rights, 
but also to pre-empt their own potential displacement. They shrouded their motives in the 
rhetoric of “cleansing” and “liberating” RVP. For their part, Kikuyu leaders spread the 
message that their community would be in danger under a Luo president (Klaus and 
Mitchell 2015; Boone 2012; Keller 2014; International Crisis Group 2008). The Mungiki 
gang is the Kikuyu version of the Kalenjin Warriors. Framing their actions in the context 
of the Mau Mau legacy, Mungiki members spun a narrative of victimization and revenge.118 
They claimed to defend poor, land-hungry Kikuyu and promised to remedy past wrongs 
done to the community (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Anderson and Lochery 2008; Rasmussen 
2010).  
In summary, the cycles of violence in Kenya are driven by a complex interplay of 
factors. Zero-sum neo-patrimonial politics and deliberately weak institutions support 
ethnic clientelist parties who will go to extreme lengths to maintain their hold on state 
power. Land scarcity, extensive migration, a lack of checks and balances, a personalized 
and centralized presidency, and a history of extra-state violence and elite impunity has only 
encouraged the downward spiral. Elections, fraud, and ethnic brokers trigger and facilitate 
                                                             
 
118 The connection to Mau Mau also carries the symbolic weight of a liberation movement that 
fought against colonial oppression (Anderson and Lochery 2008). 
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Kenya’s election violence. However, the root causes of Kenya’s insider/outsider violence 
lie in grievances over land, migration, and citizenship rights. Citizenship rules were 
presented to both sides as an opportunity to increase citizenship security by determining 
the distribution of land and power. Narratives about historic grievances and 
marginalization justified violence on both sides by describing ongoing threats to citizenship 
security. However, nationality laws never in question. As much as they may have tried to 
undermine outsider citizenship rights, insiders did not lobby for denationalization. 
My argument is that competition between citizenship regime winners and losers in 
Kenya contributed to a pervasive fear of “marginalization and exclusion under the rule of 
another community” (Jenkins 2015, 225). Fueled by long-simmering insider/outsider 
animosity, contention over the jurisdiction of national and sub-national citizenship rules 
deepened. Contentious narratives developed, mobilizing ethnic coalitions according to the 
logic of threat (“our citizenship rights are under attack”) and opportunity (“we must ensure 
the supremacy of national/sub-national citizenship rules”). I argue that Kenya’s citizenship 
struggles have not degenerated into war because even hardliners cannot make the case to 
denationalize outsiders, who are Kenyan in-migrants.  
Non-escalation in Kenya 
To be clear, political exclusion of outsider groups with contested foreign origins 
does not always lead to widespread violence. Asian-, Somali-, and Nubian-Kenyans have 
largely escaped the conflict that characterizes the Kikuyu-KAMATUSA relationship. As 
is the case of non-escalation in Ghana, additional criteria for VOB onset are not met in 
these cases. Although the outsider group has contested foreign origins, they are not a 
politically salient group. Moreover, exclusion from state patrimonial networks limits 
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largescale mobilization. Therefore, the intermittent episodes of violence involving these 
groups (namely the Nubians and Somalis) has not escalated beyond the local level. 119 I 
now turn to the case of Nubian-Kenyans as an illustration.  
Like the Dioula and the Banyarwanda, contemporary Nubians have contested 
foreign origins. In the 19th century various ethnic groups from across Sudan and Southern 
Egypt (formerly part of ancient Nubian Kingdoms) were recruited into British slave armies 
(Johnson 1988, 1989). In 1912 they were forcibly settled in Kibera, which became one of 
the densest slums in Nairobi. While the Nubians believed they were given parcels to own, 
the Crown considered them tenants (Balaton-Chrimes 2015). As in Côte d’Ivoire, 
competing understanding of land tenure laid the foundation for later tensions between 
settler Nubians and “indigenous” groups, such as the Luo.120  
Nubians maintained a “fragile superiority” during colonialism, but they were 
marginalized after independence (Balaton-Chrimes 2015, 37). They were not granted full 
citizenship rights at independence because they are not indigenous to Kenya. Further, they 
traditionally occupy the position of “landlord”, but have not been able to penetrate Kenya’s 
patrimonial networks. Consequently, they rarely have access to development funds or state 
services and struggle to get identity cards. In 2009, “Kenyan” became an official 
                                                             
 
119   An exception to this pattern: Ethnic Somalis waged the Shifta War, a bid for secession, shortly 
after independence (1963 to 1967). This exception can be explained by the fact that their territory 
was historically part of greater Somalia and the population identified more strongly with other 
Somali clans than the Kenyan nation (Whitaker 2014). 
120 The British classified Nubians as “Detribalised Natives”, referring to the fact that they were 
displaced from their ancestral “homeland”. 
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designation on the census, which ameliorated their situation slightly (Balaton-Chrimes 
2015; Manby 2015). 
Nubians have largely escaped the conflict plaguing Kenya’s multi-party era. A 
small ethnic minority concentrated in an area of Nairobi, they are considered 
“inconsequential” to the larger ethnic politics driving the country (Balaton-Chrimes 2015, 
56).121 Consequently, Nubians have been involved in localized skirmishes in Kibera, but 
nothing amounting to minor conflict.122  Secondly, they are disconnected from the state’s 
patronage networks, which limits the politicization of their status as well as their ability to 
mobilize to defend their interests. In short, we would not expect to see VOB move from 
the local to national level because criteria for escalation conflict onset are not met. 
Conclusion 
VOB in Ghana remained localized because the criteria for conflict onset were not 
met. Migration is not deeply politicized, and although many migrants are from neighboring 
countries, they represent a much smaller proportion of the total population, as compared to 
Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, and Kenya. Furthermore, traditional authorities hold a firm grip 
on land allocation and dispute resolution, and public policy has subordinated ethnic 
cleavages in Ghana. Lastly, without the politicization and clientelization of land relations, 
                                                             
 
121 In 1963, approximately three out of nine thousand Kiberans were Nubians. In the 1970s, an 
influx of mostly Kikuyu migrants swelled the population to 60-65,000 by 1980. Today, they 
number 10,000 in a total Kibera population of 350,000 (Balaton-Chrimes 2015). 
122 Their fraught tenant-landlord relationship with the Luo occasionally boils over. In 1995 four 
days of Nubian-Luo clashes left seven people dead. In 2001, 15 people died and 30,000 were 
displaced by Luo-Nubian fighting (Balaton-Chrimes 2015; Osborn 2012).These attacks have 
reified the ethnic nature of the tenant-landlord relationship in Kibera (Katumanga 2005). 
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migration has not become a national level issue in Ghana. VOB reached minor conflict 
levels in Kenya, but fell short of war. From 1963 to 1990, Kenya’s institutions enforced 
the rule of law reasonably well. After 1991, though, a steady weakening of institutions 
subverted the rule of law and contributed to a political culture characterized by corruption, 
impunity, and violence (Onoma 2010). Widespread citizenship insecurity among Kenyans, 
combined with land grievances, fueled insider/outsider conflict that escalated to the 
national stage. Politicians could not make a compelling case for denationalizing the 
outsider group, though, because it was primarily composed of in-migrants. Lastly, in both 
of these cases we see that VOB does not necessarily lead to more exclusionary nationality 
policy. Ghana and Kenya experienced progressive liberalization of nationality law, which 
helped to dampen winner/loser competition, limit the politicization and citizenship, and 




Chapter 7. Citizenship Security and Involvement in Violence: 
Evidence from 29 national surveys 
 
The micro-foundations of citizenship struggles episodes are not well understood, 
yet a nationality law lens helps explain conflict processes at the individual level. I theorize 
that exclusionary nationality laws support mobilization by making individuals feel 
citizenship insecure, meaning they cannot exercise their rights freely or fully. They 
therefore have incentive to change the status quo, even at great personal cost. Further, I 
argue that when a large portion of the population feels citizenship insecure, political 
entrepreneurs face an easier recruitment environment. They can mobilize individuals using 
contentious citizenship narratives, which depict the prevailing citizenship regime as a 
threat to group resources. They suggest an overhaul could guarantee the group’s resources 
into the future.  
My driving question in this chapter asks how citizenship security affects an 
individual’s role in collective violence—either as victims or as perpetrators. I test 
Hypotheses 3 and 4: 
 
H3a: Citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will fear 
becoming a victim of political violence. 
 
H3b: Citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will use 
political violence. 
 
H4a: Contentious narratives increase the likelihood that an individual will fear 




H4b: Contentious narratives increase the likelihood that an individual will use 
political violence. 
 
Although individual level determinants of participation have received increasing 
attention in recent conflict studies (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), the politics of 
belonging literature has been slow to leverage cross-national or survey data. Consequently, 
theories propose individual level factors, such as grievances or access to nationality identity 
documents, but it is difficult to evaluate the independent and joint effect of these factors. 
Furthermore, much of the literature assumes that political attitudes matter, yet competing 
predictions cannot be fully resolved without cross-national analysis. For example, 
marginalization is considered a root cause of VOB, but the effects of grievance are still 
debated in the wider conflict literature. No previous study has empirically tested the 
relative weight of individual level determinants on VOB. Finally, the question of who 
participates in violence is a relatively new topic in the conflict literature, and the question 
of who fears violence is even less well understood. In tackling both of these questions, I 
contribute to ongoing discussions about the micro-foundations of political violence with 
this chapter.  
My data comes from Round 5 of the Afrobarometer, a survey of political attitudes 
in 34 Sub-Saharan African countries between 2011 and 2013. I operationalize citizenship 
security as the ability to access national identity documentation. As proof of one’s 
citizenship status, these documents are fundamental to the exercise of citizenship rights 
(Manby 2009).This measure allows for citizenship security due to weak or discriminatory 
civil registration systems or a host of other institutional factors. Importantly, an individual 
can be citizenship insecure even if they are entitled to citizenship.  
193 
 
Measuring contentious citizenship narratives using Afrobarometer data proves 
more difficult because the questionnaires do not directly address this issue. However, it is 
possible to identify individuals most likely to be susceptible to these messages. 
Winner/loser competition leads to debates over the place of outsiders in the national 
political community. There may be calls to make the exercise of certain rights more 
difficult, to narrow citizenship criteria, or even to denationalize a particular group. In my 
analysis, individuals who support restrictive citizenship criteria proxy for insider group 
attitudes. Those facing effective denationalization proxy for outsider group attitudes. The 
measures of citizenship security and contentious narratives are not statistically correlated 
with each other. 
Previous chapters have applied the nationality law lens at an aggregated level of 
analysis, either looking at group level behavior or country-year indicators. This chapter 
shows how that lens contributes to a better understanding of conflict processes at the 
individual level as well.  Namely, I explain the cross-national variation in the fear of 
victimization and use of political violence in Africa as a function of citizenship politics. I 
find that insecure access to national identity documents and susceptibility to contentious 
narratives affect outcomes above and beyond ethnic discrimination, a standard predictor of 
violence in the literature. On average, insecure individuals are more likely to fear and use 
political violence than the citizenship secure. Interestingly, individuals who are insecure 
and discriminated against are not necessarily more likely to fear victimization than secure 
individuals treated fairly by the government. However, the insecure and discriminated-
against are twice as likely to use violence as their more secure and fairly treated 
counterparts. In addition, susceptibility to contentious narratives makes individuals more 
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likely to use violence. Surprisingly, these individuals are not more likely to fear 
victimization, though.  
To date, it has been unclear how to evaluate the relative influence of key factors in 
VOB. Existing work tends to focus more on the origins of various factors and the processes 
by which they influence outcomes. This chapter is the first to compare the effects of ethnic 
discrimination, access to national identity documentation, and contentious narratives on 
violence outcomes. My findings suggest often-downplayed factors, such as civil 
registration procedures, the letter of the law, and outsider-oriented narratives, merit 
renewed attention by conflict scholars.  
My cross-national approach complements existing scholarship while still revealing 
new information. I find that even beyond the well-worn cases of electoral violence, 
citizenship insecurity and contentious narratives impact an individual’s experience of 
violence. As such, the results help clarify the foundations of citizenship politics by 
demonstrating the generalizability of assumptions that have guided the field to date. The 
remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: I describe the research design, findings, 
and contributions of my analysis. I then suggest paths for future research. 
Research Design 
Afrobarometer participants are selected using a multi-stage stratified clustered 
area-probability sampling procedure. All participants are citizens of their respective 
countries so the sample does not include formally excluded individuals. However, the 
logical extension of the analysis is that these individuals feel the effects of citizenship 
insecurity and contentious narratives more strongly than anyone else.  
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Round 5’s nationally representative sample contains between 1,200 and 2,400 
respondents per country. I analyze 45,589 observations from 29 Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries, 123  using survey questions as dependent and independent variables. 
Afrobarometer questions are cited as “AQ” followed by the question number, as in AQ-
26E. For a list of the original questions and full answer choices, see Table 20 in the 
appendix.  Full descriptive statistics are available in Table 21 in the appendix.  
Dependent variables: Patterns in violence  
Violence can be measured in two distinct ways: how individuals use it and who 
becomes a victim. The first dependent variable, Fear, indicates whether an individual fears 
being a target of violence during the next election. To produce a conservative estimate, 
Fear takes a value of “1” if the respondent answers “A Lot” to AQ-54, and “0” otherwise: 
124  
AQ-54: During election campaigns in this country, how much do you 
personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or 
violence? 
 
Fearing victimization is a good approximation of an individual’s perceived 
vulnerability. Since the questionnaire only asks about fear of electoral violence, it is 
impossible to observe fear about other events, such as land grabs or riots. Nonetheless, 
looking at the context of electoral violence is illuminating because elections render the 
                                                             
 
123 I drop Cape Verde so that only countries with populations greater than 1 million are included. 
124 Other possible responses were: Somewhat; A little bit; Not at all; Don’t know; Refused to 
answer; or a missing value. 
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question of who can vote extremely salient, thereby intensifying the scrutiny of nationality 
laws and enflaming debates over citizenship criteria. Events in Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, 
the DRC, and Kenya demonstrate this trend. 
A potential criticism of Fear is that people have higher levels of fear in countries 
where elections are routinely violent. To account for this possibility, I use fixed-effects 
regression to hold constant a country’s propensity for election violence. It bears keeping in 
mind that citizenship insecurity is one of many sources of vulnerability. That said, 
individuals living in a dangerous place likely feel even more vulnerable if they are also 
citizenship insecure.  
Over 8,100 people, almost 18% of all respondents, said they fear victimization 
during the next elections. Figure 11 shows that Fear varies by country. Guineans and 





Figure 11: Proportion of respondents who fear becoming victims of violence  
 
Based on AQ-26E, the second dependent variable, Use, takes a value of “1” if the 
respondent acknowledges that they engaged in any kind of political violence during the 
past year, and “0” otherwise:125 
AQ-26E: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as 
citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, 
have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you 
do this if you had the chance: Used force or violence for a political 
cause. 
 
                                                             
 
125 Other possible responses were: No, would never do this; No, but would do if had the chance; 
Don’t know; Refused to answer; or a missing value. 
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A potential criticism of Use might be that social desirability bias limits the number 
of individuals willing to admit they have committed violent acts. This selection bias would 
lead to conservative estimates. If I find statistical significance despite the downward bias, 
then I am increasingly confident that the relationship holds.  
About 1,400 respondents, or 3% of the total, acknowledge that they used force or 
violence for a political cause in the last year. Almost 7% of respondents said they did not 
use violence in the last year but would have if given the chance. Figure 12 shows that the 
propensity is low overall and varies by country. Uganda’s 9.46% positive response rate is 
staggering.  
 
Figure 12: Proportion of respondents who recently used political violence 
 
What is interesting about the patterns of Fear and Use is that the results do not 
clearly map on to the severity of violence in the country. Figure 13 shows that there is only 
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weak correlation between Fear and Use and the number of total fatal violence events 
between 1990 and 2014, as reported by the Social Conflict in Africa Database. I 
hypothesize that citizenship security, contentious narratives, and ethnic discrimination are 
explanatory factors, albeit with varying degrees of impact. In the next section I describe 








Figure 13: Fatal violence event count, by country 
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Independent variables: Insecurity and Narratives 
National identity documents underlie citizenship security because they prove one’s 
citizenship status. Lacking this documentation poses serious problems to the exercise of 
many citizenship rights. To operationalize citizenship security for Hypotheses 3, I use the 
variable Document Access based on AQ-67: 
AQ-67: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain 
the following services from government? Or do you never try and get 
these services from government: An identity document, such as a birth 
certificate, driver’s license, passport or voter’s card? 
 
Individuals who found documents difficult to obtain are classified as citizenship 
insecure (Document Access=2), those who easily obtained documents are considered 
citizenship secure (Document Access=1). Otherwise, Document Access  takes the value 
“0”.126 This coding procedure allows direct comparison between citizenship secure and 
insecure individuals. I hypothesize that citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that 
an individual fears victimization in the near future (H3a) and has used political violence in 
the recent past (H3b).  
A potential concern about using Document Access as a measure of citizenship 
security is that individuals may operate in informal spaces where documentation is not 
needed to get by, or live in areas with weak civil administration systems where a complete 
set of documents is a luxury. However, access to identity documentation indicates the 
                                                             
 
126 Other possible responses are: Never try; Don’t know; Refused to answer; or a missing value.  
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relationship between the individual and the state, so the lack of documentation represents 
exclusion from political, economic, and social spheres. Specifically, without a national 
identity card, individuals can be denied government services and even basic human rights. 
In fact, Bronwen Manby argues that lacking documentation “can have consequences as 
permanent and damaging as…denationalization” (2009: 115).  
Another concern is that Document Access does not go far enough to measure 
restrictions on citizenship rights because it does not specify who eventually received 
identity documents and who did not. Even if an individual is ultimately successful at 
obtaining their documents, costly or lengthy processes still constitute marginalization, 
which can be exploited by political entrepreneurs to prompt collective action. I would 
expect the question of whether an individual ultimately acquired documents to matter more 
for predicting the timing of events—specifically in terms of when an individual expects to 
become a victim or when they are ready to use violence. 
Over half of all respondents are citizenship insecure: 14,031 people found identity 
documents difficult and 9,216 found them very difficult to obtain. A total of 13,956 
respondents found documents easy and 4,874 found them very easy to obtain. Kenya has 
the highest rate of citizenship insecurity at 78.5% of the population, and Mauritius has the 
lowest rate of insecurity at 16.4%.127 Figure 14 shows how these levels vary across country. 
                                                             
 
127 Generally, Kenya’s ACPI scores are higher than those of Mauritius, indicating more 
exclusionary policies. Kenya scored 2.04 until 2000, then dropped to 1.82 in 2001. It has held this 
its present score of 1.51 since 2010. In contrast, Mauritius scored 2.18 until 1992, when the score 




Figure 14: National identity document access by country 
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There are few studies on why document access varies across the continent. Formal 
and informal barriers limit document access: discriminatory institutions and regimes, weak 
civil registration systems or costly procedures, and corrupt or inefficient bureaucracies 
(Manby 2009; UNICEF 2013). One likely culprit for Document Access variation is low 
birth registration rates in Africa. UNICEF (2013) reports that the births of over 85 million 
children under the age of five in Sub-Saharan Africa have not been registered. In some 
countries, birth registration rates are lower than one in five children. The political effects 
of low birth registration rates is not a well-studied topic.  
The Afrobarometer does not directly ask about attitudes towards contentious 
narratives. Therefore, I identify individuals most likely to respond to elite appeals. Recall 
that insider narratives advocate exclusionary citizenship rules whereas outsider narratives 
highlight the threat of lost citizenship rights. To capture the effect of insider narratives, I 
operationalize Citizenship Rules using AQ-86A, B, and E:  
AQ-86A: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right 
to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a 
passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years 
old: A person born in the country with one national and one non-
national parent? 
 
AQ-86B: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right 
to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a 
passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years 
old: A person born in the country with two non-national parents? 
 
AQ-86E: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right 
to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a 
passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years 
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old: A person who came from another country, but who has lived and 
worked in the country for many years, and wishes to make the 
country his or her home? 
 
Citizenship Rules takes a value of “2” if the respondent disagrees with all three 
questions, a value of “1” if the respondent agrees with all of them, and a value of “0” 
otherwise.128 It is important to recognize that citizenship debates often revolve around these 
three questions. Further, Citizenship Rules is not statistically correlated with difficulty 
obtaining identity documents. Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggest that insider narratives increase 
the fear and use of violence. 
A total of 2,840 individuals, or about 6% of all respondents, favor exclusionary 
citizenship criteria. Burundi, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, South Africa, Tanzania, and 
Zambia have the highest rates at 17-18% of respondents. For the most part, these countries 
are a mix of post-conflict societies (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia) or hubs for immigrants 
and refugees (South Africa, Tanzania). 129  It is interesting to note that the baseline 
propensity for violence varies between these countries.  Figure 15 shows the variation in 
preferences across the region.  
                                                             
 
128 Other possible responses are: Yes; Don’t know; Refused to answer; or a missing value.  
129 ACPI scores are as follows: Tanzania 1.82, South Africa 1.35, Burundi 1.94, Sierra Leone 




Figure 15: Citizenship rule preferences by country 
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Many forces can help explain the variation in the support for exclusionary 
citizenship rules: winner/loser status under the citizenship regime, land tenure institutions, 
resource scarcity and economic crisis, etc. Figure 15 is interesting because it displays 
continent-wide variation that is not observable in existing studies, which rely on a small, 
purposive samples. The data speak to hardening attitudes towards outsiders described in so 
much of the literature, but attitudes towards citizenship rules clearly do not map on to 
largescale VOB. For instance, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia see similarly high rates 
of exclusionary attitudes, yet South Africa, with the spate of xenophobic riots, has seen 
more intense VOB than Tanzania and Zambia in the last few years. Rather, Figure 15 
presents a snapshot of an important risk factor for politicized citizenship, which can fuel 
VOB under the right circumstances.  
To capture the resonance outsider narratives, I focus on warnings of 
denationalization. I construct the variable Prevented based on AQ-27: 
AQ-27: With regard to the most recent national election in [Year], 
which statement is true for you? 
 
Prevented takes a value of “2” if the respondent was prevented from voting or did 
not vote because they could not find their name in the register, a value of “1” if they voted, 
and a value of “0” otherwise. 130 The logic is that VOB is often triggered by elections. In 
cases where VOB escalates, voting rights are often at stake. Further, when an outsider 
                                                             
 
130 Other possible responses are: Not registered to vote; Voted in the elections; Decided not to 
vote; Could not find the polling station; Did not have time to vote; Did not vote for some other 
reason; Too young to vote at the time; Don’t know; Refused to answer; or a missing value. 
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group is denationalized, it can trigger a war. This coding procedure allows direct 
comparison between individuals who voted in the last election and those who were denied 
this basic right. Prevented is not statistically correlated with difficulty obtaining identity 
documents. Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggest that outsider narratives will increase the fear 
and use of violence. 
Figure 16 shows that the number of individuals prevented from voting in the last 
election varies within countries. On the tails of the 2010 election crisis, Côte d’Ivoire has 
the largest proportion of citizenship insecure outsiders at almost 6% of respondents. This 
number is exceedingly large, considering that only 1.6% of all respondents reported the 





Figure 16: Denied voting rights by country 
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A potential criticism of Citizenship Rules and Prevented as measures of contentious 
narratives is that they do not capture the incendiary language typically used. However, 
these variables do capture the core messages of insider/outsider narratives: citizenship 
should be harder to claim and fundamental rights will be taken away. Finding significance 
even in the presence of conservative coding decisions should strengthen confidence in the 
results.  
Control variables 
I include standard demographic controls that shape attitudes and behavior regarding 
violence: the respondent’s age, gender, ethnicity, wealth, education, religion, residence in 
a rural or urban area, and neighborhood. I also control for the respondent’s ethnic group 
(Ethnicity), income (Wealth, determined based on the roofing material of each respondent’s 
house),131  and census-district (Region).  
As previously mentioned, citizenship insecurity often overlaps with ethnic 
discrimination. It is thus imperative to distinguish between their respective effects on 
patterns in violence. I measure Group Treatment, based on AQ-85A: 
AQ-85A: How often is [Respondent’s Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the 
government? 
 
                                                             
 
131 I collapsed the nine original categories of roofing material to four, just as I collapsed education 
and religion into four categories. 
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Group Treatment takes a value of “2” if the respondent believes their ethnic group 
is treated unfairly, a value of “1” if their group is not, and a value of “0” otherwise.132 This 
coding procedure allows direct comparison between individuals who feel discriminated 
against and those who believe their group is treated fairly. I expect that perceived group 
disadvantage increases the likelihood that an individual fears victimization, but I do not 
have expectations about the use of violence. Grievance-based arguments suggest that 
aggrieved groups are more likely to rebel to achieve political goals (Cederman, Wimmer, 
and Min 2010). However, opportunity-based arguments find the material conditions of 
poverty, political instability, and weak states are better predictors of conflict (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003).  
A total 7,252 respondents feel that their ethnic group is often or always treated 
unfairly and 24,613 believe their group is never treated unfairly. Nigeria and Guinea report 
the highest level of unfair treatment at over 30% of respondents. With response rates 
pushing 85%, Madagascar, Lesotho, Senegal, and Niger report the highest level of fair 
treatment. Figure 17 shows the distribution of these levels across country. 
                                                             
 
132 Other possible responses are: Sometimes treated unfairly; Don’t know; Refused to answer; or 





Figure 17: Group treatment by country 
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In order to account for the relationship between citizenship security and ethnic 
discrimination identified by Manby (2009), I create an interaction term comprised of 
Document Access and Group Treatment. The interaction takes a total of six values, 
representing every possible pairing between Document Access and Group Treatment. Of 
particular interest are comparisons between individuals who are citizenship secure and 
fairly treated and those individuals who are citizenship insecure and unfairly treated. I 
expect the interaction term to have a positive relationship with Fear (H3a), and with Use 
(H3b). These individuals exhibit two important determinants of violence: grievance (unfair 
treatment) and material incentives (denied citizenship rights). Furthermore, the politics of 
belonging literature suggests that the interaction of ethnic discrimination and citizenship 
insecurity increases the likelihood of violence. Individuals then have more to gain by 
changing the status quo and more to lose by leaving it alone.  
Of course, country level factors may influence estimates as well. Of particular 
interest are ACPI scores and the quality of a state’s civil registration system. As shown in 
Figure 18, the average ACPI score for the Afrobarometer sample is 1.7, with a minimum 
of 1.26 and a maximum of 2.33.133 Birth registration directly affects an individual’s ability 
to obtain identity documents and levels are tracked by the World Health Organization. The 
time period covered by Round 5 has full birth registration coverage. Figure 19 shows that 
the mean birth registration level is 54.8%, with a minimum of 2.3% (Malawi) and a 
maximum of 91.8% (South Africa). ACPI scores and birth registration levels cannot be 
                                                             
 
133 In the full ACPI dataset, the minimum score is 1.12, the maximum is 3, and the mean is 1.77. 
The methodology behind data collection and scoring for the ACPI is covered in Chapter 4. 
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inserted directly into the model because they are measured at a higher level of analysis than 
other variables. I include country fixed effects to control for these and other country-year 
level factors.134 
 
Figure 18: African Citizenship Policy Index scores 
 
                                                             
 
134 A hierarchical model is not appropriate in this case because the sample size of countries is 
under 50 (N=34) and Afrobarometer’s sampling procedure for countries is not random—it is 
biased towards stable, democratic countries. By adding fixed effects I effectively partition the 
analysis to remove between-country variation from the estimation process. Therefore, effects are 
calculated based on within-country variation alone, which means that unobserved variables at the 




Figure 19: Birth registration levels  
 
Connecting Insecurity to Behavior 
I use multivariate logistic regressions with fixed effects and robust standard errors 
clustered on country to estimate the likelihood that an individual will experience or commit 
violence. Table 22 in the appendix presents the full regression results and Figure 20 and 
Figure 21 show odds ratios for key independent variables. 135  I find that citizenship 
insecurity increases the fear of victimization (H3a) and the use (H3b) of political violence. 
Elite narratives are correlated with the use (H4b), but not the fear (H4a), of violence.  
                                                             
 
135 Interpretation of the interaction terms must take into account the odds ratio for both 
component variables and the interaction term. 
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According to Model 1c, citizenship insecure individuals are 25% more likely to fear 
victimization than secure individuals, on average, holding all else constant. Individuals 
from disadvantaged ethnic groups are almost two times (1.9) as likely to fear violence as 
individuals treated fairly. The coefficient on the interaction term fails to achieve statistical 
significance at conventional levels. Thus, individuals who are both citizenship insecure and 
treated unfairly are not more likely to fear victimization than individuals who are 
citizenship secure and treated fairly. Further work is needed to fully explain this counter-
intuitive result.136  
Contrary to H4a, there is no significant relationship between Citizenship Rules and 
Fear or between Prevented and Fear. It is possible that less-conservative or different 
measures of insider/outsider narratives would produce different results. For example, 
appeals explicitly linking citizenship rules and voting obstacles to ethnic discrimination 
may instill more fear of being targeted than appeals regarding citizenship law or the right 
to vote alone. After all, elite rhetoric during citizenship debates often turns on ethnic 
injustices. 
Finally, the effect of discrimination on Fear is about 65 percentage points higher 
than the effect of citizenship insecurity on Fear. In addition, women are more likely to fear 
victimization, as are people with lower levels of education. 
                                                             
 
136 Coefficients and levels of significance for key variables of interest do not change if the 
assumptions for Fear are relaxed to include individuals who “somewhat” fear attacks during the 




Figure 20: Fear of victimization during violence 
 
With respect to Model 2c, citizenship insecure individuals are 42% more likely to 
use violence than citizenship secure individuals, on average, all else equal. Ethnic 
disadvantage amplifies the effect of insecurity on the use of violence. When an insecure 
individual is treated unfairly by the government, they are two times more likely use 
violence as someone who is secure and treated fairly. In other words, feeling insecure and 
discriminated against has a roughly 160 percentage point larger effect on Use than the 
effect of feeling insecure and not discriminated against.  
In line with Hypothesis 4b, preferences for exclusionary citizenship rules make 
individuals 55% more likely to use violence, as compared to individuals with inclusionary 
preferences. People prevented from voting in the last election are 59% more likely to report 
using violence, as compared to those who voted. It is worth noting that the effect of 
narratives on Use is 13 to 17 percentage points higher than the effect of insecurity.  
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Finally, Female and Age have a negative relationship with Use. Individuals treated 
unfairly are nearly three times (2.75) as likely to use political violence as individuals treated 
fairly, on average, all else equal. 
  
Figure 21: Use of political violence 
 
As a robustness check, I further disentangle levels of citizenship insecurity by 
distinguishing the effect of having a “difficult time” as opposed to a “very difficult time” 
accessing national identity papers. Results are robust to separating the effect of being 
somewhat citizenship insecure from being very insecure (Table 23 in the appendix). 
According to Model 1d, individuals who are somewhat insecure are not more likely to fear 
violence than the citizenship secure. However, individuals who are very insecure are 1.5 
times more likely to fear violence than the citizenship secure. In other words, the effect of 
citizenship insecurity increases by 25 percentage points when the bar for insecurity is 
higher. The effects of ethnic discrimination, feeling insecure and discriminated against, and 
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susceptibility to contentious narratives are unchanged from the primary analysis (Model 
1c).  
With respect to Model 2d, the somewhat citizenship insecure are 42% and the very 
insecure are 43% more likely to use political violence than the citizenship secure. Those 
who are somewhat insecure and discriminated against are 2.54 times more likely to use 
violence than those who are citizenship secure and treated fairly. Individuals who are very 
insecure and discriminated against are 1.83 times more likely to use violence. The effects 
of ethnic discrimination, feeling insecure and discriminated against, and susceptibility to 
contentious narratives are unchanged from the primary analysis (Model 2c).  
These models, and Model 2d in particular, make an important contribution to the 
literature by addressing competing predictions about the effect of grievances on collective 
violence. I find that the very insecure are more likely to use violence than the citizenship 
secure, but less likely to use it than the somewhat insecure. This finding supports research 
showing that the most marginalized groups are less likely to use violence than moderately 
marginalized groups (Lacina 2014). This counter-intuitive finding can be explained in a 
couple of ways. The most aggrieved groups have fewer resources at their disposable with 
which to contest the status quo, and they suffer greater consequences (e.g. government 
repression) for their actions. 
Discussion 
In conclusion, this chapter examines how the citizenship regime inform conflict 
processes at the individual level. I argue that a nationality law lens helps explain the 
likelihood that individuals will fear and use political violence. My theory proposes that 
exclusionary nationality laws support mobilization by making individuals feel citizenship 
220 
 
insecure. I find that citizenship insecurity and contentious narratives are positive associated 
with Use. Citizenship security also predicts Fear, but contentious narratives do not. Put 
differently, citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will use and 
fear violence. The implication is that insecure individuals, regardless of whether they are 
insiders or outsiders, should be easier to mobilize.  
But how do elites get people to follow them? I find that emphasizing exclusionary 
citizenship rules or denied political rights supports mobilization. However, these messages 
do not seem to raise supporters’ anxiety about personal security. At least, they do not have 
an independent effect on this anxiety. Closer inspection of elite rhetoric should clarify 
whether we can better predict Fear by looking at alternate messages (e.g. historic ethnic 
discrimination, past victimization, opportunity for revenge) or an interaction of frames. It 
could be that some frames predict Fear, while others predict Use.  
The last point to make about the results is this: Contrary to what we might expect 
from the literature, the effect of each factor (i.e. citizenship security, contentious 
citizenship narratives) is independent of an individual’s experience with ethnic 
discrimination. Therefore, my analysis identifies new conflict process operating at the 
individual level, which sheds light on the micro-foundations of citizenship struggle and 
violent collective action more generally. This topic is underexplored in both the conflict 
and the politics of belonging literatures. 
This study is the first to compare competing explanations for individual level 
determinants of VOB participation. It is also the first to measure access to national identity 
documents and contentious citizenship narratives either cross-nationally or with survey 
data. Regional or global comparative studies such as this one are important contributions 
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to the field because they support widely generalizable theories about citizenship politics. 
An immediate benefit is a better understanding of VOB outside of election periods and that 
falls short of the threshold for minor or major conflict. Therefore, my methodology 
addresses the literature’s selection bias towards conflict trigged by elections. A second 
benefit is the production of generalizable knowledge. The testing procedure and findings 
presented here are broadly applicable because citizenship insecurity and problematic civil 
registration systems are not restricted to the African continent. Moreover, the nationality 
law lens is relevant for how we conceptualize the dynamics of citizenship politics in 
general and carries implications for policymaking and conflict prevention as well.  
In addition, millions, if not tens of millions, of people are affected by the “crisis of 
citizenship and statelessness in Africa” (Manby 2009, 18). The concept of citizenship 
security makes an important theoretical contribution because it explains how the lack of 
citizenship rights create grievances that can then be transformed into something hard by 
ethnic entrepreneurs. Although previous work has presumed this relationship exists, it has 
not gone far enough to explain the causal mechanism at work. Additionally, prior studies 
have approached citizenship politics from a macro-perspective, inadvertently downplaying 
the micro-foundations. Consequently, the mechanics of elite-citizen interactions and the 
process by which individual preferences become group values tend to be assumed rather 
than tested directly. In contrast, I test key assumptions of the politics of belonging field. 
Importantly, I nuance previous assumptions and identify new causal factors that drive an 
individual’s relationship to political violence—either as a victim or an aggressor. 
That said, citizenship insecurity presents measurement challenges because a wide 
variety of obstructions can prevent individuals from exercising their citizenship rights. 
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There is also the near-impossible task of measuring formal and informal institutions 
separately. In addition, elite narratives are difficult to study through Afrobarometer 
questions. Needless to say, limitations in the available data forced trade-offs in the way I 
operationalize concepts in this paper. Future research should continue to distinguish 
between insiders and outsiders in search of unique factors affecting these groups. Analysts 
might also track specific elite narratives to see how different claims affect various forms 
of contention, such as protests, riots, or communal clashes. Finally, refining the 
measurement of citizenship security to encompass formal and informal practices would 





Chapter 8. In The Days After: Evidence from Field Surveys in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana 
 
Citizenship regimes structure the politics of belonging in a country. The nationality 
law lens not only helps us understand conflict processes at the individual level; it is also 
relevant to understanding post-conflict settings. Specifically, it can illuminate the lingering 
effects of a violent politics of belonging. I test Hypothesis 5 in this chapter: 
 
H5: A history of politicized citizenship debates increases popular support for using 
political violence, even after conflict has ended. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I turn to field surveys I conducted in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana in 2014. Recall that Ivorian citizenship is a politicized and contentious issue, but 
Ghana has historically had a stable and inclusionary citizenship regime.137 My contention 
here is that Ghana serves as the counterfactual for Côte d’Ivoire; a baseline for what 
Ivoirians attitudes should look like had Côte d’Ivoire not suffered a VOB war. I find that 
risk factors in violent mobilization remain high in Côte d’Ivoire, whereas there are few 
predictors of support for violence in Ghana. My results demonstrate that VOB produces 
long-term effects on social cohesion, and that the risk of violence relapse remains elevated 
despite progress towards reconciliation. 
                                                             
 
137 See Chapters 5 and 6 for case studies of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. 
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The survey results also reveal a certain puzzle. From certain angles, it seems that 
Hypothesis 5 is not in fact borne out. Over the last six years, the Ivoirian government has 
seen progress in peace-building efforts. For instance, international audiences cheered as 
incumbent Alassane Ouattara won re-election in 2015 without a return to violence. 
Furthermore, an experiment I embedded in the 2014 questionnaires shows that support for 
ethnically-biased distribution is about 13 percentage points higher in Ghana than in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Similarly, support for ethnically-inclusive distribution is about 11 percentage 
points lower in Ghana.138  
                                                             
 
138 The differences in support levels are statistically significant at conventional levels with p-values 




Figure 22: Resource distribution preferences, by country 
 
Alongside these encouraging signs, I find that Côte d’Ivoire’s path to peace remains 
incomplete and fragile. Popular support for using violence to achieve political goals is 
higher in Côte d’Ivoire, and Ivoirians willing to mobilize are more tolerant of political 
violence than Ghanaians. Furthermore, although Ivoirians outwardly express a stronger 
preference for ethnic inclusion, ethnic cleavages retain their potent link with violence in 
Côte d’Ivoire but not in Ghana. I contend that the stark contrast here is indicative of the 
lingering effects of VOB. However, the patterns I unearth say more than that violence 
begets violence. Indeed, they speak to the nature of divisions that persist in Ivoirian society, 
and therefore the types of cleavages along which future cycles of violence may erupt. It is 
no coincidence that ethnic cleavages, which previously catapulted debates over Ivoirian 
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citizenship onto the national stage and down the path to war, continue to have a strong 
association with support for violence. We also learn from the surveys that political 
entrepreneurs face a conducive recruitment environment. Ethnicity remains a salient 
cleavage in society and individuals willing to mobilize are also more tolerant of using 
violence to achieve political goals.  
In the following sections I detail the methodology of my field surveys and 
embedded experiment, present an empirical analysis of Hypothesis 5, and discuss 
alternative explanations. I conclude by reflecting on what these findings mean for the future 
of Ivoirian peace-building and for post-VOB countries more generally.  
Research design  
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are appropriate cases for this comparison because they are 
similar along important structural dimensions related to geography, demographics, and 
development, but their divergent nation-building processes and citizenship regimes 
produced vastly different outcomes in terms of the politics of belonging. The conflict 
processes active in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are detailed in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6, 
respectively, but it is worth summarizing them here as well. Côte d’Ivoire offered 
expansive citizenship rights under first-president Houphouët Boigny. After 1993, 
nationalist principles grounded citizenship in autochthony, leading to the denationalization 
of many northerners (collectively referred to as “Dioula”). From the mid-1990s to the early 
2000s, violence in Côte d’Ivoire progressed from protests to civil war in response to the 
codification of exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality law. Citizenship in Ghana is 
not politicized because formal and informal institutions are generally geared towards 
national integration of all ethnic groups. Ghana’s pluralistic nation-building model has 
227 
 
weakened ethnic barriers and helped to build a unified national identity. Communal 
violence has remained localized through most of Ghana’s history. 
To study political attitudes in each country, I conducted field surveys in Abidjan 
and Accra from November to December 2014. The sampling procedure was not intended 
to produce a nationally representative sample, but, as the metropolitan centers of their 
respective countries, Abidjan and Accra offer diverse subject pools. Survey sites were 
selected using a multistage sampling procedure tailored to the specific municipal structure 
of the city.139 In Abidjan, 7 communes (districts) were randomly selected, followed by 4 
localities (neighborhoods) within each commune. In all, 23 neighborhoods were surveyed 
in Abidjan. In Accra, a sample of 21 localities were selected from a population of 103, all 
of which were included in the final sample. Within each locality, subjects were selected 
using a clustered random sample stratified by gender. Enumerators began at a focal point 
in each locality and used a “random walk” to select every fourth household.140 In total, 841 
surveys were completed. Survey questions are cited throughout this discussion as “FS” 
followed by the question number (i.e. FS-15). A list of original survey questions is 
available in Table 24 in the appendix. 
                                                             
 
139 Differences between Abidjan and Accra in terms of municipal structure and ease of mobility 
necessitated sampling procedures tailored to the local context. Surveys could not be completed in 
all the randomly-selected neighborhoods of Abidjan due to unforeseen issues that arose during the 
field research, including inclement weather, security concerns of the enumerators, and logistical 
constraints. 
140  Within each household, one respondent was interviewed. If multiple people were in the 
household, enumerators used randomized cards to select a participant over the age of 18. 
228 
 
I embedded an experiment in the questionnaire to evaluate attitudes regarding 
resource distribution by local officials. Surveys and experiments are common measurement 
tools for individual-level factors, such as support for political actors or policy (Lyall, Blair, 
and Imai 2013; Gutiérrez-Romero 2014; Wantchekon 2003) or perception of state 
institutions (Gutiérrez-Romero 2014). Enumerators administered three versions of the 
survey, each of which had slightly different phrasing of the following prompt: 
FS-15: Now I’m going to give you some information about aid distribution and 
then I’ll ask for your opinion. An aid organization has given a community leader a 
little money by to buy grain for families in the community. He only has enough 
money to buy grain for 50 households even though most families in the community 
need the grain. 
 
 The “Ethnic-Bias” treatment group learned that the leader distributed grain to 
members of his ethnic group only. The “Ethnic-Inclusion” treatment group heard that the 
leader distributed grain to at least one household from each ethnic group. The control group 
learned that the leader randomly distributed grain to households. Participants were then 
asked whether the method described was an acceptable way to distribute the grain.  
In summary, the present analysis employs a most-similar research design. Ghana’s 
questionnaires thus indicate what attitudes should look like in the absence of a politicized 
citizenship regime. In other words, Ghanaian responses are a proxy for what Ivoirian 
attitudes would look like today had VOB not happened. Outcomes in Côte d’Ivoire should 
generalize to other post-VOB settings because Ivoirian politics of belonging have followed 




Table 5 presents summary statistics demonstrating that the treatment groups did 
not differ statistically from the control group.141 None of the p-values reach statistical 
significance, suggesting that randomization effectively created balance between the 
groups. The treatment and control groups comprised both Ivoirians and Ghanaians. In the 
analysis I separate the treatment effects by country to understand how Citizenship Regime 
affects outcomes. 
[Insert Table 5] 
In summary, the present analysis employs a most-similar research design. Ghana’s 
questionnaires thus indicate what attitudes should look like in the absence of a politicized 
citizenship regime. In other words, Ghanaian responses are a proxy for what Ivoirian 
attitudes would look like today had VOB not happened. Outcomes in Côte d’Ivoire should 
generalize to other post-VOB settings because Ivoirian politics of belonging have followed 
a familiar trajectory seen elsewhere on the continent. 
 
                                                             
 
141 Columns 1-3 list the mean of demographic characteristics by group, Columns 4 and 6 list the 
differences between the means of the treatment and control groups. Columns 5 and 7 state the p-
value of the test that the difference between the respective treatment and control group is zero. 
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Table 5: Balance test 
















Age 45.095 44.297 44.964 0.131 0.989 -0.666 0.938 
Gender 0.498 0.491 0.837 -0.339 0.339 -0.346 0.334 
Education 6.565 6.993 6.971 -0.406 0.446 0.022 0.973 
Religion 2.807 4.556 3.964 -1.157 0.408 0.592 0.710 
Employed 2.940 1.652 1.650 1.291 0.241 0.003 0.998 
Wealth 3.758 3.975 3.466 0.292 0.569 0.509 0.344 
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A model for risk assessment  
The following section covers variables under study in this chapter: support for 
political violence, ethnic cleavages, and mobilization feasibility. These indicators are 
operationalized through survey questions.  
Dependent variable 
To gauge levels of popular tolerance of political violence, the variable Support 
dichotomizes responses to FS-11. This question asks about the legitimacy of political 
violence. I code Support as “1” for individuals who agree that “it is sometimes necessary 
to use violence in support of a just cause.”142  
This binary dependent variable paints a clear picture of attitudes, yet comes with 
some drawbacks. First, violence occurs in a moment and it is understandably difficult for 
individuals to predict what they would do in very specific circumstances. That said, 
Ivoirians may make better predictions given that they recently went through a conflict. 
Secondly, FS-11 is potentially affected by social desirability bias, which is inherent in 
sensitive survey questions. I attempt to address this problem by providing respondents 
some distance from the act of violence. For example, I do not ask participants if they 
committed or would commit violence. Instead, I ask them whether such an act is ever 
justified. Taking this softer approach allows the respondent to safely express opinions that 
may run up against social norms. I still expect the distribution of responses to this question 
                                                             
 
142 Other possible responses (Support=0) are: The use of violence is never justified in politics (, 
Agree with neither, Don’t know, and No response. 
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to underestimate true preferences in the population. The fact that coefficients achieve 
statistical significance in spite of such bias builds confidence in the results. So too does the 
expectation that social desirability should affect Ghanaian responses to the same extent  
(possibly even more), which would level out Support’s downward-bias.  
Overall, 20% of respondents agree that violence is justified in certain 
circumstances, while half believe it is never justified. Figure 23 displays the distribution 
across all possible responses to FS-11. I find that Ghanaians are much less supportive of 
political violence (13.4%) than Ivoirians (27.9%).143 A chi-square test shows that Ivoirian 
levels of Support differ significantly (p=0.00) from those of Ghanaians. 
                                                             
 
143 These values correspond to those found in the Afrobarometer data, in which 12.4% of Ghanaians 




Figure 23: Support for violence, by country 
 
Let us turn now to the independent variables of the analysis. With the understanding 
that violence occurs in a moment, I evaluate risk factors shown in the literature to be 
capable of transforming support for violence into action. I look specifically at the role of 
ethnic cleavages and mobilization around political entrepreneurs, which made a deep mark 
on the Ivoirian civil war. I measure ethnic cleavages as the salience of ethnic identification 
relative to national identification (Ethnic Salience), and the perception that the government 
favors co-ethnics in resource distribution (Ethnic Bias). Ethnic Salience is a categorical 
variable based on FS-8: 
FS-8: Let’s suppose that you had to choose between being a [National Identity] and 
being a [Self-reported Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your 




I code Ethnic Salience as “3” when an individual identifies more strongly with their 
nationality than with their ethnicity, and as “1” if the reverse is true.144 I code the variable 
as “2” if a respondent expresses equal attachment to ethnic and national identity.  
Winner/loser mobilization typically follows ethnic lines, so measuring the strength 
of attachment to ethnic identity is important to this study. I do not mean to suggest that 
strong ethnic attachments are necessarily violence-prone. Rather, they represent a potential 
cleavage along which individuals may mobilize. Ethnicity-based mobilization has been 
found in the literature to intensify outcomes (Eck 2009). An additional benefit of Ethnic 
Salience is that it allows me to interrogate attitudes towards violence held by individuals 
who feel greater attachment to their national identity. This angle is too often overlooked in 
the politics of belonging literature. Given that outsiders often push for a liberal citizenship 
emphasizing a polity unified around the national character, violence of belonging may 
reflect a nationalist goal. The Ivoirian case is testament to this fact.  
Overall, 23% of respondents favor their ethnic identity and 30% favor their national 
identity. Figure 24 breaks down responses by Ethnic Salience categories and by country. I 
find that the distribution of identity salience differs significantly (p=0.00) between 
Ivoirians and Ghanaians, but in ways that may surprise. Ethnic and national identification 
is actually twice as high in Ghana (at 30% and 40%, respectively) as in Côte d’Ivoire (at 
15% and 19%, respectively). Ivoirians tend to report equal attachment (60%). This result 
could be driven by a number of forces beyond the scope of this project: social desirability, 
                                                             
 
144 People who identified “more” or “only” with a particular identity were collapsed into the same 
category (Ethnic Salience=1 or 3). Other possible responses include: Don’t know (Ethnic 
Salience=0) and No response (Ethnic Salience=0). 
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response to a traumatic experience pitting ethnic and national identity against one another, 
etc. Through multivariate analysis, I demonstrate that group identification maintains a 
positive relationship with tolerance of violence in Côte d’Ivoire, but not in Ghana. 
 
Figure 24: Relative ethnic salience, by country 
 
Based on FS-9, Ethnic Bias captures perceptions about resource distribution by the 
government. 
FS-9: In your community, who receives goods and services from the government?    
 
I code Ethnic Bias as “1” if a respondent perceives ethnic bias in the distribution of 
state resources and as “2” if he or she perceives a bias towards people who helped get the 
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ruling party elected (henceforth referred to as “clients”).145 In the Ivoirian Civil War, the 
perception of biased resource distribution by the government (particularly their favoritism 
towards migrants) encouraged citizenship regime “losers” to mobilize. Ethnic Bias speaks 
to the salience of this risk factor in Ivoirian politics today. It is possible that there is 
substantial overlap between co-ethnics of the regime and their supporters. However, given 
that respondents have the clear option to report ethnic bias specifically, I am confident that 
the two answers capture different sentiments. The distribution of responses supports this 
assumption. 
Overall, 23% of respondents believe leaders favor their co-ethnics, but many people 
(43%) report no bias. Figure 25 breaks down responses by Ethnic Bias categories and by 
country. The difference in perceptions between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire is highly 
significant (p=0.00), likely driven by sharp differences in the type of perceived government 
bias. I find that roughly three times as many Ivoirians report ethnic bias as Ghanaians (36% 
and 11%, respectively), and that three times as many Ghanianas report client bias as 
Ivoirians (25% and 9%, respectively).  
                                                             
 
145 Other possible responses include: No bias, meaning no perception of patronage (Ethnic Bias=3), 




Figure 25: Biased resource distribution, by country 
 
The last factor I investigate is mobilization feasibility, which concerns leaders’ 
ability to rally supporters around a cause. It is based on FS-10: 
FS-10: If you disagree with something the government is doing and one of the 
following individuals calls on you to join them and their supporters in working to 
solve the problem, how likely are you to agree? 
 
Elections are so central to escalation processes during the politics of belonging that 
violence is often related to mobilization by politicians specifically. Feasibility thus takes a 
value of “2” if someone is “likely” or “very likely” to follow a political party leader when 
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protesting government policy.146 As a robustness check, I look at other types of leadership 
to capture different mobilization patterns: local government officials and traditional 
leaders.  
One strength of Feasibility is that the variable reflects an understanding that 
violence occurs in a moment. In a time of crisis or upheaval, charismatic leaders can bring 
latent tensions to the surface or even cultivate new preferences. Therefore, a risk 
assessment of violence relapse must not only consider attitudes towards violence as a 
political tool or the salience of ethnic cleavages, but also towards the likelihood of 
collective action. The next step, which I do in short order, is to determine whether 
mobilization will lead to communal fighting.  
The inevitable caveat for Feasibility is that I do not mean to suggest that all 
collective action in Côte d’Ivoire necessarily turns violent. I also recognize that the 
question is framed broadly enough to capture non-violent and violent protest. For these 
reasons, it is important to study the relationship between Feasibility and other risk factors. 
Concern arises when individuals willing to mobilize are also more tolerant of violent 
action. I find this to be the case in Côte d’Ivoire.  
Overall, 54% of respondents are willing to follow political party leaders, 52% are 
willing to follow local government officials, and 63% are willing to follow traditional 
leaders. As shown in Figure 26, Ghanaians and Ivoirians are similarly likely to follow 
leadership with some significance in the distribution of responses (p=0.067).  
                                                             
 
146 Other possible responses are: Unlikely to follow (Feasibility=1), Don’t know (Feasibility=0), 









My analysis of Afrobarometer data from Chapter Chapter 7 showed how important 
it is to control for the effect of political grievance. I treat grievance as a control rather than 
an explanatory variable because its effect on conflict onset is still debated in the literature. 
In addition, ethnic grievance is an alternative explanation to the factors presently 
identified.147 Based on FS-6, I code Grievance as “1” if the respondent believes their ethnic 
group to be politically worse or much worse off than other groups in society.148 In a 
robustness check I do not collapse the original categories of FS-6, instead allowing 
Grievance to reflect the full variation in responses.149  
FS-6: Think about the present condition of [R’s Ethnic Group]. How would you 
rate the condition of [R’s Ethnic Group] compared to other ethnic groups in the 
country in terms of political influence?  
 
 
About 28% of all respondents feel marginalized to some extent. Interestingly, I find 
that only 16% of Ivoirians feel their ethnic group fares better than other groups in society, 
compared to 37% of Ghanaians. The level of grievance differs significantly (p=0.00) 
between the two countries. Figure 27 displays the distribution across all possible responses 
to FS-6. 
                                                             
 
147 See Chapter Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of the treatment of political grievance in 
the literature. 
148  Other possible responses are: Similar (Grievance=2), Better (Grievance=3), Much better 
(Grievance=3), Don’t know (Grievance=0), and No response (Grievance=0).  
149  The categories of Grievance in grievance-robust models are as follows: Much better 
(Grievance=5), Better (Grievance=4), Similar (Grievance=3), Worse (Grievance=2), Much Worse 




Figure 27: Political grievance, by country 
 
I include standard demographic controls of age, gender, ethnicity, employment, 
education, religion, and residence in a rural or urban area in all empirical models. These 
variables are established factors in mobilization, political grievance, and violent onset. 
Ethnicity is operationalized as the respondent’s family language and Employment is a 
binary indicator for whether an individual is employed. A control for household wealth is 
purposively excluded given high collinearity between wealth (measured as self-reported, 
personal economic conditions) and Grievance. Models rely on unpooled data. Those using 
the Ivoirian sample include a control for whether the respondent lives in a stronghold of 
242 
 
Ouattara (RDR party) or Gbagbo (FPI party).150 Detailed summary statistics of all control 
variables are available in Table 25 in the appendix. 
Empirical Analysis 
The previous section demonstrated that tolerance of political violence is higher in 
Côte d’Ivoire than in Ghana. This section takes the analysis a step further to study correlates 
of that tolerance. I find that ethnic cleavages and willingness to rally around leadership, 
two triggers of conflict processes, are positively and significantly related to Support in Côte 
d’Ivoire and not in Ghana. In fact, only client-based distribution has a consistently positive 
and significant relationship with Support among Ghanaians. The implication is that 
ethnicity remains a potent cleavage in Côte d’Ivoire that can be leveraged by political 
entrepreneurs. Further, I show that collective action under the guidance of entrepreneurs is 
violence-prone. A similar situation is less likely in Ghana. After presenting the results, I 
address several alternative explanations.  
The models are a series of logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered 
on neighborhood (Locality) using unpooled survey data. I factor out categorical variables 
to determine the effect of each category on the outcome of interest. Figure 28 displays the 
effects of key variables from the main model, with estimates presented as odds ratios.151 
The full regression results, including those from feasibility-robust models (controlling for 
                                                             
 
150 See Chapter 4 for details about Ivoirian leadership and political party allegiances. 
151 Recall that odds ratios are the exponentiated coefficients of a logistic regression. They 
describe differences between two populations in terms of order of magnitude. 
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other leadership types) and grievance-robust models (disaggregating Grievance), are 
available in Tables 26 and 27 in the appendix.152  
 
 
Figure 28: Correlates of support for political violence 
 
I find that leadership has a strong and positive correlation with Support in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Individuals willing to rally behind political party leaders, government officials, 
and traditional leaders are more tolerant of political violence (Models 4-6e and 4-6f), as 
compared to their less-than-willing counterparts. Specifically, those Ivoirians willing to 
mobilize around a political party leader are 3.32 times more likely to support political 
violence than those who are not willing to mobilize. Ghanaians willing to do the same are 
1.8 times more likely as their less-motivated counterparts (Model 1e). However, the 
                                                             
 
152 The coefficients are not exponentiated in these tables. 
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coefficient on Feasibility loses its statistical significance in Ghana’s feasibility-robust 
models (Models 2-3e and 2-3f, respectively). Smaller coefficients and inconsistent 
significance indicates a weak relationship between mobilization and support for violence 
in Ghana.  
In support of Hypothesis 5, ethnic cleavages predict Support in Côte d’Ivoire in 
spite of the reported ethnic tolerance there (Models 4-6e and 4-6f). Those who believe that 
government agents favor their co-ethnics are about three times more likely to support 
political violence than those who do not perceive a bias. Additionally, those who identify 
more strongly in ethnic terms are around 1.63 times more likely to support violence than 
those who identify equally with their ethnic and national identities. Interestingly, Ivoirians 
who identify more strongly in national terms are about twice as likely to support violence, 
reinforcing the idea that VOB can be instigated by those favoring national integration. The 
literature has not paid much attention to this strand of VOB so it would be a productive 
avenue for future research. 
Furthermore, ethnic cleavages are not predictive of Support in Ghana (Models 1-
3e and 1-3f), which is in line with my prediction. I find that ethnic bias and ethnic 
identification do not significantly affect tolerance of violence among Ghanaians. However, 
Ghanaians who perceive client bias in the government are three times more likely to 
support political violence, as compared to those who perceive no bias. In contrast, client 
bias has a much weaker relationship with Support among Ivoirians. In Côte d’Ivoire 
(Models 5-6e and 5-6f), the coefficient regarding client bias is half the size as in Ghana 
(Models 1-3e and 1-3f) and only somewhat significant. 
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The effect of political marginalization is hard to determine in the models. Grievance 
has a negative and somewhat significant (p<0.1) effect on Support in Ghana, but no 
significant effect in Côte d’Ivoire in the main models (Models 1-6e). In grievance-robust 
models (Models 1-6f), the coefficient on Grievance fails to achieve significance in almost 
every model in the Ghana sample, and has only a weak relationship with Support in the 
Côte d’Ivoire sample. The coefficients in Models 1-6f are finicky. They gain and lose 
significance depending on the model specification. Some of the contradictory results can 
be attributed to low-observation counts in the categories “much worse” (N=72) or “much 
better” (N=60). This fact justifies my decision to collapse Grievance into four categories 
in the primary analysis. At the same time, these results are a microcosm of the ongoing 
debate in the literature about how to understand the effect of grievance. Marginalization 
clearly has a nuanced relationship with political violence, and specifying this relationship 
may be beyond the scope of this present study. 
Finally, I find that individuals in President Ouattara’s (RDR) strongholds are less 
supportive of using political violence than individuals in former-President Gbagbo’s (FPI) 
strongholds. This result likely stems from the fact that RDR supporters were the primary 
victims of Ivoirité and VOB preceding the war. Furthermore, they are now in power with 
the head of their party in the presidential office, and violence would surely threaten their 
position.  
Alternatives 
One source of potential bias stems from the pressure some respondents may feel to 
answer questions in a socially desirable way. This problem plagues any questionnaire 
broaching sensitive subjects, such as ethnic relations and political violence. I try to 
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minimize the effect of this bias in two ways. First, I compare two countries with strong 
social norms against ethnic discrimination. I expect that social desirability would affect 
Ghanaian responses to the same or greater extent as Ivoirian responses, thus levelling out 
any downward-bias caused by social desirability. Granted, norm-development evolved in 
different ways in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. However, the underlying process of norm-
development is endogenous to the independent variable of interest here (Citizenship 
Regime). In fact, the norm-development processes are possible causal mechanisms driving 
differences in Ivoirian and Ghanaian attitudes. Secondly, surveys were conducted in private 
so that respondents could speak their minds away from friends or family members. Lastly, 
I designed the questionnaire such that respondents did not have to openly admit to engaging 
in “negative” behavior. For example, I ask whether violence is ever justified, rather than 
whether respondents have used violence themselves. When the questionnaire asks directly 
about a sensitive topic, such as ethnically-biased resource distribution, I use an 
experimental design. I can therefore compare responses to the sensitive question with 
responses to neutral (random distribution) or pro-social (ethnically-inclusive) questions. 
Finding statistically significant results, even if the estimates of true preferences are 
conservative measures, increases confidence in the results.  
A second concern with the chosen testing procedure may be that Côte d’Ivoire 
suffered a civil war from 2002 to 2007, with a brief resumption of fighting in 2010. This 
recent unrest has surely impacted individual attitudes towards mobilization, leadership, 
grievances, and violence. However, rather than undermining my results, the Ivoirian 
conflict is part and parcel of the key independent variable, Citizenship Regime. Struggles 
over contested citizenship, and nativist ideology in particular, characterize politics in Côte 
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d’Ivoire during the multi-party era. The civil war was a response to Côte d’Ivoire’s 
increasingly exclusionary citizenship regime. The violence further politicized citizenship 
debates, thereby reinforcing the contrast exploited in my testing. There is no way to 
disentangle the risk factors explored here from an individual’s experience with the war. 
Instead, this chapter emphasizes what we can glean from the data, which is that 
exclusionary citizenship regimes increase the salience of risk factors in violence even after 
conflict has ended. I leave it to future research to explain how much of the results are driven 
by experience of past conflict.  
Discussion 
Many of the preceding chapters have investigated collective violence in the 
aggregate. Chapter 4 linked nationality law and annual events and fatalities, while Chapters 
5 and 6 examined group level processes and mechanisms. To fully understand collective 
behavior, it is important to identify micro-level determinants and then link all levels of 
analysis. I use survey data in Chapters 7 and Chapter 8 to explore individual-level 
determinants of political violence. I aim to shed light on the foundations of VOB. The 
findings have implications for determining the likelihood of conflict relapse. 
Ethnic entrepreneurs on both sides of the citizenship debate in Côte d’Ivoire preyed 
upon ethnic divisions, effectively tearing the country in two. Today, the recruitment 
environment for Ivoirian political entrepreneurs remains rife with opportunity and 
collective action is violence-prone. I find not only that ethnic cleavages are salient in in 
Côte d’Ivoire, but that they are strongly associated with support for political violence. 
Furthermore, I show that individuals willing to mobilize around leadership are more 
tolerant of violence, as compared to other individuals.  
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The consequence is that Côte d’Ivoire’s path to peace, roundly cheered after the 
2015 election, is incomplete and fragile. Serious threats to stability and reconciliation 
remain, an observation that has sobering implications for other post-citizenship-conflict 
societies. This is not to say that Côte d’Ivoire is on the upswing of a conflict trap. Rather, 
I suggest that there is still work to do. The positive steps towards peaceful elections and 
continued economic development are encouraging. However, if the root causes of Côte 
d’Ivoire’s VOB are not fully resolved, they remain potent even after fighting has died 
down. A concern for Côte d’Ivoire moving forward is that the fundamental question of land 
ownership has not been settled. Lessons from Ghana on managing disputes, and de-
politicizing citizenship issues in particular, may serve Côte d’Ivoire well in the long-run.  
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Chapter 9. A Path for Citizenship Studies 
 
Where should the boundaries of the Nation lie? Who is an insider? Who is an 
outsider? These profoundly contentious questions form the core of the politics of 
belonging. Citizenship represents the legal bond between an individual and the state. 
Citizenship rules, formalized through nationality law, determine who has a claim to the 
most important rights in the polity: the right to vote, stand for office, own property, obtain 
a passport, etc. Debating who does or does not have a right to citizenship can lead to 
violence because citizens “own” the state. 
Previous scholarship explains why citizenship debates so often turn into armed 
confrontations. The role of land or election mechanisms, often framed as insider/outsider 
competition, receive much attention from analysts. Far less energy is directed to the role of 
exclusive nationality laws, much less the cross-national variation in VOB intensity. And 
yet variation within nationality laws produces notably different levels of violence. This gap 
in our knowledge leads to the question, why is insider/outsider violence worse in some 
places than others? I argue that the answer lies in the legal framework of belonging itself. 
Specifically, codifying exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality law intensifies VOB. 
Moreover, I identify a new causal factor in civil war: the threat to denationalize an outsider 
group. 
Starting from the premise that citizenship politics is a form of redistributive conflict 
producing winners and losers, I argue that exclusive nationality laws increases competition 
between these groups. Furthermore, the marginalization produced by exclusive laws 
creates incentives to challenge status quo citizenship rules. Winner/loser competition 
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follows ethnic lines, and thus encourages the development of contentious citizenship 
narratives about where outsiders belong. These narratives justify a preferred pattern of 
resource distribution and frame status quo citizenship rules as threats and opportunities. 
The ethnically-exclusive appeals inherent in these narratives build group cohesion, 
reinforce an ethnic security dilemma, and facilitate armed organization.  
The literature is fairly clear on factors in VOB onset: political competition between 
insiders and outsiders, politicization of land and ethnicity, and economic or political crisis. 
In contrast, I focus attention on the underexplored question of variation in VOB intensity. 
Why is it that citizenship debates lead to localized skirmishes in some countries, but minor 
conflict or even war in others? Restrictive laws deepen marginalization and exacerbate 
insider/outsider tensions. Contentious narratives emphasize deep group cleavages, which 
facilitates ethnic mobilization and thus intensifies the severity of VOB outcomes. When 
outsiders are labelled foreigners because the group is composed of internal and external 
migrants, calls to strip them of citizenship rights gain traction. Once a group faces 
denationalization, they have few options outside of extra-institutional strategies to defend 
their rights. Consequently, armed confrontations are more likely to devolve into a civil war. 
However, events remain constrained at the level of minor conflict where outsiders do not 
have contested foreign origins, which happens where outsiders are primarily in-migrants. 
My research makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. First, 
the conflict studies field is intensely interested in how exclusion from power, resource 
competition, or ethnic rivalries drive conflict processes. And yet citizenship, the 
fundamental instrument of inclusion and access, is largely overlooked. I find that 
provisions in nationality laws have explanatory power in their own right, and not just in 
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the well-worn cases of extreme violence sparked by competitive elections. While the 
existing literature recognizes that citizenship policy has far-reaching effects, it has not 
made much headway in understanding how specific provisions impact violence outcomes. 
Situated in the burgeoning scholarship on Africa’s citizenship policies, this dissertation 
offers a fresh vantage point for the citizenship politics field. For instance, the African 
Citizenship Policy Index’s (ACPI) flexible framework expands the breadth of legal 
provisions to be studied, and proposes a means of systematizing and coordinating 
overlapping research agendas. In addition, by employing violence severity as an outcome 
of interest, I endeavor to correct the selection bias towards extreme cases (e.g. conflict 
events and election violence) currently weighing on the field.  
Secondly, previous work tends to assign groups to opposite ends of the 
insider/outsider dichotomy and study their interactions. In contrast, I conceptualize groups 
as aggregations of individuals that fall along a spectrum of citizenship security. This 
approach is novel in the way it emphasizes how threats to citizenship rights and 
opportunities for improved status guide violent collective action. In deviating from the 
traditional focus on ethnic identity and grievance, the concept of citizenship security 
provides a new perspective on why contentious narratives lead to VOB and how elites are 
able to convince supporters to follow them. Furthermore, examining the insider/outsider 
dichotomy as a citizenship regime winner/loser divide sheds a different light on elite-
individual interactions. This approach implicates elites and individuals from insider and 
outsider groups in the joint production of violence. Therefore, it offers novel insight into 
group relations, and how group composition interacts with nationality law. 
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In terms of empirical contributions, I identify new factors and trends never before 
observed by taking a broadly comparative approach. I find that event frequency and fatality 
rates generally rise as laws become more exclusionary, and that laws have a larger effect 
on fatality rates. Looking at individual level data, which is under-utilized in existing VOB 
studies, I show that people who have difficulty obtaining national identity papers are more 
likely to fear and use political violence. Individuals susceptible to contentious citizenship 
narratives are more likely to use political violence, but not to fear it. Access to national 
identity documents and susceptibility to contentious narratives are significant factors and 
independent of ethnic grievance. These findings are important because the correlation 
between these factors and VOB is acknowledged in the literature, but not statistically 
modeled. Moreover, studies to date are unclear on how to evaluate their relative weight, as 
compared to the effect of other VOB forces. 
The ACPI is one of my most important empirical contributions. Data limitations 
have hampered the development of generalizable metrics relevant to citizenship politics. 
Without indicators permitting systematic comparisons across countries and time periods, 
it is extremely challenging to determine the extent to which nationality laws explain 
geographic or temporal variation in outcomes of interest. The relationship between 
citizenship policy and patterns in political violence remains under-explored because 
existing work has not produced a comprehensive, cross-national indicator. I created the 
ACPI to help remedy this major constraint on research into citizenship law. Employing a 
country-year unit of analysis, the ACPI is the first quantitative metric for studying Africa’s 
legal framework of belonging. Capturing the most salient policy dimensions (e.g. 
birthright, gender, ethnicity, naturalization, and dual nationality), the index generalizes to 
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almost any region of the world. The ACPI builds on dedicated efforts of other scholars and 
complements existing research by enlarging the scope of variation under observation. An 
additional benefit is that the ACPI moves the field towards developing standardized 
indicators to facilitate replication and consensus. Tracking ACPI scores over time yields 
an encouraging trendline: citizenship policies in Africa are becoming more inclusionary. 
At the same time, ACPI analysis demonstrates the close relationship between exclusive 
nationality laws and violence severity. 
In summary, a comparative study of nationality laws helps explains a wider range 
of outcomes, from localized skirmishes to civil war, in a wide range of time periods, both 
during and outside of election periods than what has come before. Furthermore, close 
attention to the interaction of elite interests and individual motivation fills in details about 
how contentious narratives transform individual preferences into action at the group level. 
Finally, case studies demonstrate that events are more likely to escalate into war when 
denationalization becomes a bargaining chip in citizenship debates.  
The policy implications of this project are clear: minimize exclusion through 
citizenship law to reduce marginalization and violence. This is not to say that nationality 
law is a panacea for security issues in Africa or elsewhere, but inclusionary citizenship 
policies are more than lofty goals to be included in human rights treaties. They must be 
established and enforced through constitutions and peace agreements. They are a means of 
strengthening state institutions and augmenting the government’s legitimacy, which serve 
the twin goals of achieving stability and increasing development. 
Historical circumstances set many countries in Africa on a trajectory of acute and 
often violent citizenship debates: a period of repressive colonization, weak institutions 
254 
 
designed for extractive purposes, complicated and extensive migration flows, deep ethnic 
fractures and history of conflict along group lines, forced democratization in the context of 
fragile political institutions and vulnerable economic structures. These conditions are not 
a favorable groundwork for stable or peaceful politics, much less for delicate issues 
surrounding belonging and identity. The evolution of citizenship law in Africa is therefore 
illustrative of the processes and mechanisms that transform the politics of belonging into 
violence of belonging.  
However, African experiences are not singular events and nativism. Demonization 
of the Other arises in places as disparate as Asia, the Indian sub-continent, the former 
Soviet Bloc, and Western Europe (Geschiere 2009; Côté and Mitchell 2015). The 
proliferation of this obsession can be explained by the ordinariness of the conditions that 
propel citizenship debates towards violence. Many parts of the developing world are still 
recovering from their colonial past. Pressures amplified by globalization, such as massive 
migration flows and economic and political liberalization are not confined to a single 
continent or development level. Additionally, a truism of sorts is emerging in global 
politics: Economic and political instability at the national level generate profound 
existential insecurity at the individual level, which leads to scapegoating foreigners for a 
bounty of misfortunes. These trends may be magnified in African states, but they are still 
apparent almost anywhere else. Consequently, lessons from this dissertation apply beyond 
the Continent’s boundaries. While not universal per se, they tell us a great deal about the 
meaningfulness of membership in the contemporary moment. We can draw out their 
implications for Nations in states and political development generally.   
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Similarly, dire prognoses about the future of the nation-state as an organizing 
principle in the international system may be overblown. Christian Lund’s observation that 
“the idea of the state is, if not entirely clear, quite powerful despite the incapacity of 
government institutions” is apropos (2003, 589). Continued confrontations over citizenship 
criteria indicate that the nation-state remains a powerful, if only symbolic, organizing force. 
In fact, a “new nationalism” (Ake 1996; Kersting 2009) spreading around the globe 
espouses indigeneity as the essential criterion for membership in the political community. 
Further, it suggests the swelling popularity of having nation-homogenous states. 
Legislation should therefore be closely monitored for nativist (or proto-nativist) strands 
because inclusionary policies are jeopardized by such movements.  
As the fundamental tool of inclusion and exclusion from rights resources in the 
polity, citizenship laws have the potential to consolidate or undermine democracy. I have 
detailed the various ways leaders in Africa have manipulated nationality laws as part of 
divide and rule politics. However, it would be a mistake to containerize this research as 
only relevant to multi-ethnic societies democratizing in the modern era. For instance, 
charismatic populist leaders espousing xenophobic nationalism are largely responsible for 
the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, the growing number of parliamentary seats in 
Europe held by far-right parties, and the success of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential 
election in the United States.153  
                                                             
 
153 On the Brexit vote, see: Goodwin and Heath (2016) and Inglehart and Norris (2016). On the rise 
of far-right parties in Europe, see: Norris (2005), Mudde (2007), Goodwin (2011), or Inglehart and 
Norris (2016). On far-right ideology in the U.S. presidential campaign of 2016, see: Philip 
Klinkner, “The easiest way to guess if someone supports Trump? Ask if Obama is a Muslim,” 
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Preferences for exclusionary citizenship rules at the local level are poised to upend 
inclusionary policies at the national level, paralleling the cases of Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, 
and Kenya. As competition between winners and losers under the prevailing regime has 
intensified in Western Europe, some elites have turned to exclusionary national identity 
discourses and contentious citizenship narratives to push for more restrictive citizenship 
rules. Calls to close borders in Finland, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, 154 or to build walls 
in Austria, Hungary, and the United States reflect ongoing citizenship debates in these 
countries. 155  Furthermore, legislation in the U.S. to tighten voter identification 
requirements and calls to eliminate jus soli citizenship rights represent efforts to shrink the 
boundaries of the national community.156 The “long, hot” summers of “urban rebellion” 
                                                             
 
Vox.com, June 2, 2016. http://www.vox.com/2016/6/2/11833548/donald-trump-support-race-
religion-economy (Accessed September 28, 2016). 
154  Finland’s nationalist Finns Party wants to block immigration from non-European Union 
countries: Jan Sundberg, “Who are the nationalist Finns Party?” BBC.com, May 11, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32627013 (Accessed September 28, 2016). Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden are clamping down on the number of migrants crossing their borders: WSJ. 
“Europe’s Closing Borders,” The Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-closing-borders-1452212006 (Accessed September 28, 
2016).  
155 Austria plans to build a wall on its border with Slovenia and Italy: Simon Tomlinson, “Is Austria 
building a fence on the border with Italy?” DailMail.com, April 12, 2016, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3535936/EU-concerned-Austria-planning-build-fence-
border-Italy.html (Accessed September 28, 2016). Hungary built fences on its southern border with 
Serbia and Croatia in 2015, then announced expansion plans in 2016: Associated Press, “Hungary's 
PM plans 'more massive' fence to keep out migrants,” The Guardian, August 26, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/26/hungarys-pm-plans-more-massive-fence-to-
keep-out-migrants (Accessed September 28, 2016). On the proposed U.S.-Mexico border wall, see: 
“Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again”. DonaldJTrump.com. 
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/immigration-reform (Accessed September 28, 2016). 
156 On voter ID laws, see: Brennan Center for Justice, “New Voting Restrictions in Place for 2016 
Presidential Election,” Brennan Center, at http://www.brennancenter.org/voting-restrictions-first-
time-2016 (Accessed September 28, 2016). On ending birthright citizenship, see: Tal Kopan, 
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during the American civil rights movement (McLaughlin 2014), and their latest 
reincarnation as protests over discriminatory policing, serve as reminders that while 
largescale violence is unlikely, restrictive citizenship rules can be destabilizing even in 
strong states. 
Where do we go from here? The challenge is to pursue meaningful reforms that 
encourage buy-in from stakeholders and avoid creating a regressive backlash that 
undermines the entire project. The latest return to nativism stands in stark contrast with the 
integrationist vision that characterizes the 20th century. From the League of Nations to 
organizations bent on regional unification to an embrace of Multiculturalism, the trajectory 
of citizenship policy, while halting at times, has generally inclined towards greater 
tolerance and deeper integration. Since the establishment of Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, all international 
human rights treaties uphold the principle that every person has a right to a nationality. The 
difficulty, of course, is bringing domestic policy into line with international norms. The 
African Union (AU) has taken positive steps in this direction by seeking to formalize the 
right to a nationality, which is implied but not explicitly granted by Article 6 of the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. As of August 2015, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Right adopted a draft Protocol to the African Charter 
                                                             
 
“Birthright citizenship: Can Donald Trump change the Constitution?” CNN.com, August 18, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/18/politics/birthright-citizenship-trump-constitution/ and Jenna 
Johnson, “Scott Walker: The U.S. should ‘absolutely’ stop granting birthright citizenship,” The 





on the Right to a Nationality. In July 2016, the AU allowed the draft to “enter the 
procedures for elaboration of legal instruments for adoption by the African Union” (CRAI 
2016). If the Protocol is passed, it places additional pressure on governments to change 
nationality and naturalization laws to make them more inclusive.157  
An entire overhaul of domestic nationality law is, of course, unlikely in the vast 
majority of cases. Instead, incremental changes are the surest way to improve citizenship 
policies.158 First, there should be a pathway to citizenship for individuals born in the 
territory and for long-term residents. This pathway should not be narrow or characterized 
by discretionary judgement on the part of officials; it should fight against conditions 
leading to permanent exclusion. Secondly, citizenship rules should not only be widely 
inclusive, but also objective, specific, clear, and transparent. Otherwise, competing claims 
to nationality will continue to subvert social cohesion, political stability, and democratic 
consolidation. The position of insiders and outsiders is similarly undermined by vague or 
contradictory nationality laws. The adoption, implementation, and enforcement of just laws 
requires strong state institutions. Finally, the legitimacy of nationality laws depends upon 
the legitimacy of the state and its institutions; this point should not be forgotten.  
  
                                                             
 
157  More information on international and African standards for citizenship laws is available 
through the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative at http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/. 
158  Manby (2015, Chapter 15) details opportunities for reform and principles that should be 






Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, ACPI Models 
 Mean Std Dev Min Max Count 
ACPI Scores      
Unweighted 1.772 0.353 1.12 3.00 1088 
2x-weighted 2.508 0.500 1.59 4.24 1088 
3x-unweighted 2.682 0.535 1.70 4.54 1088 
      
Patterns in Violence      
Elections - Frequency 0.738 2.181 0.00 20.00 1050 
Elections - Fatalities 9.810 139.275 0.00 4050.00 1050 
Land - Frequency 0.229 0.769 0.00 9.00 1050 
Land - Fatalities 11.366 123.769 0.00 3500.00 1050 
Ethnicity - Frequency 1.268 4.530 0.00 66.00 1050 
Ethnicity - Fatalities 58.898 345.441 0.00 5420.00 1050 
All Violence - Frequency 8.173 16.085 0.00 249.00 1050 
All Violence - Fatalities 95.276 405.613 0.00 5560.00 1050 
Minor Conflict - Incidence 0.178 0.382 0.00 1.00 1092 
War - Incidence 0.071 0.256 0.00 1.00 1092 
      
Additional Factors      
GDP per capita 515.954 314.620 1.00 1061.00 1092 
Regime Type 0.466 5.581 -10.00 10.00 1062 
Excluded Population Size 0.190 0.266 0.00 0.85 1092 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.707 0.200 0.18 0.94 1092 
Population Density 70.396 107.177 1.65 621.15 1092 
Immigrant Population Size 3.644 3.813 0.18 18.43 1092 
Arable Land Size 13.129 12.628 0.32 48.77 1092 
Law Year 0.070 0.255 0.00 1.00 1092 




Table 7: Descriptive Statistics by Country, ACPI Models 
 
ACPI Scores (Avg) All Violence (Avg) 
 
Unweighted 2x-weighted 3x-weighted Frequency Fatalities 
Angola 1.46 2.04 2.18 4.16 15.12 
Benin 1.26 1.78 1.91 3.2 1.32 
Botswana 1.62 2.04 2.18 0.64 0.04 
Burkina Faso 1.51 2.14 2.29 3.12 2.72 
Burundi 2.11 2.75 2.94 6.68 56.96 
Cameroon 1.7 2.4 2.57 4.84 21.2 
C.A.R. 1.7 2.4 2.57 10.76 40.68 
Chad 1.35 1.91 2.04 2.52 42.24 
Congo 2.18 3.09 3.3 1.44 0.72 
Côte d’Ivoire 1.99 2.75 2.94 13.16 90.12 
DRC 2.42 2.75 2.94 19.68 852.48 
Eritrea 1.73 2.45 2.62 0.64 2.36 
Ethiopia 1.37 2.04 2.18 4.04 64.04 
Gabon 1.51 1.91 2.04 3 1.12 
Gambia 1.53 2.04 2.18 0.56 0.56 
Ghana 1.42 1.91 2.04 3.28 139 
Guinea 1.82 2.57 2.75 5.36 31.84 
Guinea-Bissau 1.64 1.91 2.04 2.6 2.4 
Kenya 1.86 2.14 2.29 21.4 265.76 
Lesotho 1.62 2.29 2.45 2.24 5.56 
Liberia 1.73 2.45 2.62 4.84 84.04 
Madagascar 1.94 2.75 2.94 3.4 16.36 
Malawi 1.86 2.57 2.75 5.52 6.4 
Mali 1.9 2.57 2.75 7.84 29.72 
Mauritania 1.84 2.7 2.88 4.32 16.12 
Mauritius 1.64 2.57 2.75 0.32 0.44 
Mozambique 1.72 2.04 2.18 3.4 10 
Namibia 1.4 2.29 2.45 1.16 2.76 
Niger 1.95 2.57 2.75 7.84 12 
Nigeria 2.33 3.3 3.53 59.12 1090.6 
Rwanda 1.89 1.59 1.7 3.72 147.48 
Senegal 2.14 3.09 3.3 6.92 7.16 
Sierra Leone 2.68 2.94 3.15 4.2 12.48 
Somalia 1.8 2.29 2.45 21.4 221.24 
South Africa 1.47 1.91 2.04 40.72 300.36 
Sudan 1.64 2.57 2.75 18.08 363.2 
Swaziland 1.72 2.45 2.62 3.36 0.2 
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Tanzania 1.85 2.57 2.75 3.88 7.12 
Togo 1.59 2.24 2.4 4.52 13.84 
Uganda 1.92 2.45 2.62 4.2 14.2 
Zambia 1.94 2.75 2.94 5.44 3.2 
Zimbabwe 1.65 2.04 2.18 15.76 6.44 
 
 









Frequency Fatalities Frequency Fatalities Frequency Fatalities 
Angola 0.12 0 0 0 0.08 0.08 
Benin 0.6 0.16 0 0 0.08 0.08 
Botswana 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 
Burkina Faso 0.16 0 0.08 0.84 0.12 0.4 
Burundi 0.28 0.64 0.04 0 0.76 19.56 
Cameroon 0.4 0.28 0.36 2.6 0.36 2.24 
C.A.R. 0.32 4.76 0.12 3.28 0.84 6.76 
Chad 0.16 0.04 0.12 5.6 0.44 28.04 
Congo 0.16 0.04 0 0 0 0 
Côte d’Ivoire 2.32 19.56 0.36 3.04 0.96 36.2 
DRC 1.6 48.28 0.44 226.48 4.8 655.4 
Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ethiopia 0.32 4.08 0.44 23.84 1.16 39.12 
Gabon 0.72 0.36 0 0 0 0 
Gambia 0.04 0.08 0 0 0.04 0 
Ghana 0.64 0.8 0.04 0.12 0.6 131.76 
Guinea 1.72 8.6 0.04 2.4 0.36 9.2 
Guinea-Bissau 0.2 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.08 1.24 
Kenya 2.56 72.88 1.12 30.32 3.76 136.96 
Lesotho 0.64 1.96 0.04 0.24 0.04 1.36 
Liberia 0.28 0.16 0 0 0.84 14.96 
Madagascar 0.52 2.04 0.04 0 0.08 0.12 
Malawi 0.88 2.08 0.08 0 0.12 0.2 
Mali 0.36 0.32 0.12 1.4 1.84 6.96 
Mauritania 0.44 0.28 0 0 0.96 15.04 
Mauritius 0.04 0.04 0.04 0 0 0 
Mozambique 0.28 3.52 0 0 0.04 0.04 
Namibia 0.08 0.04 0 0 0.12 0 
Niger 0.24 0 0.24 0.96 0.52 4.88 
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Nigeria 4.68 216.96 2.12 87.2 14.32 839.2 
Rwanda 0.36 0.32 0 0 0.64 35.24 
Senegal 0.8 0.52 0 0 0.72 0.96 
Sierra Leone 0.64 1.12 0.04 0.04 0.08 2 
Somalia 0.08 0.52 0.92 16.96 4.36 105.2 
South Africa 1.84 6.84 0.68 4.68 9.04 203.6 
Sudan 0.64 2.6 1.24 65.28 3.12 164.08 
Swaziland 0.04 0 0.08 0 0 0 
Tanzania 1.16 1.92 0.04 1.24 0.76 0.4 
Togo 1 4.44 0.04 0.8 0.16 3.52 
Uganda 0.56 0.64 0.08 0 0.4 8.8 
Zambia 0.96 0.2 0 0 0.08 0.08 






Table 8: Event Frequency, Unweighted ACPI Scores 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 0.720 0.366 1.663** 0.280 
 (0.487) (0.571) (0.570) (0.197) 
Pop. Density, log 0.184 -0.253 -0.259 -0.200 
 (0.363) (0.410) (0.479) (0.165) 
GDP per capita 0.000* -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.064** 0.450 1.113 -0.150 
 (0.879) (1.218) (0.901) (0.504) 
Immigrant Pop., log -0.142 -0.598** -0.409** -0.009 
(0.171) (0.237) (0.202) (0.084) 
Regime Type 0.027 0.027 0.109** 0.034* 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.046) (0.021) 
Excluded Pop., log -0.076 -0.239 0.061 0.098 
(0.126) (0.213) (0.205) (0.081) 
Law Year 0.933** 1.383*** 0.836*** 0.147 
 (0.319) (0.297) (0.139) (0.147) 
Election Year 2.098*** -0.136 0.097 -0.282** 
 (0.142) (0.206) (0.127) (0.106) 
Arable Land Size, log 0.105 0.566 0.229 0.200 
 (0.353) (0.466) (0.449) (0.149) 
Minor Conflict 0.289 0.246 0.659** 0.291** 
 (0.343) (0.322) (0.267) (0.127) 
War -0.806 0.387 0.447 0.581*** 
 (0.688) (0.335) (0.403) (0.142) 
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency    0.099*** 
   (0.026) 
Land Violence Frequency    0.351*** 
   (0.068) 
Election Violence Frequency    0.176*** 
   (0.025) 
Observations 1020 1020 1020 1020 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters. 




Table 9: Event Frequency, Unweighted ACPI Scores and Lags 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 0.719 0.462 1.634** 0.282 
 (0.492) (0.575) (0.565) (0.191) 
Pop. Density, logged and lagged 0.123 -0.373 -0.301 -0.247 
(0.364) (0.410) (0.489) (0.157) 
GDP per capita, lagged 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged 2.140** 0.382 1.196 -0.088 
(0.876) (1.232) (0.880) (0.489) 
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged -0.130 -0.618** -0.424** -0.016 
(0.169) (0.234) (0.199) (0.076) 
Regime Type, lagged 0.020 0.020 0.092** 0.020 
 (0.023) (0.034) (0.045) (0.020) 
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged -0.075 -0.155 0.038 0.080 
(0.120) (0.239) (0.208) (0.079) 
Law Year 0.984** 1.344*** 0.986*** 0.157 
 (0.314) (0.284) (0.167) (0.135) 
Election Year 2.116*** -0.086 0.221 -0.307** 
 (0.136) (0.215) (0.136) (0.100) 
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged 0.152 0.654 0.263 0.245* 
(0.358) (0.460) (0.464) (0.146) 
Minor Conflict 0.304 0.302 0.647** 0.284** 
 (0.345) (0.335) (0.271) (0.124) 
War -0.832 0.433 0.443 0.504*** 
 (0.634) (0.300) (0.347) (0.140) 
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency    0.103*** 
   (0.027) 
Land Violence Frequency    0.340*** 
   (0.065) 
Election Violence Frequency    0.180*** 
   (0.025) 
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters. 






Table 10: Fatality Rates, Unweighted ACPI Scores 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 4.331** 2.281* 2.915*** 0.931* 
 (1.355) (1.269) (0.824) (0.498) 
Pop. Density, log 0.097 -0.382 0.552 0.237 
 (0.740) (0.982) (0.659) (0.277) 
GDP per capita 0.002* -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.631 6.747** 4.670** 1.252 
 (1.727) (3.253) (1.574) (0.953) 
Immigrant Pop., log -0.043 -1.470** -0.543* -0.107 
 (0.343) (0.525) (0.291) (0.166) 
Regime Type 0.142* 0.036 0.058 -0.001 
 (0.074) (0.098) (0.074) (0.036) 
Excluded Pop., log -0.329 -0.197 0.345 0.073 
 (0.297) (0.409) (0.350) (0.211) 
Law Year 0.232 1.029 0.085 0.243 
 (0.773) (0.734) (0.329) (0.264) 
Election Year 2.279*** -0.229 -0.190 -0.321 
 (0.478) (0.400) (0.321) (0.230) 
Arable Land Size, log 0.432 0.515 -0.575 -0.275 
 (0.790) (0.968) (0.571) (0.314) 
Minor Conflict 1.439* 1.167* 1.332** 0.837** 
 (0.772) (0.687) (0.530) (0.280) 
War -0.975 2.453** 1.928** 1.762** 
 (0.917) (1.194) (0.817) (0.587) 
Election Violence  Fatalities    0.006 
    (0.006) 
Land Violence  Fatalities    0.006 
    (0.006) 
Inter-ethnic Violence  Fatalities    0.005** 
    (0.002) 
Observations 1020 1020 1020 1020 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.  





Table 11: Fatality Rates, Unweighted ACPI Scores and Lags 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 4.118** 1.905* 2.510** 0.793 
 (1.410) (1.093) (0.781) (0.499) 
Pop. Density, log 0.015 -0.230 0.464 0.190 
 (0.749) (0.787) (0.700) (0.280) 
GDP per capita 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.797 7.874** 5.376*** 1.245 
 (1.718) (2.939) (1.597) (0.994) 
Immigrant Pop., log 0.035 -1.674*** -0.716** -0.138 
 (0.364) (0.487) (0.311) (0.161) 
Regime Type 0.122* 0.016 0.019 -0.020 
 (0.074) (0.089) (0.070) (0.037) 
Excluded Pop., log -0.471 0.085 0.237 -0.032 
 (0.310) (0.365) (0.346) (0.199) 
Law Year 0.344 0.897 0.337 0.305 
 (0.711) (0.677) (0.326) (0.278) 
Election Year 2.042*** -0.034 -0.079 -0.357 
 (0.500) (0.375) (0.322) (0.223) 
Arable Land Size, log 0.521 0.195 -0.482 -0.230 
 (0.765) (0.844) (0.631) (0.327) 
Minor Conflict 1.337* 1.271* 1.251** 0.840** 
 (0.749) (0.659) (0.520) (0.279) 
War -0.942 2.214** 1.632** 1.627** 
 (0.948) (1.012) (0.735) (0.554) 
Election Violence  Fatalities    0.006 
    (0.006) 
Land Violence  Fatalities    0.006 
    (0.006) 
Inter-ethnic Violence  Fatalities    0.005** 
    (0.002) 
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.  





Table 12: Event Frequency, 2x-Weighted ACPI Scores 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 0.507 0.256 1.171** 0.198 
 (0.343) (0.404) (0.404) (0.139) 
Pop. Density, log 0.183 -0.253 -0.260 -0.200 
 (0.363) (0.410) (0.480) (0.165) 
GDP per capita 0.000* -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.065** 0.452 1.115 -0.149 
 (0.878) (1.218) (0.900) (0.503) 
Immigrant Pop., log -0.142 -0.598** -0.410** -0.009 
(0.171) (0.237) (0.202) (0.084) 
Regime Type 0.027 0.027 0.109** 0.034* 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.046) (0.021) 
Excluded Pop., log -0.076 -0.239 0.062 0.098 
(0.126) (0.213) (0.205) (0.081) 
Law Year 0.932** 1.383*** 0.835*** 0.147 
 (0.319) (0.297) (0.139) (0.147) 
Election Year 2.098*** -0.136 0.097 -0.282** 
 (0.142) (0.206) (0.128) (0.106) 
Arable Land Size, log 0.106 0.566 0.231 0.200 
 (0.353) (0.466) (0.450) (0.149) 
Minor Conflict 0.288 0.246 0.659** 0.291** 
 (0.343) (0.322) (0.268) (0.127) 
War -0.806 0.387 0.446 0.581*** 
 (0.688) (0.334) (0.402) (0.142) 
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency    0.099*** 
   (0.026) 
Land Violence Frequency    0.351*** 
   (0.068) 
Election Violence Frequency    0.176*** 
   (0.025) 
Observations 1020 1020 1020 1020 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters. 






Table 13: Event Frequency, 2x-Weighted ACPI Scores and Lags 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 0.506 0.324 1.151** 0.199 
 (0.346) (0.406) (0.400) (0.135) 
Pop. Density, logged and lagged 0.122 -0.373 -0.303 -0.247 
 (0.365) (0.410) (0.489) (0.157) 
GDP per capita, lagged 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged 2.141** 0.383 1.197 -0.087 
 (0.875) (1.232) (0.880) (0.489) 
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged -0.130 -0.618** -0.424** -0.016 
(0.169) (0.234) (0.199) (0.076) 
Regime Type, lagged 0.020 0.020 0.092** 0.020 
 (0.023) (0.034) (0.045) (0.020) 
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged -0.075 -0.156 0.039 0.080 
(0.120) (0.239) (0.208) (0.079) 
Law Year 0.983** 1.344*** 0.985*** 0.157 
 (0.314) (0.283) (0.167) (0.135) 
Election Year 2.116*** -0.086 0.221 -0.306** 
 (0.136) (0.215) (0.136) (0.100) 
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged 0.153 0.655 0.265 0.245* 
 (0.358) (0.461) (0.465) (0.146) 
Minor Conflict 0.303 0.303 0.647** 0.284** 
 (0.345) (0.335) (0.271) (0.124) 
War -0.833 0.433 0.443 0.504*** 
 (0.634) (0.300) (0.346) (0.140) 
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency    0.103*** 
   (0.027) 
Land Violence Frequency    0.340*** 
   (0.065) 
Election Violence Frequency    0.180*** 
   (0.025) 
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 




Table 14: Event Frequency, 3x-Weighted ACPI Scores 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 0.475 0.241 1.098** 0.185 
 (0.321) (0.377) (0.376) (0.131) 
Pop. Density, log 0.182 -0.253 -0.261 -0.200 
 (0.363) (0.410) (0.479) (0.165) 
GDP per capita 0.000* -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.063** 0.451 1.113 -0.150 
 (0.878) (1.218) (0.900) (0.504) 
Immigrant Pop., log -0.142 -0.598** -0.409** -0.008 
 (0.171) (0.237) (0.202) (0.084) 
Regime Type 0.027 0.027 0.109** 0.034* 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.046) (0.021) 
Excluded Pop., log -0.076 -0.239 0.062 0.098 
 (0.126) (0.213) (0.205) (0.081) 
Law Year 0.932** 1.383*** 0.834*** 0.147 
 (0.319) (0.297) (0.139) (0.147) 
Election Year 2.098*** -0.136 0.096 -0.282** 
 (0.142) (0.206) (0.128) (0.106) 
Arable Land Size, log 0.106 0.567 0.230 0.200 
 (0.353) (0.466) (0.449) (0.149) 
Minor Conflict 0.289 0.246 0.660** 0.291** 
 (0.343) (0.322) (0.267) (0.127) 
War -0.805 0.387 0.448 0.582*** 
 (0.688) (0.335) (0.403) (0.142) 
Election Violence  Fatalities    0.099*** 
    (0.026) 
Land Violence  Fatalities    0.351*** 
    (0.068) 
Inter-ethnic Violence  Fatalities    0.176*** 
    (0.025) 
Observations 1020 1020 1020 1020 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 




Table 15: Event Frequency, 3x-Weighted ACPI Scores and Lags 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 0.474 0.304 1.079** 0.186 
 (0.324) (0.380) (0.373) (0.127) 
Pop. Density, logged and lagged 0.121 -0.374 -0.303 -0.247 
 (0.365) (0.410) (0.488) (0.157) 
GDP per capita, lagged 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged 2.139** 0.382 1.195 -0.087 
 (0.876) (1.232) (0.880) (0.489) 
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged -0.129 -0.618** -0.424** -0.016 
(0.169) (0.234) (0.199) (0.076) 
Regime Type, lagged 0.020 0.020 0.092** 0.020 
 (0.023) (0.034) (0.045) (0.020) 
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged -0.074 -0.155 0.039 0.080 
(0.120) (0.239) (0.208) (0.079) 
Law Year 0.983** 1.343*** 0.984*** 0.157 
 (0.314) (0.284) (0.166) (0.135) 
Election Year 2.116*** -0.086 0.221 -0.307** 
 (0.136) (0.215) (0.136) (0.100) 
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged 0.153 0.655 0.264 0.245* 
 (0.358) (0.460) (0.464) (0.146) 
Minor Conflict 0.304 0.303 0.647** 0.284** 
 (0.345) (0.335) (0.271) (0.124) 
War -0.832 0.433 0.446 0.505*** 
 (0.634) (0.300) (0.347) (0.140) 
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency    0.103*** 
   (0.027) 
Land Violence Frequency    0.340*** 
   (0.065) 
Election Violence Frequency    0.180*** 
   (0.025) 
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 




Table 16: Fatality Rates, 2x-Weighted ACPI Scores 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 3.031** 1.612* 2.052*** 0.654* 
 (0.951) (0.896) (0.583) (0.351) 
Pop. Density, log 0.090 -0.390 0.552 0.237 
 (0.742) (0.985) (0.660) (0.277) 
GDP per capita 0.002* -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.685 6.740** 4.656** 1.252 
 (1.722) (3.248) (1.575) (0.954) 
Immigrant Pop., log -0.050 -1.473** -0.540* -0.107 
 (0.343) (0.523) (0.292) (0.166) 
Regime Type 0.140* 0.036 0.058 -0.002 
 (0.074) (0.097) (0.074) (0.036) 
Excluded Pop., log -0.331 -0.199 0.343 0.073 
 (0.298) (0.409) (0.351) (0.211) 
Law Year 0.217 1.027 0.084 0.241 
 (0.768) (0.732) (0.329) (0.264) 
Election Year 2.275*** -0.226 -0.190 -0.320 
 (0.479) (0.400) (0.321) (0.230) 
Arable Land Size, log 0.439 0.525 -0.573 -0.273 
 (0.793) (0.973) (0.572) (0.314) 
Minor Conflict 1.435* 1.172* 1.327** 0.837** 
 (0.771) (0.687) (0.530) (0.280) 
War -0.967 2.454** 1.914** 1.758** 
 (0.917) (1.191) (0.816) (0.586) 
Election Violence  Fatalities    0.006 
    (0.006) 
Land Violence  Fatalities    0.006 
    (0.006) 
Inter-ethnic Violence  Fatalities    0.005** 
    (0.002) 
Observations 1020 1020 1020 1020 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.  





Table 17: Fatality Rates, 2x-Weighted ACPI Scores and Lags 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 2.879** 1.347* 1.765** 0.557 
 (0.989) (0.773) (0.553) (0.351) 
Pop. Density, logged and lagged 0.008 -0.237 0.464 0.189 
 (0.751) (0.790) (0.702) (0.281) 
GDP per capita, lagged 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged 2.849* 7.863** 5.368*** 1.245 
 (1.718) (2.941) (1.599) (0.995) 
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged 0.029 -1.675*** -0.715** -0.138 
(0.366) (0.486) (0.311) (0.161) 
Regime Type, lagged 0.120 0.016 0.018 -0.021 
 (0.074) (0.089) (0.070) (0.037) 
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged -0.473 0.083 0.235 -0.032 
(0.312) (0.366) (0.347) (0.199) 
Law Year 0.329 0.896 0.336 0.304 
 (0.707) (0.676) (0.325) (0.278) 
Election Year 2.035*** -0.031 -0.079 -0.356 
 (0.501) (0.376) (0.322) (0.223) 
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged 0.527 0.203 -0.479 -0.229 
 (0.766) (0.850) (0.632) (0.327) 
Minor Conflict 1.331* 1.274* 1.246** 0.841** 
 (0.748) (0.659) (0.520) (0.279) 
War -0.938 2.214** 1.622** 1.624** 
 (0.949) (1.011) (0.735) (0.553) 
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency    0.005** 
   (0.002) 
Land Violence Frequency    0.006 
   (0.006) 
Election Violence Frequency    0.006 
   (0.006) 
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 





Table 18: Fatality Rates, 3x-Weighted ACPI Scores 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 2.850** 1.505* 1.918*** 0.613* 
 (0.890) (0.839) (0.542) (0.328) 
Pop. Density, log 0.090 -0.387 0.552 0.236 
 (0.741) (0.985) (0.658) (0.277) 
GDP per capita 0.002* -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.655 6.752** 4.661** 1.250 
 (1.724) (3.251) (1.574) (0.953) 
Immigrant Pop., log -0.044 -1.473** -0.542* -0.106 
 (0.343) (0.524) (0.292) (0.166) 
Regime Type 0.142* 0.036 0.058 -0.001 
 (0.074) (0.098) (0.074) (0.036) 
Excluded Pop., log -0.330 -0.198 0.344 0.074 
 (0.297) (0.409) (0.350) (0.211) 
Law Year 0.225 1.026 0.082 0.241 
 (0.770) (0.734) (0.329) (0.264) 
Election Year 2.275*** -0.227 -0.191 -0.320 
 (0.479) (0.401) (0.321) (0.230) 
Arable Land Size, log 0.438 0.520 -0.575 -0.273 
 (0.791) (0.972) (0.570) (0.314) 
Minor Conflict 1.436* 1.170* 1.332** 0.837** 
 (0.772) (0.688) (0.530) (0.280) 
War -0.964 2.455** 1.922** 1.761** 
 (0.917) (1.194) (0.815) (0.586) 
Election Violence  Fatalities    0.006 
    (0.006) 
Land Violence  Fatalities    0.006 
    (0.006) 
Inter-ethnic Violence  Fatalities    0.005** 
    (0.002) 
Observations 1020 1020 1020 1020 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.  





Table 19: Fatality Rates, 3x-Weighted ACPI Scores and Lags 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
 Elections Land Inter-ethnic Other 
     
ACPI Score, unweighted 2.708** 1.258* 1.652** 0.522 
 (0.927) (0.723) (0.514) (0.328) 
Pop. Density, logged and lagged 0.008 -0.235 0.464 0.189 
 (0.750) (0.789) (0.700) (0.281) 
GDP per capita, lagged 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged 2.818 7.875** 5.371*** 1.244 
 (1.718) (2.938) (1.598) (0.994) 
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged 0.034 -1.675*** -0.715** -0.137 
(0.366) (0.487) (0.311) (0.161) 
Regime Type, lagged 0.121* 0.016 0.018 -0.020 
 (0.074) (0.089) (0.070) (0.037) 
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged -0.472 0.085 0.236 -0.031 
(0.311) (0.365) (0.346) (0.199) 
Law Year 0.335 0.894 0.333 0.304 
 (0.709) (0.677) (0.326) (0.278) 
Election Year 2.036*** -0.032 -0.080 -0.356 
 (0.501) (0.376) (0.322) (0.223) 
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged 0.526 0.199 -0.481 -0.229 
 (0.765) (0.848) (0.630) (0.327) 
Minor Conflict 1.333* 1.273* 1.250** 0.840** 
 (0.749) (0.659) (0.520) (0.279) 
War -0.933 2.216** 1.628** 1.626** 
 (0.950) (1.012) (0.734) (0.554) 
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency    0.005** 
   (0.002) 
Land Violence Frequency    0.006 
   (0.006) 
Election Violence Frequency    0.006 
   (0.006) 
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022 
Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 






Table 20: Original Afrobarometer Questions 
Dependent Variable Questions 
 
AQ-26E 
Question: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please 
tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would 
you do this if you had the chance: Used force or violence for a political cause 
Value Labels: 0=No, would never do this, 1=No, but would do if had the chance, 2=Yes, once 
or twice, 3=Yes, several times, 4=Yes, often, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -
1=Missing 
Note: Author collapsed into binary variable  
 
AQ-54 
Question: During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming 
a victim of political intimidation or violence? 
Value Labels: 0=A lot, 1=Somewhat, 2=A little bit, 3=Not at all, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused 
to answer, -1=Missing 
Note: Author collapsed into binary variable 
 
Independent Variable Questions 
 
AQ-27 
Question: With regard to the most recent national election in [20xx], which statement is true for 
you? 
Value Labels: 0=You were not registered to vote, 1=You voted in the elections, 2=You decided 
not to vote, 3=You could not find the polling station, 4=You were prevented from voting, 5=You 
did not have time to vote, 6= You did not vote because you could not find your name in the 
voters‟ register, 7=Did not vote for some other reason, 8= You were too young to vote, 9=Don’t 
know/Can't remember, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing 
Note: Author collapsed into 3-category variable 
 
AQ-67A 
Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services 
from government? Or do you never try and get these services from government: An identity 
document, such as a birth certificate, driver’s license, passport or voter’s card? 
Value Labels: 1=Very difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very easy, 5=Never try, 9=Don’t 
know/Haven’t heard enough, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion 





Question: How often is [Respondent’s Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the government? 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always, 7=Not applicable, 9=Don’t know, 
997=Not asked, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing 
Note: Interviewer entered respondent ‟s exact response. If respondent did not identify any group 
on this question – that is, if they “Refused to answer” (9998), said “Don’t know” (9999), or 
“national ID only” (9990) – then the interviewer marked “Not applicable” for questions Q85A-
Q85B and continued to question 85C. 
Note: Not asked in Sudan, Author collapsed into 3-category variable 
 
AQ-86A  
Question: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the 
country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they 
are at least 18 years old: A person born in the country with one national and one non-national 
parent?  
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Don’t know, 997=Not asked, 998=Refused to answer, -
1=Missing  




Question: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the 
country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they 
are at least 18 years old: A person born in the country with two non-national parents?  
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Don’t know, 997=Not asked, 998=Refused to answer, -
1=Missing  




Question: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the 
country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they 
are at least 18 years old: The wife of a national man, even if she was born outside of the country?  
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Don’t know, 997=Not asked, 998=Refused to answer, -
1=Missing  
Note: Not asked in Sudan, Author merged with AQ-86A & B and collapsed into 3-category 
variable 
 
Control Variable Questions 
 
Interviewer’s gender  
Values: 1=Male, 2=Female, -1=Missing  
Note: Answered by interviewer 
 
AQ-1  
Question: How old are you?  
277 
 
Values: 18-100, 105, 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don’t know, -1=Missing 
 
AQ-84  
Question: Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group 
or tribe?  
Note: See Afrobarometer R5 codebook for value labels. 
AQ-105  
Question: What was the roof of the respondent’s home or shelter made of?  
Value Labels: 1= Metal, tin or zinc, 2= Tiles, 3= Shingles, 4= Thatch or grass, 5= Plastic sheets, 
6= Asbestos, 7=Multiple materials, 8=Some other material, 9=Could not tell/ could not see, 
10=Concrete, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
Note: Author collapsed into 5-category variable. 
 
AQ-117  
Question: Interviewer’s highest level of education  
Value Labels: 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary/high school, 5=High school 
completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from 
a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University, completed, 9=Post graduate, -
1=Missing  
Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable. 
 
AQ-98A  
Question: What is your religion, if any?  







Table 21: Descriptive statistics, Afrobarometer 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Years 45,589   2011 2013 
Country 45,589   1 29 
Census district 45,589   1 1523 
Document Access 45,589 1.190 0.891 0 2 
Difficult 23,247     
Easy 7,774     
Other 14,568     
Citizenship Rule Preferences 45589 0.496 0.612 0 2 
Exclusionary 2,840     
Inclusionary 16,950     
Other 25,799     
Voting Access 45,589 0.767 0.458 0 2 
Prevented 716     
Voted 33,531     
Other 11,342     
Ethnic Group Treatment 45,589 0.858 0.663 0 2 
Unfair 7,252     
Fair 24,613     
Other 13,724     
Fear of Violence 45,589 0.179 0.383 0 1 
Used Violence 45,589 0.031 0.172 0 1 
Age* 45,589 36.979 14.521 18 105 
Ethnicity* 45,589 531.382 443.964 1 2760 
Female 45,589 1.500 0.500 1 2 
Wealth 45,589 2.594 0.894 0 4 
Indeterminate 3,373     
Plastic Sheets 203     
Thatch/Grass 10,394     
Metal/Asbestos 29,216     
Tiles/Shingles 2,403     
Education 45,589 0.768 0.739 0 3 
Less than Primary  17,393     
Primary to High School 22,916     
Post- High School 3,726     
University or Higher 1,554     
Religion 45,589 1.285 0.633 0 4 
No response 2,601     
Christian 29,145     
Muslim 12,224     
Other Religion 1,482     
279 
 
Atheist/Agnostic 137     
* For these variables, I removed indeterminate, “don’t know” and “no response” categories 
in calculating the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. The number of 











0.Other Document Access -0.055 0.188 
 (0.103) (0.180) 
2.Difficult Document Access  0.221* 0.350** 
 (0.119) (0.163) 
0.Other Group Treatment 0.185 0.121 
 (0.146) (0.194) 
2.Unfair Group Treatment 0.693*** 1.044*** 
 (0.175) (0.237) 
0.Other Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment  0.037 0.102 
 (0.161) (0.261) 
0.Other Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment -0.246 -0.181 
 (0.163) (0.207) 
2.Difficult Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment -0.035 -0.053 
 (0.166) (0.203) 
2.Difficult Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment -0.158 -0.672** 
 (0.189) (0.250) 
0.Other Citizenship Rules -0.012 0.159 
 (0.050) (0.136) 
2.Exclusionary Citizenship Rules 0.055 0.437* 
 (0.106) (0.240) 
0. Other Voting Rights 0.092** 0.005 
 (0.042) (0.111) 
2. Prevented Voting Rights 0.027 0.461** 
 (0.102) (0.184) 
Age -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnicity 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban/Rural Residence -0.089 0.152 
 (0.058) (0.094) 
Income Level 0.033 -0.074 
 (0.034) (0.055) 
Female 0.264*** -0.288*** 
 (0.035) (0.045) 
Education Level -0.093** -0.037 
 (0.030) (0.060) 
1.Christian -0.030 0.025 
 (0.082) (0.151) 
2.Muslim 0.070 0.141 
 (0.162) (0.163) 
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3.Other Religion -0.140 -0.307 
 (0.184) (0.318) 
4.Atheist/Agnostic -0.528** -0.729 
 (0.259) (0.957) 
District -0.002 -0.029 
 (0.014) (0.020) 
Observations 45589 45589 












0.Other Document Access -0.050 0.197 
 (0.103) (0.181) 
2.Difficult Document Access  0.093 0.350* 
 (0.105) (0.179) 
3.Very Difficult Document Access 0.407** 0.358** 
 (0.137) (0.181) 
0.Other Group Treatment 0.198 0.133 
 (0.148) (0.201) 
2.Unfair Group Treatment 0.650*** 1.012*** 
 (0.177) (0.246) 
0.Other Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment  0.025 0.095 
 (0.162) (0.261) 
0.Other Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment -0.233 -0.172 
 (0.162) (0.210) 
2.Difficult Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment 0.047 0.021 
 (0.164) (0.290) 
2.Difficult Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment -0.207 -0.516* 
 (0.167) (0.307) 
3.Very Difficult Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment -0.159 -0.197 
 (0.195) (0.197) 
3.Very Difficult Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment -0.125 -0.853*** 
 (0.234) (0.244) 
0.Other Citizenship Rules -0.012 0.161 
 (0.049) (0.137) 
2.Exclusionary Citizenship Rules 0.044 0.436* 
 (0.103) (0.241) 
0. Other Voting Rights 0.090** 0.004 
 (0.041) (0.109) 
2. Prevented Voting Rights 0.022 0.459** 
 (0.101) (0.184) 
Age -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnicity 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban/Rural Residence -0.096* 0.158* 
 (0.058) (0.091) 
Income Level 0.037 -0.069 
 (0.033) (0.057) 
Female 0.266*** -0.291*** 
 (0.035) (0.045) 
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Education Level -0.085** -0.034 
 (0.031) (0.059) 
1.Christian -0.026 0.025 
 (0.080) (0.150) 
2.Muslim 0.065 0.139 
 (0.161) (0.160) 
3.Other Religion -0.141 -0.323 
 (0.180) (0.314) 
4.Atheist/Agnostic -0.507** -0.728 
 (0.258) (0.958) 
District -0.002 -0.029 
 (0.014) (0.020) 
Observations 45589 45589 








Table 24: Original Field Survey Questions 
Dependent Variable Questions 
 
FS-11 
Question: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?   
Values: 3= It is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause, 2= The 
use of violence is never justified in politics, 1=Agree with neither, 99=Don’t know, 
77=Refused to answer 
Note: Author collapsed into binary variable 
 
Independent Variable Questions 
 
FS-8 
Question: Let’s suppose that you had to choose between being a Ghanaian and being a 
[Group from Q5]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings? 
Values: 5=Only national identification, 4=More national identification, 3= Equal 
attachment to ethnic and national identity, 2=more ethnic identification, 1=only ethnic 
identification, 99=Don’t know, 77=Refused to answer  
Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable 
 
FS-9 
Question: In your community, who receives goods and services from the government? 
Values: 3= Everyone, 2= Only people who helped get the ruling party elected, 1= Only 
members of the ruling party’s ethnic group, 99=Don’t know, 77=Refused to answer 
Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable 
 
FS-10 
Question: If you disagree with something the government is doing and one of the 
following individuals [A leader of the political party that you support, Local government 
officials, Religious, or traditional leaders] calls on you to join them and their supporters 
in working to solve the problem, how likely are you to agree? 
Values: 3=Very likely, 2=Likely, 1=Not at all likely, 99=Don’t know, 77=Refused to 
answer 
Note: Author collapsed into 3-category variable 
 
Control Variable Questions 
 
Interviewer’s gender  
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Value Labels: 1=Male, 2=Female, -1=Missing  
Note: Answered by interviewer 
 
FS-1 
Question: How old are you?  
Values: 18-84, 777=Refused to answer, 999=Don’t know 
 
FS-4 
Question: Which language do you speak at home? That is, the language of your group 
of origin. 
Values: Abbey, Abidji, Aboure, Abron, Adjoukrou, Agni, Ahanta, Ahizi, Akan, 
Alladjan, Appolo, Attie, Avikam, Bakoue, Bambara, Baoule, Bete, Boussanga/Burkina, 
Bulsa, Dagaare, Dagaati, Dagbani, Dagomba, Dida, Djimini, Dogo, Ebrie, Ehotile, 
English, Ewe, Fafara, Fanti, Francais, Ga/Dangbe, Gagou, Gnamboua, Godie, Gonja, 
Gouro, Guan, Guere, Hausa, Kotokoli, Koulango, Koyaka, Krobo, Kroumen, Kusasi, 
Lobi, M'Batta, Malinke/Dioula, Mamprusi, Mole/Burkina, More, Mossi/Burkina, 
N'Gbato, Narie, Neo, Ningo, Nzema, Odienneka, Senoufo, Sisaala, Siya, Toura, Wobe, 
Yacouba, Yorey, Other [Specify]. 
 
FS-6 
Question: Think about the present condition of [Group from Q4]. How would you rate 
the political influence of [Group from Q4] compared to other ethnic groups in the 
country? 
Values: 5=Much Better, 4=Better, 3=Same, 2=Worse, 1=Much worse, 99=Don’t know, 
77=Refused to answer  
Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable 
 
FS-18 
Question: Interviewer’s highest level of education  
Value Labels: 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only, 2=Some primary 
school, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary/high school, 5=High school 
completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications other than university e.g. a diploma or 
degree from a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University, completed, 
9=Post graduate, 99=Don’t know, 77=Refused to answer  
Note: Author collapsed into 5-category variable 
 
FS-19 
Question: What is your religion, if any? 
Values: Christianity, Islam, Traditional/ethnic religion, Atheist (don’t believe in God), 
Agnostic (don’t know if there is a God), Other (Specify), Don’t know, Refused to answer 






Question: What is your occupation?  Please only specify the main one 
Values: Open-ended 





Question: Now I’m going to give you some information about aid distribution and then 
I’ll ask for your opinion. An aid organization has given a community leader a little 
money by to buy grain for families in the community. He only has enough money to buy 
grain for 50 households even though most families in the community need the grain. 
[Read T1, T2, or C]. Is this an acceptable way to distribute the grain? 
T1: He decides to give grain to members of his ethnic group (family/cultural group) 
only. 
T2: He decides to make sure that at least one household from each ethnic group 
(tribe, cultural group) in the community gets some grain. 
C: He decides to give grain to 50 households at random.  






Table 25: Descriptive Statistics, Field Surveys 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Percent 
Support for violence 841 0.203 0.403 0 1  
Follow political party leader 841 1.503 0.576 0 2  
Other (political party) 34     4.04 
Unlikely to follow (political party) 350     41.62 
Likely to follow (political party) 247     29.37 
Very likely to follow (political party)† † 210     24.97 
Follow government official 841 1.476 0.575 0 2  
Other (government official) 34     4.04 
Unlikely to follow (government official) 373     44.35 
Likely to follow (government official) 249     29.61 
Very likely to follow (government 
official)† † 185     22.00 
Follow traditional leader 841 1.595 0.551 0 2  
Other (follow traditional leader) 26     3.09 
Unlikely to follow (traditional leader) 289     34.36 
Likely to follow (traditional leader) 275     32.70 
Very likely to follow (traditional leader)† † 251     29.85 
Group political conditions 839 7.422 18.188 1 99  
Much Worse (political conditions)† † 72     8.58 
Worse (political conditions) 160     19.07 
Same (political conditions) 333     39.69 
Better (political conditions) 166     19.79 
Much Better (political conditions)† † 60     7.15 
Other (political conditions) 48     5.72 
Resource distribution 841 1.870 1.147 0 3  
Other (resource distribution) 140     16.65 




Client bias 142     16.88 
No bias 365     43.4 
Ethnic/National identification 841 1.979 0.848 0 3  
Other (identification) 39     4.64 
Only ethnic (identification)† † 63     7.49 
More ethnic (identification)  53     6.30 
Equal (identification) 499     59.33 
More national (identification) 58     6.90 
Only national (identification)† † 143     17.00 
Education 841 2.232 0.839 0 4  
Other (education) 3     0.36 
Primary school or less 130     15.46 
High school or less 459     54.58 
Some post-H.S. 167     19.86 
University or Graduate school 82     9.75 
Religion 841 1.837 0.684 0 4  
Other (religion) 30     3.57 
Islam 165     19.62 
Christianity 579     68.85 
Traditional or Other religion 46     5.47 
Atheist or Agnostic 21     2.5 
Employed 841 1.496 0.559 0 2  
Other (employed) 26     3.09 
No 372     44.23 
Yes 443     52.68 
Sex 840 0.607 3.435 0 99  
Men 428     50.95 
Women 411     48.93 
No response (sex) 1     0.12 




No response (age) 10     1.19 
Language 841 11.541 9.371 0 30  
Locality 841 19.794 9.539 1 32  






Table 26: Predicting Support for Violence, Main Model 
 Ghana Côte d’Ivoire 
 (1e) (2e) (3e) (4e) (5e) (6e) 
Unlikely to follow political party 0.000   0.000   
 (.)   (.)   
Likely to follow political party 0.597**   1.201***   
 (0.263)   (0.237)   
Other (follow political party) 0.000   0.000   
 (.)   (.)   
Unlikely to follow traditional leader  0.000   0.000  
  (.)   (.)  
Likely to follow traditional leader  0.371   0.645***  
  (0.277)   (0.191)  
Other (follow traditional leader)  -0.208   0.000  
  (1.199)   (.)  
Unlikely to follow gov't official   0.000   0.000 
   (.)   (.) 
Likely to follow gov't official   0.255   0.581** 
   (0.285)   (0.207) 
Other (follow gov't official)   0.000   -0.579 
   (.)   (0.396) 
Worse political conditions -0.669** -0.631* -0.569* -0.583 -0.472 -0.514 
 (0.322) (0.329) (0.319) (0.493) (0.502) (0.513) 
Similar political conditions 0.124 0.105 0.170 0.356 0.401 0.347 
 (0.290) (0.287) (0.279) (0.393) (0.323) (0.358) 
Better political conditions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Other (political conditions) 0.978** 0.877** 0.850** 1.128** 0.911** 0.609 
 (0.424) (0.383) (0.395) (0.469) (0.427) (0.443) 




 (0.545) (0.507) (0.497) (0.261) (0.256) (0.259) 
Client bias 1.223** 1.108** 1.086** 0.491 0.567* 0.588* 
 (0.431) (0.375) (0.402) (0.357) (0.313) (0.323) 
No bias 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Other (bias) 0.978** 0.877** 0.850** 1.128** 0.911** 0.609 
 (0.424) (0.383) (0.395) (0.469) (0.427) (0.443) 
More/Only ethnic identification 0.600 0.488 0.513 0.487** 0.375* 0.372* 
 (0.453) (0.453) (0.441) (0.202) (0.215) (0.193) 
Equal identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
More/Only national identification 0.228 0.210 0.199 0.733** 0.668* 0.657* 
 (0.326) (0.316) (0.310) (0.356) (0.380) (0.362) 
Other (identification) 0.099 0.010 0.111 -0.819 -0.772 -0.891 
 (0.843) (0.862) (0.812) (0.633) (0.652) (0.617) 
Education Level -0.267* -0.281** -0.280** -0.006 0.005 0.030 
 (0.141) (0.134) (0.131) (0.181) (0.186) (0.180) 
Religion -0.175 -0.195 -0.173 -0.112 -0.093 -0.136 
 (0.239) (0.248) (0.243) (0.186) (0.161) (0.171) 
Employed -0.113 -0.050 -0.072 0.007 0.052 0.093 
 (0.318) (0.319) (0.318) (0.176) (0.156) (0.197) 
Men 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Women 0.137 0.146 0.155 -0.554** -0.546** -0.550** 
 (0.267) (0.271) (0.268) (0.253) (0.215) (0.212) 
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ethnicity -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 0.064** 0.061** 0.065** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
RDR stronghold    -0.714** -0.633** -0.619** 
    (0.261) (0.299) (0.292) 




 (1.000) (0.938) (0.902) (0.958) (0.835) (0.959) 
Observations 426 438 427 374 379 395 








Table 27: Predicting Support for Violence, Grievance-Robust Model 
 Ghana Côte d’Ivoire 
 (1f) (2f) (3f) (4f) (5f) (6f) 
Unlikely to follow political party 0.000   0.000   
 (.)   (.)   
Likely to follow political party 0.610**   1.214***   
 (0.266)   (0.199)   
Other response (political party) 0.000   0.000   
 (.)   (.)   
Unlikely to follow traditional leader  0.000   0.572**  
  (.)   (0.190)  
Likely to follow traditional leader  0.411   0.000  
  (0.284)   (.)  
Other response (traditional leader)  -0.241   -0.684*  
  (1.192)   (0.399)  
Unlikely to follow gov't official   0.000   0.000 
   (.)   (.) 
Likely to follow gov't official   0.272   0.682*** 
   (0.291)   (0.171) 
Other response (gov't official)   0.000   0.000 
   (.)   (.) 
Much worse political conditions -1.102 -1.161 -1.070 -0.871 -1.016** -0.986** 
 (0.736) (0.730) (0.717) (0.532) (0.466) (0.472) 
Worse political conditions -0.640* -0.587 -0.512 -1.060* -0.937 -0.967 
 (0.371) (0.391) (0.380) (0.618) (0.588) (0.617) 
Similar political conditions 0.044 0.011 0.097 -0.035 -0.061 -0.094 
 (0.303) (0.305) (0.291) (0.395) (0.320) (0.344) 
Better political conditions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 




 (0.569) (0.562) (0.562) (0.599) (0.649) (0.636) 
Don’t know (political) -0.561 -0.552 -0.564 0.366 0.102 -0.073 
 (0.795) (0.799) (0.799) (1.159) (1.038) (1.001) 
No response (political) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.387 -1.007 -1.198 
 (.) (.) (.) (0.991) (1.226) (1.105) 
Ethnic bias 0.658 0.581 0.576 1.243*** 1.136*** 1.216*** 
 (0.559) (0.530) (0.515) (0.284) (0.267) (0.267) 
Client bias 1.221** 1.117** 1.082** 0.531 0.619* 0.649* 
 (0.432) (0.380) (0.402) (0.371) (0.349) (0.335) 
No bias 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Other response (bias) 0.965** 0.877** 0.842** 1.263** 1.067** 0.746* 
 (0.419) (0.380) (0.389) (0.442) (0.363) (0.419) 
More/Only ethnic identification 0.631 0.528 0.552 0.488** 0.395* 0.376* 
 (0.440) (0.439) (0.426) (0.230) (0.226) (0.204) 
Equal identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
More/Only national identification 0.242 0.227 0.213 0.616* 0.548 0.532 
 (0.325) (0.318) (0.312) (0.366) (0.393) (0.367) 
Other response (identification) -0.264* -0.277* -0.279** 0.020 0.032 0.052 
 (0.146) (0.141) (0.140) (0.169) (0.167) (0.161) 
Education Level -0.182 -0.206 -0.182 -0.095 -0.085 -0.139 
 (0.245) (0.255) (0.248) (0.184) (0.161) (0.171) 
Religion -0.117 -0.061 -0.083 -0.001 0.060 0.099 
 (0.320) (0.322) (0.322) (0.208) (0.188) (0.224) 
Employed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Men 0.136 0.144 0.156 -0.532** -0.551** -0.557** 
 (0.272) (0.279) (0.276) (0.222) (0.205) (0.201) 
Women 0.631 0.528 0.552 0.488** 0.395* 0.376* 
 (0.440) (0.439) (0.426) (0.230) (0.226) (0.204) 




 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ethnicity -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 0.070** 0.066** 0.070** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) 
RDR stronghold    -0.639** -0.575** -0.561** 
    (0.257) (0.285) (0.275) 
Constant -1.722* -1.602 -1.432 -2.649** -2.412** -2.354** 
 (1.040) (0.993) (0.950) (0.949) (0.802) (0.958) 
Observations 425 437 426 372 377 393 




Table 28: Africa’s Nationality Laws 
Country Year Law Name 
Angola 1975 The Constitution of the People's Republic of Angola [10 
November 1975] 
 1984 Law No. 8/84 of 7 February 
 1991 Law No. 13/1991 of 11 May 1991, Nationality Law 
 2005 Law No. 1/05 of July 1 (National Assembly) 
 2007 Decree No. 31/07 of 14 of May, Birth Registration [14 May 
2007] 
 2010 Constitution of the Republic of Angola [21 January 2010] 
Benin 1965 Law No. 65-17 of 23/06/65 containing the Code of 
Dahomean Nationality  
1972 Decree No. 72-62 of 15 March 1972 
Botswana 1966 Constitution of Botswana [30 September 1966] 
 1966 The Citizenship of Botswana (Supplementary Provisions) 
Law, 1966 [14 September 1966] 
 1969 The Citizenship 30 June Act, 1969 
 1982 Citizenship Act, 1982 (Act No. 25 of 1982) 
 1982 Amendment Act No. 32 of 1982. 
 1984 Citizenship (Amendment), 1984 (Act No. 17 of 1984) 
 1995 Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1995 (No. 14 of 1995) 
 1998 Citizenship Act, 1998 (No. 8 of 1998) 
 2002 Citizenship Act, 2002 (No. 9 of 2002) 
 2004 Citizenship Act, 2004 (No. 1 of 2004) 
Burkina Faso 1961 Law No.50-61-AN of 1 December 1961 pertaining to the 
adoption of a Code of Voltaic nationality  
1989 Law ANVII-13 of 16 November 1989 pertaining to the 
institution and application of the Code of individuals and of 
the family 
Burundi 1971 Decree No. 1/93 of 10 August 1971 pertaining to the 
Nationality Code 
 2000 Law No. 1-013 of 18 July 2000 pertaining to the reform of 
the Nationality Code 
 2003 Decree No. 100/156 of 14 October 2003 pertaining to the 
practical methods of acquiring Burundian nationality by 
acquisition 
 2005 Law No. 1/010 of 18 March 2005 pertaining to the 
promulgation of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi 
Cameroon 1959 Ordonnance No. 59-66 of 26 November 1959 pertaining to 
the Cameroonian Nationality Code 
 1968 Law No. 1968-LF-3 of 11 June 1968 pertaining to the 




 1968 Decree n° 1968 DF-478 of the 16th December 1968 to 




1966 Ordonnance No. 1966/64 of 30 August 1966 modifying Law 
No. 61-212 of 27 May 1961 pertaining to the Central 
African Nationality Code 
1995 1995 Constitution 
Chad 1961 Law No. 31-60 of 27 February 1961 pertaining to the 
Chadian Nationality Code 
Chad 1961 Decree No.16/PG of 28 septembre 1961 regarding the 
Chadian Nationality Code. 
Chad 1962 Ordonnance No. 33/PG-INT of 14 August 1962 pertaining 
to the Chadian Nationality Code 
Chad 1963 Decree No.211-PG.-INT of 6 November 1963 pertaining to 
the application of the Chadian Nationality Code. 
Chad 2007 Birth Act of 2007, No. 
148/PR/PM/MISP/SE/SG/DAPEC/2007, 30 April 2007 
Republic of 
Congo 
1961 Law No. 35-61 of 20 June 1961 pertaining to the Congolese 
Nationality Code\ 
1961 Decree No. 61-178 of 29 July 1961 determining methods for 
applying the Nationality Code 
 1961 Circulaire n° 747 du 31 juillet 1961, Déclarations en vue de 
décliner, de répudier et renoncer a répudier la nationalité 
congolaise par application du Code de la nationalité et du 
Décret n° 78 du 29 juillet 1961 
 1993 Loi No. 2-93 du 30 septembre 1993 modifiant l’article 30 de 
la loi No. 35-61 du 20 juin 1961. 
Côte d'Ivoire 1961 Loi n° 61-415 du 14 décembre 1961 portant code de la 
nationalité ivoirienne 
 1964 Loi No.64-381 du 7 octobre 1964 
 1972 Loi No.72-852 du 21 Décembre 1972. 
 2000 Constitution ivoirienne du 23 juillet 2000 
 2004 Loi No.2004-662 du 17 décembre 2004 
 2004 Loi portant dispositions spéciales en matière de 
naturalisation [Côte d'Ivoire], No. 2004-663, 17 December 
2004 
 2005 Décision n° 2005-03/PR du 15 juillet 2005 relative au code 
de la nationalité [Côte d'Ivoire], 2005-03/PR, 15 July 2005 
 2005 Décision n° 2005-04/PR du 15 juillet 2005, portant 
dispositions spéciales en matière de naturalisation [Côte 
d'Ivoire], 2005-04/PR, 15 July 2005 
 2005 Décision n° 2005-09/PR du 29 août 2005 relative au code de 





 2005 Décision n° 2005-10/PR du 29 août 2005 relative aux 
dispositions spéciales en matière de naturalisation [Côte 
d'Ivoire], N° 2005-10/PR, 29 August 2005 
 2006 Communique du conseil des ministres du 31 mai 2006 [Côte 
d'Ivoire], 31 May 2006 
 2013 Projet de loi portant dispositions particulières en matière 
d'acqusition de la nationalité par déclaration [Côte d'Ivoire], 
6 June 2013, 
 2013 Projet de loi n° du portant modification des articles 12, 13, 
14 et 16 de la loi n° 61 - 415 du 14 decembre 1961 portant 
code de la nationalite telle que modifiee par les lois n° 72 - 
852 du 21 decembre 1972 et n° 2004- 662 du 17 decembre 
2004 et les decisions 2005-03/PR du 15 julillet 2005 et n° 
2005-09/PR du 29 août 2005 [Côte d'Ivoire], 6 June 2013 
 2013 Loi No.2013-653 du 13 septembre 2013 portant dispositions 
particulières en matière d'acquisition de la nationalité par 
déclaration 
 2013 Loi No.2013-654 du 13 septembre 2013 portant 
modification des articles 12, 13, 14 et 16 de la Loi n°61-415 
du 14 décembre 1961 portant Code de la nationalité 
 2014 Côte d'Ivoire: Arrêté interministériel N° 003/ 
MJDHLP/MEMIS du 2014 fixant la période de souscription 
et de traitement des demandes d'acquistion de la nationalité 
ivoirienne par déclaration [Côte d'Ivoire], 27 March 2014 
 2014 Côte d'Ivoire: Circulaire interministérielle no. 06 
MJDHLP/MEMIS du 2014, mise en oeuvre de la Loi no. 
2013-653 du 13 septembre 2013 portant dispositions 
particulières en matière d'acquisition de la nationalité 




1964 Constitution of 1 August 1964 
1965 Decree-Law (décret-loi) of 18 September 1965 
1972 Loi No. 1972-002 du 5 janvier 1972 relative à la nationalité 
zaïroise 
 1981 Loi No. 1981-002 du 29 juin 1981 relative à la nationalité 
zaïroise 
 1994 Acte Constitutionnel de la transition du 9 Avril 1994 
 1997 Décret-loi constitutionnel No. 003 du 27 mai 1997 relatif à 
l’organisation et l’exercice du pouvoir en République 
Démocratique du Congo 
 1999 Décret-loi no. 197 du 29 janvier 1999 
 2003 Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo 
 2004 Loi No. 04-024 du 12 novembre 2004 relative à la 
nationalité congolaise 





DRC 2006 Arrêté ministériel n° 261/CAB/MIN/J/2006 du 04 juillet 
2006 portant certaines mesures d'exécution de la Loi n° 
04/024 du 12 novembre 2004 relative à la nationalité 
congolaise [Democratic Republic of the Congo], No. 
261/CAB/MIN/J/2006, 4 July 2006 
DRC 2011 Constitution de la République Démocratique Du Congo, 
2011 
Eritrea 1992 Eritrean Nationality Proclamation (No. 21/1992), 6 April 
1992  
1997 Constitution of Eritrea [Eritrea], 23 May 1997 
Ethiopia 1930 Ethiopian Nationality Law of 1930, 22 July 1930 
 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, 21 August 1995 
 2002 Proclamation No. 270/2002 concerning the rights of foreign 
nationals of Ethiopian origin 
 2003 Proclamation on Ethiopian Nationality, No. 378 of 2003 
[Ethiopia], 378/2003, 23 December 2003 
 2004 Directive Issued to Determine the Residence Status of 
Eritrean Nationals Residing in Ethiopia [], January 2004 
G-Bissau 1976 Lei da nacionalidade No.1/76 de 4 de maio 
 1984 Lei da nacionalidade No. 1/84 de 15 de fevereiro 
 1984 Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau [Guinea-
Bissau], 1984 
 1992 Lei da nacionalidade No.2/92 de 6 de abril 
 2010 Lei da nacionalidade No.6/2010 de 21 de junho 
Gabon 1962 Décret no. 58/PR du 2 mars 1962 déterminant les modalités 
d'application du Code de la Nationalité Gabonaise [Gabon], 
58/PR, 15 March 1962  
1998 Gabon: Loi n°37-1998, Code de la nationalité [Gabon] 
Gambia 1965 Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia, 1965 
 1965 Gambia Nationality and Citizenship Act, Cap 82, 18 
February 1965 
 1970 No. 1 of 1970 [The Gambia], 24 April, 1970 
 1997 Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia, 1997 
[Gambia], 16 January 1997 
Ghana 1957 Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council 1957/277 
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